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Abstract 
 
Prior research provides evidence on how manager attributes affect characteristics of 
management earnings forecasts and how firm characteristics affect market participants’ 
perception of the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Using a manager-firm matched 
panel dataset, this thesis examines whether the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts, as measured by investors’ and analysts’ responses to management earnings forecasts 
news, are influenced by: (1) the forecasting track records of individual managers, and (2) 
manager attributes. The results indicate that, overall, investors’ responses to management 
earnings forecasts vary with the firms’ forecasting track records but not with the forecasting 
track records of individual managers or with manager attributes. The results indicate that 
analysts’ responses to management earnings forecasts are positively associated with managers’ 
individual forecasting track records. Results also indicate that analysts react less strongly to 
management earnings forecasts issued by CEOs with CFO experience, and react more strongly 
to management earnings forecasts issued by managers who are also the chairperson. Overall, 
the results suggest that analysts, being more sophisticated users, consider both manager- and 
firm-specific characteristics in their assessments of management earnings forecasts. This thesis 
contributes to the literature by providing a more comprehensive understanding of whether 
manager-specific forecasting track records and manager attributes matter to investors and 
analysts. The findings reported in this thesis may help to inform the communicators (firms and 
managers) of management earnings forecasts about what matters to users, which may help 
them vary their forecasting behaviours. Results may also help inform boards of directors about 
what matters to users of management earnings forecasts and help the board better monitor 
managers in this regard, and, inform observers such as regulators and commentators in 
providing signals about what matters to users in terms managers’ forecasting behaviours and 
attributes. 
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CHAPTER 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Manager-provided earnings forecasts (hereafter ‘management earnings forecasts’), typically 
issued on a per share basis, are an important source of forward-looking market information that 
market participants consider when predicting firm’s future earnings (Graham et al., 2005).1 
Between 2009-2014, approximately half of the S&P 1,500 issued at least one management 
earnings forecast. Like with all communications, it is reasonable to expect that the credibility 
of both the source (firm and manager) and the content of the management earnings forecast 
(forecast characteristics) are considered by market participants. The literature on the credibility 
of management earnings forecasts has considered the content of the forecast, but has only 
largely examined the firm as a source. We have a limited knowledge of whether the manager 
matters as a source. The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the manager matters to 
users of management earnings forecasts. In particular, this thesis examines whether investors’ 
and analysts’ reactions to management earnings forecasts are conditioned by manager-specific 
prior forecast performance and manager attributes. 
 
In their 2014 survey on earnings guidance practices of U.S. companies, the National Investor 
Relations Institute (NIRI) found that executives’ two most commonly cited reasons for issuing 
management earnings forecasts were: (1) to manage earnings expectations of market 
participants, and (2) to increase transparency (NIRI, 2014).  This is consistent with findings of 
                                               
1 This excludes earnings preannouncements (warnings) that are provided on or after the accounting fiscal period 
has ended but before earnings are announced. Management earnings forecasts are also referred to as management 
forecasts and earnings guidance. 
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academic studies that have found that management earnings forecasts can reduce information 
asymmetry (e.g., Coller and Yohn, 1997, Billings et al., 2015), and provide substantial new 
information to investors (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007, Ball and Shivakumar, 2008, Beyer et al., 
2010) and analysts (e.g., Waymire, 1986, Cotter et al., 2006), who often revise their forecasts 
within a few days of the management earnings forecast. 
 
Management earnings forecasts can be short-term (twelve months ahead or less) and long-term 
(more than twelve months) forecasts of earnings. The forecasts can be in the form of point 
estimates (e.g. “about $0.10”), range estimates (e.g. “between $0.10 and $0.12”), open-ended 
estimates (e.g. “at least $0.10”), or qualitative statements (e.g. “may be below expectations”) 
about the future performance of the company. Short-term point and range management 
earnings forecasts are the most common form of management earnings forecasts. 
 
Despite the widespread practice of issuing management earnings forecasts and, evidence that 
they are informative, there are conflicting views regarding the issuance of management 
earnings forecasts. Proponents argue that: (1) more information is useful to market participants 
as it leads to less uncertainty (Janjigian, 2003); and (2) management earnings forecasts are 
especially useful for correcting market expectations for smaller companies that do not have 
much analyst coverage (Venkataraman, 2006, Johnson, 2007). Critics contend that issuance of 
management earnings forecasts can encourage managers to emphasise short-term goals at the 
expense of long-term goals; this view has been expressed by researchers (e.g., Fuller and 
Jensen, 2002, Morgan, 2003), regulators (e.g., Levitt, 2000), lobbyists (e.g., U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, 2007), non-profit organisations (e.g., The Aspen Institute, 2016), the media (e.g., 
Zuckerman, 2005, Plitch, 2006) and managers (e.g., Sorkin, 2016). The managers of some 
firms, such as Google  and Berkshire Hathaway, have expressed similar concerns and have 
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adopted strong stances against the provision of management earnings forecasts (e.g. Page, 
2004, Belvedere, 2016). Other concerns are focussed on the credibility of management 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Miller, 2009). 
 
While the purported motivations of managers when issuing management earnings forecasts 
seem defensible and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts can be verified when 
earnings are announced, managers’ assertions in earnings guidance statements may not always 
be reliable. In the U.S., the issuance of management earnings forecasts is voluntary, the 
forecasts are unaudited and the Private Securities Litigation Reform (PSLR) Act 1995 safe 
harbor provisions shelter managers from litigation with respect to unattained projections when 
forecasts are provided in ‘good faith’.2 These circumstances suggest that, because management 
earnings forecasts are unverifiable at the time of announcement, and managers have significant 
discretion regarding forecast attributes such as forecast precision, there is scope for 
opportunistic bias in management earnings forecasts. For example, a media report about Eli 
Lilly and Company, reports that: “But analysts also noted that Lilly tends to lowball its 
guidance, and its 2015 results beat forecasts” (Staton, 2016).3 Prior studies also provide 
evidence that managers have incentives to use management earnings forecasts strategically for 
self-serving purposes; for example, before: (1) raising external finance (Frankel et al., 1995) 
and seasoned equity offerings (Feng and Koch, 2010, Kim, 2016), (2) management buyouts 
(Hafzalla, 2009), (3) insider purchases and sales (Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Rogers, 2008, 
Cheng et al., 2013), and (4) stock option awards (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000), and in order to 
avoid missing analyst forecasts (Matsumoto, 2002, Cotter et al., 2006, Christensen et al., 2011).  
 
                                               
2 See Section 102 of the PSLR Act 1995. 
3 http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/lilly-ceo-lechleiter-nabs-16-6m-2015-pay  
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While it is generally accepted that management earnings forecasts must convey news for there 
to be a market reaction (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008), the extent to which market participants 
adjust their expectations in response to the news in the management earnings forecasts will be 
conditioned by the perceived reliability of the forecast (Jennings, 1987). Social psychology 
research argues that message credibility depends on both the message content and the source 
of the message (Hovland et al., 1953). This is reflected in the earnings forecast literature, which 
indicates that the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts, as measured by stock 
market reaction and analyst reaction to the management earnings forecast news, varies with 
firm forecast-specific (message-specific) and other firm-specific characteristics (dimensions of 
the source).4 Firm forecast-specific characteristics associated with the perceived credibility of 
management earnings forecasts include prior forecast accuracy (Hutton and Stocken, 2007), 
forecast consistency (Hilary et al., 2014), forecast specificity (Bamber and Cheon, 1998), 
forecast disaggregation (Lansford et al., 2013), forecast attributions (Chen et al., 2016), and 
forecast news (Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2013). Other firm-specific characteristics associated 
with the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts include financial distress 
(Koch, 2002), litigation risk (Ng et al., 2013) and ownership structure (Ajinkya et al., 2005). 
 
The general body of research on firm-specific characteristics accords with the proposition that 
message source matters. However, these studies have focussed on firm characteristics, but do 
not consider the influence of individual managers who are responsible for developing the 
earnings forecasts and who communicate the forecasts to the market. 5 This incomplete view of 
source credibility is surprising given the anecdotal evidence that analysts and investors 
                                               
4 Hirst et al. (2008) review message and firm characteristics and their effect on market responses to management 
earnings forecasts. I discuss some of these characteristics in Chapter 3. 
5 Notable exceptions of studies that consider whether manager characteristics matter in investors’ assessments of 
the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts include Baik et al. (2011) and Yang (2012), which 
are discussed a bit later in this chapter. 
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consider senior executives’ collective and individual attributes when evaluating management’s 
disclosures.  
 
At the collective manager level, Morningstar analyst investment reports include a category for 
“Stewardship”, in which analysts assign a rating of “Poor”, “Standard” or “Exemplary”, to the 
firm’s management and board. These reports also include a section where analysts comment 
on various aspects of management. For example, in a Morningstar analyst note for Avnet Inc, 
the analyst notes that “Avnet’s management seems to be accurate about giving sound guidance, 
…, management discussions are open and transparent about trends in different regions” 
(Wahlstrom, 2014a). There is also anecdotal evidence that managers matter to financial 
regulators. In an OECD report, for example, Koenig (2005) writes: “Business executives 
appear to have a knack for recognising these trends, and filtering out transitory fluctuations” 
(p. 250).6 There is also a sense that management credibility is important to the broader market 
as analysts’ comments about management are often referenced in business reports. For 
example, in a media note to investors about Mylan Inc., a Credit Suisse analyst is quoted thus: 
“Management continues to confuse investors in the way it discusses its performance and 
guidance, which continues to foster a management credibility issue and hurts the stock” 
(Sabatini, 2008). In the case of Valeant Pharmaceuticals, an analyst is quoted as having “lost 
confidence in management’s ability to understand its own business and to provide reliable 
guidance” (Lopez, 2016).7  
 
Anecdotal evidence that market participants attach credibility to individuals when evaluating 
management earnings forecasts include the following illustrative examples: 
                                               
6 I thank Professor K. Ramesh for drawing my attention to this quote. 
7 http://www.businessinsider.com.au/nomura-analyst-turns-on-valeant-2016-3?r=US&IR=T 
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• In a Morningstar stock recommendation for Anglo American, the analyst commented 
that “… if Carroll and the management team are to blame, it is only that they are overly 
optimistic forecasters rather than poor project managers” (Rohr, 2014).  
• Commenting on the CFO of Blackbaud Inc, the analyst noted that “we like Boor's up-
front demeanor and transparency with investors” (Wahlstrom, 2014b).  
• Commenting on Fitbit CEO’s management earnings forecasts, Cramer on CNBC notes: 
“James Park should be banned from making any projections …. I think these numbers 
mean nothing to him. I mean, he cut the guidance for next quarter but then boosted the 
full-year forecast” (Stevenson, 2016).8  
• In a media note about Salesforce’s CFO changeover, Citigroup analyst noted: “Current 
CRM CFO had established a history of conservative guidance with excellent disclosure 
and we hope Hawkins continues this” (Ray, 2014).9  
• Dichev, Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal (2013), in their study involving a survey and 
interviews of CFOs, report that one CFO noted, “I think when people [emphasis added] 
are dishonest it is very hard for an analyst with just public information to tell, at least 
in the short-term” (p. 27).  
 
Overall, it is plausible that the properties of management forecasts may be associated with 
manager characteristics and that some market participants consider the prior forecast behaviour 
of individual managers when evaluating the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Two 
notable prior studies, Baik, Farber & Lee (2011) and Yang (2012) consider managers’ 
characteristics and forecasting track record in relation to the credibility of their management 
                                               
8 http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/05/cramer-elon-musk-getting-away-with-financial-murder.html 
9 http://www.barrons.com/articles/salesforce-names-autodesks-hawkins-new-cfo-1404161016 
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earnings forecasts. Baik et al. (2011) examine the association between managerial ability and 
the stock market reaction to the management earnings forecast news. Baik et al. (2011) find 
that management earnings forecasts issued by higher-ability CEOs elicit a stronger market 
reaction than those issued by lower-ability CEOs. Yang (2012), finds that when information 
uncertainty is high, the market is more responsive to management earnings forecasts issued by 
managers with higher manager-specific forecast accuracy. However, these two studies focus 
on only two manager attributes (ability and forecast accuracy) and examine management 
earnings forecasts only in terms of investor reaction. 
 
Despite the evident role of individual managers in the issuance of management earnings 
forecasts, and media and analysts reports and research evidence that manager-specific factors 
are associated with various attributes of management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al., 2010), 
we only have a modest understanding of whether market participants place weight on manager-
specific factors in assessing the credibility of management earnings forecasts. In this study, I 
examine an extensive list of manager traits and assess the perceived credibility of management 
earnings forecasts using: (1) stock market reaction and (2) consensus analyst forecast revisions. 
I address this gap in our understanding of how market participants evaluate the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts by investigating the following research question: 
  
RQ: Do manager-specific factors affect the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts? 
 
To address the research question, I draw on prior research to develop hypotheses focussed on 
whether manager-specific prior forecast performance and manager attributes matter in relation 
to the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts.  
  
 8 
First, I predict that the perceived credibility of the current management forecast varies with 
differences in individual managers’ prior forecasting performance. Second, I predict that the 
perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts varies with differences in managers’ 
non-forecasting attributes. Testing these hypotheses builds on prior studies in several ways. 
 
One of the first studies to examine the effect of individual style or managerial characteristics 
on organisational outcomes, Bertrand & Schoar (2003), uses a manager-firm matched panel 
dataset that follows managers across firms and time, and finds that manager-specific effects 
contribute to investing, financing and organisational practices.10 More recent studies in 
accounting have considered idiosyncratic managerial fixed effects on accounting outcomes 
such as tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 2010), discretionary accruals (Ge et al., 2011), likelihood 
of accounting misstatements (Ge et al., 2011), management tone in earnings calls (Davis et al., 
2015), and management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al., 2010, Yang, 2012).  
 
Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset to examine manager fixed effects on the 
characteristics of management earnings forecasts, Bamber et al. (2010) find managerial fixed 
effects on forecast frequency, forecast specificity, forecast news, forecast bias and forecast 
accuracy. While Bamber et al. (2010) find that managerial effects are associated with 
management earnings forecast issuance and forecast characteristics, they do not consider 
whether these effects influence capital market participants’ assessment of the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts. Prior studies largely have not distinguished between the 
forecast credibility attributable to the firm versus the manager. A notable exception is Yang 
(2012), who uses the Bertrand & Schoar (2003) method to extract manager-specific fixed effect 
                                               
10 With the Bertrand & Schoar (2003) method, managers are tracked across firms because managers must work 
at more than one firm so that the manager fixed effects on corporate outcomes can be estimated. This is 
explained further in Chapter 3. 
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on forecast accuracy. Yang (2012) then investigates the capital markets responses to managers 
with higher forecast accuracy and finds that the market responds more strongly to forecasts by 
managers with higher forecast accuracy. Yang, however, only focuses on one aspect of prior 
forecast performance: manager-specific forecast accuracy. While accuracy might enhance 
management’s credibility with respect to their management earnings forecasts, evidence 
suggests that investors and analysts consider other factors in assessing the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts. This thesis extends Yang in two ways. First, by examining 
whether investors’ responses to management earnings forecast news vary with the manager-
specific effect of two other common prior forecast performance measures including forecast 
frequency and forecast precision. Second, this thesis extends Yang (2012) by examining the 
effect of manager-specific forecast performance on analysts. Analysts are sophisticated users 
who can also assess the credibility of managers when considering management earnings 
forecasts (Baik et al., 2011). Specifically, I examine whether there is an association between 
manager-specific prior forecast performance and: (1) investor reaction, and (2) consensus 
analyst forecast revisions. 
 
Prior research examines the effect of manager attributes on corporate outcomes and accounting 
disclosures.11 However, little research has focused on whether or not managers’ attributes and 
underlying characteristics affect the perceived credibility of their management earnings 
forecasts. A notable contribution is Baik et al. (2011), which measures CEO ability, as press 
citations, manager-specific efficiency as measured by Demerjian et al. (2012a) and industry-
adjusted return on assets, and examines whether these moderate stock market reactions to 
management earnings forecasts. Baik et al. find that stock market reactions to management 
                                               
11 See, for example, Adams et al. (2005), Aier et al. (2005), Francis et al. (2008), Bamber et al. (2010), Dyreng 
et al. (2010), Srinidhi et al. (2011), Demerjian et al. (2012b), Ahmed and Duellman (2013), Benmelech et al. 
(2015), Davis et al. (2015) and Hamm et al. (2017). 
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earnings forecast news are stronger for high-ability CEOs than for low-ability CEOs. Social 
psychology research argues that the degree to which an individual will be influenced by a 
communicator’s message will depend on the individual’s beliefs about the perceived credibility 
(expertise and trustworthiness) of the communicator (Hovland et al., 1953). For example, the 
degree to which an individual will be persuaded by a communicator’s message can depend on 
how intelligent, knowledgeable, able and sincere the individual perceives the communicator to 
be (Hovland et al., 1953). However, it is difficult to obtain data about executives’ innate ability 
and attributes. Prior research therefore suggests the use of observable characteristics of the 
communicator that may be correlated with the communicator’s innate ability and psychological 
traits (Hovland et al., 1953, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Hambrick, 2007). In this thesis, I 
integrate the approaches of Yang (2012) and Baik et al. (2011) and examine whether a more 
comprehensive list of observable managers’ attributes are associated with stock market and 
analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts. Specifically, I examine whether managers’ 
personal, imputed and positional attributes may be correlated with factors investors and 
analysts consider in assessing the perceived credibility of management. Personal attributes 
examined include: (1) age, (2) sex, (3), educational background, (4) military experience, and 
(5) network size. Imputed attributes examined are: (1) managerial ability, (2) number of awards 
won, and (3) press coverage. Positional attributes of the manager examined include: (1) tenure, 
(2) manager/chair duality, (3) CEO’s CFO experience, and (4) manager’s charitable 
involvement. 
 
 
1.2 Contribution 
 
This thesis responds to a call by Dichev et al. (2013) to study the “human factor” in assessing 
  
 11 
the credibility of disclosures, by moving away from a narrow focus on individual aspects of 
managers to a broader focus on the effect of manager-specific prior forecast performance as 
well as manager attributes on the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. In 
doing so, it contributes to the literature by providing a more comprehensive understanding of 
whether manager-specific factors matter to investors and analysts in their assessments of the 
credibility of management earnings forecasts.  
 
This thesis also has implications for practice. By providing evidence of whether manager-
specific characteristics matter to market participants, this thesis informs managers who wish to 
better understand the cues investors and analysts use to assess managers. This also informs: (1) 
firms of potential benefits from having specific managers with specific traits or characteristics, 
(2) boards about what matters to users which can help boards better monitor managers and, (3) 
regulators and commentators in providing signals about what matters to users in terms 
managers’ forecasting behaviour and attributes. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of related literature and 
contains the specific hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the 
research design. Chapter 4 reports the results. Chapter 5 provides additional analyses. Chapter 
6 provides the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2  Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the literature concerned with management earnings forecasts and the 
factors associated with the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. The review 
identifies the theoretical foundation necessary for the development of my hypotheses. 
 
 
2.2 Background 
 
The issuance of management earnings forecasts in the U.S. is largely voluntary. An exception 
is where managers issue guidance to comply with SEC Rule 10b-5 (Bochner and Clark, 2008). 
This rule requires managers to either disclose material private information before trading their 
firm’s securities or abstain from trading (Li et al., 2016). Management earnings forecasts are 
fairly common. Approximately 97% of the S&P 1,500 issued at least one management forecast 
between 1994-2014 and, between 2009-2014, approximately half of the S&P 1,500 issued at 
least one management earnings forecast. Issuance of management earnings forecasts has 
increased over time and is most commonly provided by bigger firms (Anilowski et al., 2007). 
At the firm level, the provision of management earnings forecasts tends to be ‘sticky’ because 
a forecast can create a disclosure precedent whereby the market may interpret future non-
disclosure as bad news (Graham et al., 2005, Chen et al., 2011). Management earnings forecasts 
are now typically bundled with earnings announcements. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) 
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document that bundled management earnings forecasts constituted less than 10% of all 
management earnings forecasts in 1995 but increased to about 80% by 2007. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, this bundling practice causes a methodological challenge in separating the market 
participants’ reactions to management earnings forecasts from reactions to earnings 
announcements. 
 
 
2.2.1 Potential Negative Consequences of Issuing Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Critics contend that issuance of management earnings forecasts can encourage managers to 
emphasise short-term goals at the expense of long-term goals; this view has been expressed by 
researchers (Fuller and Jensen, 2002, Morgan, 2003), regulators (Levitt, 2000), lobbyists (U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, 2007), non-profit organisations (The Aspen Institute, 2016), the media 
(Zuckerman, 2005, Plitch, 2006) and managers (Sorkin, 2016). The managers of some firms, 
such as Google (Page, 2004) and Berkshire Hathaway (Belvedere, 2016), have expressed 
similar concerns and have adopted strong stances against the provision of management 
earnings forecasts. Mostly, criticism has been focused on the provision of quarterly 
management earnings forecasts. One of the main arguments against the provision of quarterly 
management earnings forecasts is that it can lead to ‘managerial myopia’ moving away focus 
from long-term goals to short-term ones (Ying Wang and Tan, 2013, Kim et al., 2017). There 
is some evidence that this can be damaging to firms if they are too focused on meeting or 
beating their own forecasts (e.g.,Cheng et al., 2005, Acito, 2011, Koch et al., 2012, Call et al., 
2014). Cheng et al. (2005), for example, find that firms that frequently issue quarterly 
management earnings forecasts invest significantly less in R&D than firms that do not 
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frequently issue quarterly management earnings forecasts.12 There have been calls for firms to 
stop providing quarterly management earnings forecasts (e.g., Fuller and Jensen, 2002, Levitt, 
2000, Morgan, 2003, Zuckerman, 2005, Plitch, 2006, Hsieh et al., 2006, Nolop, 2012, The 
Aspen Institute, 2016), and some major companies (e.g. Unilever, Gillette and McDonalds) 
have ceased providing quarterly guidance or annual guidance (Katz and McIntosh, 2009). 
Evidence suggests that stopping guidance can worsen the firm’s information environment 
(Houston et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2011).13 As such, some critics of management earnings 
forecasts have suggested that companies should move away from quarterly management 
earnings forecasts towards annual forecasts or disaggregated forecasts (U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, 2007, NIRI, 2008, Deloitte, 2009, Lansford et al., 2013, The Aspen Institute, 
2016). Houston et al. (2010) find that approximately 86% of firms that ceased to provide 
quarterly management earnings forecasts between 2002-2005 kept providing annual 
management earnings forecasts. 
 
 
2.2.2 Potential Benefits of Issuing Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Proponents for management earnings forecasts argue that: (1) more information is useful to 
market participants as it leads to less uncertainty (Janjigian, 2003); and (2) management 
earnings forecasts are especially useful as a means of correcting market expectations for 
smaller companies that do not have much analyst coverage (Venkataraman, 2006, Johnson, 
2007, Anantharaman and Zhang, 2011). Management earnings forecasts are an important 
                                               
12 There is also evidence of benefits associated with issuance of quarterly management earnings forecasts. Firms 
that provide quarterly management earnings forecasts tend to provide more informative disclosures to the 
market (Choi et al., 2011) and are associated with less earnings management (Call et al., 2014). 
13 Houston et al. (2010) find that, after stopping, often firms resume providing guidance. 
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source of market information because they provide a key metric, earnings per share, upon 
which the market focuses (Graham et al., 2005, Dichev et al., 2013). Beyer et al. (2010), for 
example, analyse the relative contribution of various disclosures to quarterly stock return 
variance for the period 1994-2007 and find that management earnings forecasts provide an 
average of approximately 15% of accounting-based information compared to earnings 
announcements which provide less than 3% of accounting-based information. Similarly, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008) find that, management earnings forecasts issued in 1994-2006 explain 
relatively more of stock price movements than earnings announcements. Therefore, 
management earnings forecasts can be an important tool to manage earnings expectations. 
Several studies find evidence that firms issue management earnings forecasts in order to avoid 
problems associated with unrealistic earnings expectations (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift, 1984, 
Hassell and Jennings, 1986, King et al., 1990, Cotter et al., 2006, Seybert and Yang, 2012, 
Larocque, 2013). Management earnings forecasts can also reduce information asymmetry 
(e.g.,Coller and Yohn, 1997, Lennox and Park, 2006, Bonsall et al., 2013b, Balakrishnan et al., 
2014, Billings et al., 2015, Guay et al., 2016). Coller and Yohn (1997), for example, find that 
the bid-ask spreads nine days after provision management earnings forecasts are significantly 
smaller than spreads nine days before management earnings forecasts. Similarly, Guay et al. 
(2016) find a positive association between financial statement complexity and the frequency 
of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that managers use management earnings 
forecasts to help reduce negative effects associated with complex disclosures. Management 
earnings forecasts may also reduce the magnitude of post-earnings-announcement drift 
implying that they help to reduce investor under-reaction to earnings announcements (Li and 
Tse, 2008, Wang, 2008, Zhang, 2012). 
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2.3 The Perceived Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Agency theory emphasises the risk that managers pursue their self-interest and respond 
rationally to their personal utility functions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As discussed in 
Section 2.2.2, managers possess private information about the firm and forecasts issued can 
inform investors and analysts about the expected future earnings of the firm (Graham et al., 
2005, NIRI, 2008, Deloitte, 2009, NIRI, 2014). Empirical evidence is consistent with investors 
using information in the management earnings forecast to adjust their assessments of the firm’s 
value (Penman, 1980, Ajinkya and Gift, 1984, Atiase et al., 2005, Anilowski et al., 2007, 
Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). However, as discussed in Section 
2.2.1, the issuance of management earnings forecasts may induce undesirable effects, such as 
‘managerial myopia’. Also, users of management earnings forecasts cannot perfectly predict 
the relationship between what managers know and what they actually disclose (Crawford and 
Sobel, 1982, Benabou and Laroque, 1992, Stocken, 2000, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Hamm 
et al., 2012, Bonsall et al., 2013, Goodman et al., 2013). Therefore, the extent to which market 
participants use a management forecast to adjust their expectations depends on the surprise 
‘news’ element (the difference between the management forecast and existing market 
expectations) and on the perceived credibility of the forecast (Jennings, 1987, Mercer, 2004, 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Ng et al., 2013). That is, the perceived credibility of the forecast is 
a component of the usefulness of the management earnings forecast.  
 
The perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts is a concern because of their 
voluntary non-audited nature, coupled with the PSLR Act 1995 safe harbor provision which 
protects managers against litigation for unattained forecasts provided the forecasts were issued 
in ‘good faith’. These circumstances, along with the core assumptions of agency theory, 
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suggest that managers may have incentives and opportunity to strategically use management 
earnings forecasts for personal gain or to overstate/understate their firm’s value (e.g., Frankel 
et al., 1995, Aboody and Kasznik, 2000, Matsumoto, 2002, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Cotter 
et al., 2006, Rogers, 2008, Hafzalla, 2009, Choi et al., 2010, Cheng et al., 2013, Baginski et 
al., 2016). For example, Frankel et al. (1995), find that managers tend to release good news in 
their management earnings forecasts to maximize stock prices before raising external finance. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that managers with stock-based compensation incentives are 
more willing to delay good news and precipitate bad news to reduce the strike price of their 
stock options. Therefore, because management earnings forecasts are unverifiable at the time 
of announcement, there is potential for intentional bias in the magnitude, precision and timing 
of the forecast. Managers are constrained however because management earnings forecasts are 
verified when earnings are announced and because biased forecasts can hurt their reputation 
(Stocken, 2000). Notwithstanding these constraints, managers can strategically bias the 
forecasts because they have significant discretion over the forecast disclosed and forecast 
characteristics, such as forecast precision, timing, tone, horizon and level of disaggregation, 
(Kothari et al., 2009, Cheng et al., 2013, Huang et al., 2013, Davis et al., 2015). Users of 
management earnings forecasts therefore cannot discern the asymmetry between what 
managers know and what they disclose (Crawford and Sobel, 1982, Benabou and Laroque, 
1992, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Hamm et al., 2012, Bonsall et al., 2013a, Goodman et al., 
2013). As articulated by Benabou and Laroque (1992):  
 
“… private information is typically noisy, so that predictions which turn out to 
be incorrect can always be ascribed to honest errors. Manipulation will still 
hurt an insider’s reputation, but much more gradually and reversibly, through 
a process that he can partially control by mixing truth and lies over time to suit 
his best interests.” (p. 921) 
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2.4 Factors that may Influence the Perceived Credibility of Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
 
Mercer (2004) summarises four factors that market participants use in their assessments of the 
credibility of management disclosures: (1) situational incentives, (2) levels of external and 
internal assurance, (3) forecast-specific characteristics and (4) management’s credibility. In 
Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4, I summarise the situational incentives, assurance, forecast-specific 
characteristics and management credibility aspects that can influence the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts. This thesis is focussed on the influence of management 
credibility on the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. In Section 2.4.4, I 
also briefly discuss how this thesis builds on prior research management credibility of 
management earnings forecasts.  
 
 
2.4.1 Situational Incentives 
 
Situational incentives that may affect the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts are forecast antecedents that “exist at the time the manager decides to issue a forecast” 
(Hirst et al., 2008). Firm-specific situational characteristics that may be associated with the 
perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts include litigation risk (Skinner, 1994, 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Ng et al., 2013), financial distress (Frost, 1997, Koch, 2002), and 
proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Wang, 2007, Koch and Park, 2011, Ng et al., 
2013). For example, investors respond less strongly to management earnings forecasts issued 
by financially distressed firms because they are aware of potential incentives for financially 
distressed firms to paint a better picture of their financial health. Manager-specific incentives 
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are discussed in Section 2.3. Overall, Mercer (2004) argues that market participants are aware 
that there are incentives surrounding the issuance management earnings forecasts and 
incorporate these incentives when they react to the forecasts. 
 
 
2.4.2 Levels of External and Internal Assurance 
 
Prior research argues that the credibility of voluntary reports can be increased if they are 
verified by independent third parties (Beets and Souther, 1999, Ball et al., 2012). This is 
consistent with findings of prior studies that suggest that assurance can improve the perceived 
credibility of voluntary disclosures such as corporate social responsibility disclosures 
(Pflugrath et al., 2011, Moroney et al., 2012). Because they are forward-looking, management 
earnings forecasts are generally non-audited. However, Ball et al. (2012) suggest that the 
perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts can be indirectly enhanced by 
signalling a commitment for higher quality disclosures through higher levels of audit effort. 
Making the assumption that managers have some discretion over the level of audit effort, Ball 
et al. (2012) argue that managers can signal their commitment to more credible management 
earnings forecasts by seeking higher levels of audit verification (proxied by higher audit fees) 
of their audited financial statements. Consistent with their argument, Ball et al. (2012) find 
evidence that the market reaction to the issuance of management earnings forecasts is stronger 
for firms with higher audit fees. 
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2.4.3 Forecast Characteristics 
 
Forecast-specific characteristics are the properties of the management forecast chosen by 
managers. For example, managers can choose the frequency, precision and the timing of their 
forecasts, or provide different forecast attributions and disaggregated forecasts; the latter are 
forecasts which include key line items underlying the forecast.14 Forecast characteristics shown 
to be associated with the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts include 
forecast timing (e.g., Pownall and Waymire, 1989, Pownall et al., 1993), forecast accuracy 
(e.g., Williams, 1996, Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Zhang, 2012, Ng et al., 2013), forecast 
frequency (e.g., Hutton and Stocken, 2007), forecast precision (e.g., Bamber and Cheon, 1998, 
Baginski et al., 1993, Hirst et al., 1999), forecast consistency (e.g., Hilary et al., 2014), forecast 
attribution (e.g., Baginski et al., 2000, Hutton et al., 2003, Baginski et al., 2004), and forecast 
disaggregation (e.g., Hirst et al., 2007, Lansford et al., 2013). 
 
 
2.4.4 Management Credibility 
 
In the neoclassical economics literature concerned with firm behaviour and performance, 
idiosyncratic manager effects and attributes are ignored. With regards to corporate outcomes, 
managers are regarded as rational optimisers and homogenous inputs (Weintraub, 1993, 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). That is, even though they may be responsible for corporate 
choices, these choices are assumed not to be influenced by their individual styles. Following 
the development of upper echelons theory, studies in the management literature examining the 
                                               
14 Measurement of forecast characteristics is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
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effect manager-specific characteristics on corporate outcomes are emerging (Plöckinger et al., 
2016). Upper echelons theory posits that executives’ backgrounds, values and personalities 
affect how they interpret strategic situations and therefore will influence their choices 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Hambrick, 2007). One of the first empirical studies to examine 
the influence of manager-specific factors in relation to corporate outcomes is the seminal study 
by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), which uses a manager-firm matched panel to examine the effect 
of managers on firm policies. Specifically, they control for firm effects and follow managers 
across firms and over time to identify managers’ fixed effects (commonalities) on corporate 
outcomes. Overall, they find that manager-specific effects contribute significantly to corporate 
decisions such as investing and financing practices (e.g. acquisition decisions, dividend 
policies, cost-cutting policies).  
 
Since Bertrand and Schoar (2003), studies in the accounting literature have adopted upper 
echelons theory to argue that manager style affects corporate disclosure (e.g., Francis et al., 
2008, Bamber et al., 2010, Brochet et al., 2011, Dyreng et al., 2010, Ge et al., 2011, DeJong 
and Ling, 2013). Ge et al. (2011), for example, use the Bertrand and Schoar method to identify 
CFO effects on various accounting outcomes (e.g. discretionary accruals, use of operating 
leases, earnings smoothing, and likelihood of accounting misstatements). Dyreng et al. (2010) 
use the same method to find that individual executives have a significant effect on corporate 
tax avoidance a firm undertakes, and Davis et al. (2015) use this method and find that managers 
have a significant effect on the tone of their earnings conference calls across firms. In the 
management earnings forecast literature, Brochet et al. (2011) examine executive effects in the 
issuance of management earnings forecasts and find that following a CEO turnover, if new 
CEOs are appointed from an external firm and have forecasting experience, they are more 
likely to increase issuance of management earnings forecasts. Bamber et al. (2010), following 
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Bertrand and Schoar, use a matched manager-firm panel dataset and find significant manager 
fixed effects on forecast frequency, forecast specificity, forecast news, forecast bias and 
forecast accuracy. Therefore, consistent with predictions from the upper echelons theory, prior 
studies find evidence that manager characteristics can influence their disclosure choices.  
 
Overall, while upper echelons theory predicts that manager characteristics can influence 
disclosure choices and agency theory predicts the potential for self-serving behaviour, they do 
not predict whether users of accounting information will discriminate between manager effects 
and firm effects.  
 
The issue of whether or not the source of information matters is known in social psychology 
as source credibility (Hovland et al., 1953). Source credibility reflect perceptions of 
trustworthiness, expertise, goodwill, morality, attractiveness, dynamism, authoritativeness and 
character (Pornpitakpan, 2004). This literature recognises that source credibility is an important 
part of the communication process, whereby a receiver evaluates a communicator based on 
perception the receiver holds of the communicator (McCroskey and Young, 1981). As 
expressed by Hovland et al. (1953):  
 
“An important factor influencing the effectiveness of a communication is the 
person or group perceived as originating the communication - and the cues 
provided as to the trustworthiness, intentions, and affiliations of this source”. 
(p. 13) 
 
In the finance and accounting literature, source credibility is generally conceptualised in two 
dimensions: competence and trustworthiness (Newell and Goldsmith, 2001). In an accounting 
context, source credibility has been defined as the degree to which “managers who direct the 
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preparation of financial statements inspire belief in the statements” (Beaulieu and Rosman, 
2003). For example, in the auditing literature, research finds that auditors rely more on 
information provided by more credible clients (e.g., Beaulieu, 2001, Bhattacharjee et al., 2012). 
In relation to management earnings forecasts, Mercer (2005) defines managers’ reporting 
credibility as “investors’ beliefs about management’s trustworthiness and competence in 
financial disclosure” (p.725). 
 
Social psychology research suggests that the degree to which market participants will be 
persuaded by a message (management earnings forecasts news) involves a more complex 
process which includes the message as well as the source (Hovland et al., 1953). As articulated 
by Metzger et al. (2003): “Message credibility examines how message characteristics impact 
perceptions of believability, either of the source or of the source’s message” (p. 302). Within 
the context of management earnings forecasts, the degree to which investors and analysts 
believe the management earnings forecast news is influenced by the perceived credibility of 
the message as well as the source of the management earnings forecast. The source of the 
management earnings forecast is both the firm and the manager. In examining the perceived 
credibility of management earnings forecasts, prior research has largely focused on forecast 
(message) characteristics and firm (source) characteristics (e.g., Hirst et al., 1999, Mercer, 
2005). That is these studies do not distinguish between the credibility associated with the firm 
and the credibility associated with managers. This deficiency is partly addressed in Yang 
(2012) and Baik et al. (2011) who examine manager-specific forecast accuracy and managerial 
ability, respectively. This thesis builds on these two studies and examines management’s 
credibility with respect to their management earnings forecasts by focusing on managers’ 
personal forecasting track records and managers’ individual attributes. This is discussed further 
in the next section.  
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2.5 Manager-Specific Forecast Performance  
 
Empirical evidence in the management earnings forecast literature is consistent with investors 
using information in the management earnings forecast to adjust their assessments of the firm’s 
value (Penman, 1980, Ajinkya and Gift, 1984, Atiase et al., 2005, Anilowski et al., 2007, 
Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). As previously discussed, prior studies 
find that investors’ reactions to the management earnings forecast news depend on the 
perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. Prior research has examined the effect 
of prior forecast performance on credibility of management earnings forecasts. Three prior 
forecast performance measures shown to affect the credibility of management earnings 
forecasts include forecast accuracy, frequency and precision. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, 
using the Bertrand and Schoar method allows for the estimation of manager-specific fixed 
effects on disclosure outcomes including manager-specific prior forecast performance. In this 
section, I review the relevant literature on prior forecast performance and develop Hypotheses 
1 and 2, concerned with manager-specific prior forecast performance. 
 
 
2.5.1 Management Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 
One of the main aspects of prior forecast performance studied is forecast accuracy. Indeed, as 
found by Graham et al. (2005) in their survey of top executives, one of the main reasons 
managers issue management earnings forecasts is to develop a reputation for accuracy. 
Examples of studies that examine the relation between forecast accuracy and the credibility of 
management earnings forecasts are numerous (e.g., Hassell and Jennings, 1986, Hassell et al., 
1988, Williams, 1996, Hirst et al., 1999, Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Zhang, 2012, Ng et al., 
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2013). These studies use different measures of forecast accuracy and show that, irrespective of 
how forecast accuracy is computed,15 market participants respond more to management 
earnings forecasts of firms with prior forecast accuracy; that is, firms with higher prior forecast 
accuracy develop a reputation for credible forecasts (Ng et al., 2013). These studies do not 
however distinguish between the perceived credibility associated with the firm and the 
perceived credibility associated with managers. This deficiency is partly addressed in Yang 
(2012), who uses the Bertrand and Schoar (2003) method and tracks managers across firms 
and over time, to isolate and estimate manager-specific prior forecast accuracy, separate from 
firm-specific prior forecast accuracy. Yang (2012) finds that, when information uncertainty is 
high, the market reacts more strongly to management earnings forecast news issued by 
managers with higher forecast accuracy. However, Yang (2012) examines only one aspect of 
prior forecast performance. While accuracy might enhance management’s credibility with 
respect to their management earnings forecasts, other evidence suggests that investors and 
analysts also consider forecast frequency (Hutton and Stocken, 2007) and forecast precision 
(Choi et al., 2010) in assessing the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. 
 
 
2.5.2 Management Earnings Forecast Frequency 
 
Prior research provides evidence that firms acquire a forecasting reputation only after they have 
provided accurate forecasts for a substantial period of time (Hutton and Stocken, 2007). Greater 
forecast frequency is associated with the perceived credibility of management earnings 
                                               
15 Most studies compute ex post forecast accuracy by comparing the management forecast against the actual 
earnings per share and deflating by price (e.g. Baik et al., 2011, Hilary et al., 2014). Other studies use forms of 
this ex post measure and calculate the average accuracy over a number of periods (e.g. Hutton and Stocken, 
2007, Ng et al., 2013) while a few studies compute ex-ante forecast accuracy by predicting forecast accuracy 
based on past forecast accuracy and firm attributes (Zhang, 2012). 
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forecasts because it increases the precision with which investors can assess the management 
earnings forecasts of firms by providing more data points (Trueman, 1986, Hutton and Stocken, 
2007, Ying Wang and Tan, 2013). In survey results, Graham et al. (2005) find that managers 
seem to be aware that the market expects firms to maintain disclosure precedent regardless of 
whether forecast news is good or bad. However, it can be argued that managers with lower 
forecasting ability issue more frequent management earnings forecasts to correct their previous 
forecasts.  Forecasting frequency also distinguishes between firms that provide event-generated 
guidance versus regular management earnings forecasts. This is important because routine 
guiders may be more likely to spend greater resources in order to build a reputation for 
credibility (Acito, 2011, Bhojraj et al., 2011, Dambra et al., 2012, Ying Wang and Tan, 2013). 
On the other hand, management earnings forecasts issued by non-frequent guiders may be 
event-generated and potentially contain more news than management earnings forecasts issued 
by frequent guiders (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). This could lead to a bigger reaction to 
forecasts issued by infrequent guiders because such forecasts contain more unexpected 
information. 
 
 
2.5.3 Management Earnings Forecast Precision 
 
Managers can also choose the precision of their forecasts by issuing point, range, open-ended 
and qualitative forecasts. A point forecast provides the highest level of precision while a 
qualitative forecast provides the lowest level of precision. Prior research finds that forecast 
precision is associated with the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts and 
argue that this is because more precise earnings forecasts suggest less management uncertainty 
(Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, Baginski et al., 1993, Hughes and Pae, 2004, Choi et al., 2010, Du 
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et al., 2011). This argument reflects the logic that managers will issue more precise forecasts 
when they are more certain about realising their earnings projections. Research also finds that 
overconfident managers tend to issue more precise forecasts (Hilary and Hsu, 2011). Managers 
can, however, strategically vary forecast precision for their self-serving advantage (Hughes and 
Pae, 2004). For example, managers might issue less precise forecasts when the forecast 
conveys bad news possibly because they want to dampen reaction to the bad news (Hughes 
and Pae, 2004) or reduce litigation risk (Choi et al., 2010). Prior studies also find that 
management earnings forecasts of good news tend to be more precise before insider sales 
(Cheng et al., 2013). More recently, Hayward and Fitza (2017)provide evidence that, after a 
setback, managers may increase forecast precision to manage impressions. Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that managers may increase their forecast precision if they are more certain, 
overconfident or for self-serving purposes.  
 
 
2.5.4 Hypothesis 1 
 
As discussed, source credibility research finds that the perceived credibility of the message and 
the perceived credibility of the source are overlapping (Hovland et al., 1953). As noted by 
Abelson (1959): “what an audience thinks of a persuader may be directly influenced by what 
they think of his message” (p. 81). If managers’ prior overall forecast performance, as measured 
by managers’ propensity to issue more accurate, frequent and precise forecasts, affects their 
perceived source credibility and thereby the perceived credibility of their management earnings 
forecasts, then investors’ reaction to management earnings forecast news will be stronger for 
forecasts issued by managers with higher prior forecast performance. Formally, I hypothesise 
the following: 
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Hypothesis 1: Stock price reactions to management earnings forecast news are positively 
related to manager-specific prior forecasting performance.  
 
 
2.5.5 Hypothesis 2 
 
Analysts quickly revise their forecasts in response to management earnings forecasts. Research 
finds that analysts’ reactions vary with prior management earnings forecast performance 
(Waymire, 1986, Jennings, 1987, Hassell et al., 1988, Williams, 1996, Cotter et al., 2006). 
Management earnings forecasts also influence what analysts include in their definitions of 
earnings (Christensen et al., 2011). Intuitively, analysts, being sophisticated users, should have 
a high degree of understanding of managers’ incentives and differences between the firm-
specific prior forecast performance and manager-specific prior forecast performance. As 
previously discussed, anecdotal evidence also suggests that analysts place importance on 
individual managers’ forecasting ability.  
 
However, research suggests that individual differences are more likely to matter when 
complexity and uncertainty is high (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Plöckinger et al., 2016). In 
examining the relation between perceived credibility of potential borrowers and lending 
judgements, for example, Beaulieu (1994) finds that in making loan judgements in the face of 
negative information, experienced lenders stopped using credibility information while 
inexperienced lenders used both accounting and credibility information. This would imply that 
analysts might be less dependent on manager-specific information and more interested in firm-
specific information. To this end, I hypothesise the following: 
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Hypothesis 2: Consensus analyst forecast revisions following management earnings forecast 
news are associated with manager-specific prior forecasting performance.  
 
 
2.6 Manager Attributes 
 
Psychology research defines the source’s credibility as users’ beliefs about the source’s 
expertise and trustworthiness (Hovland et al., 1953). In management earnings forecast 
research, experimental evidence suggests that investors will find management earnings 
forecasts issued by less credible sources less useful (Hirst et al., 1999, Mercer, 2004, Mercer, 
2005, Cianci and Kaplan, 2010, Chen et al., 2016). Yang (2012) cites Mercer (2005) and 
alludes to source credibility by suggesting that because “past performance is a signal of the 
manager’s forecasting skill and credibility, market participants should assign greater (less) 
weight to forecasts issued by managers with higher (lower) prior forecasting accuracy” (p.168). 
However, as previously discussed, Yang (2012) only examines one aspect of management 
credibility: accuracy. Yang (2012) does not examine whether attributes of the manager affects 
their perceived credibility and consequently the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts.  
 
Using the Bertrand & Schoar (2003) manager-firm matched panel method provides estimates 
of manager-specific prior forecast performance. Hypotheses 1 and 2 examine whether market 
participants reactions to management earnings forecasts are associated with managers’ 
individual overall prior forecast performance. However, as noted by Hirst et al. (1999), 
perceptions of source credibility (expertise and trustworthiness) may not necessarily be 
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correlated with managers’ prior forecast performance because unforeseeable circumstances 
may lead to otherwise competent executives having low prior forecasting performance. 
Managers may also have higher prior forecast performance because they have engaged in 
earnings management (Kasznik, 1999) or strategically biased their management earnings 
forecasts (Matsumoto, 2002, Rogers, 2008). In addition, it can be argued that the fixed effects 
estimates obtained using the Bertrand and Schoar method are a design artefact. Hypotheses 3 
and 4, examine whether a number of observable characteristics that may convey the perceived 
expertise and trustworthiness of managers, affect market participants’ assessment of the 
credibility of managers and consequently of management’s earnings forecasts. 
 
Prior studies have examined some aspects of the source in relation to accounting choices. For 
example, Ge et al. (2011) and Dyreng et al. (2010), examine whether different managerial 
characteristics affect a number of accounting choices. Specifically, Dyreng et al. (2010), 
examine how age, educational background, sex, manager shareholdings, optimism and 
overconfidence affect propensities to reduce effective tax rates. Dyreng et al. (2010) find that 
these common observable characteristics are not strongly associated with propensities to 
reduce effective tax rates. Ge et al. (2011) find that common observable characteristics explain 
only a small portion of CFO styles. Similarly, Francis et al. (2008) find that observable 
characteristics of CEOs can explain a portion of firms’ earning quality. One reason for the 
small explanatory power of executive characteristics in these studies could be because of the 
relatively non-voluntary nature of disclosures studied. In the management earnings forecasts 
domain, Bamber et al. (2010) examine several demographic factors and how they relate to 
management earnings forecast characteristics. They find that managers with finance and 
accounting backgrounds tend to produce more precise forecasts while those born before WWII 
and with military experience tend to issue more conservative forecasts. 
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While prior studies have examined some aspects of the source in relation to management 
earnings forecasts, they have largely not examined whether observable management 
characteristics affect market participants’ assessment of the credibility of management earnings 
forecasts. A notable exception of a study that examines an aspect of management’s perceived 
credibility is a study by Baik et al. (2011) that examines the relation between managerial ability 
and the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. Using various measures of 
managerial ability, Baik et al. find that there is a greater stock market response to management 
earnings forecasts for firms with higher ability managers. This thesis extends Baik et al. and 
addresses the possibility that perceptions of management credibility may not necessarily be 
solely based on management’s prior forecast performance by developing Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
These hypotheses focus on the same issues as Hypotheses 1 and 2 but distinguish between the 
manager’s forecasting track record and observable attributes of the manager. 
 
Investors and analysts may use an array of observable characteristics of managers in evaluating 
the expertise and trustworthiness of management and thus the believability of their 
management earnings forecasts. Expertise has been defined as “the extent to which a 
communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions” (Hovland et al., 1953). That is, 
the extent to which an individual perceives the message source as credible depends on the 
source’s expertise which can refer to the source’s qualifications, skills, ability, and experience 
(Newell and Shemwell, 1995, Metzger et al., 2003, Mercer, 2005). Trustworthiness has been 
defined as “the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to communicate the 
assertions he considers most valid” (Hovland et al., 1953). It is the “willingness of a person B 
to act favorably towards a person A, when A has placed an implicitly or explicit demand or 
expectation for action on B” (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010).  
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As noted by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick (2007), it is difficult to measure or 
obtain psychometrics data on executives’ cognitive and psychological traits. Therefore, they 
suggest the use of observable characteristics of individuals such as industry and firm tenures, 
educational backgrounds, and affiliations, that may be correlated with psychological 
characteristics of the individuals. In Sections 2.6.1 to 2.6.3, I discuss personal, imputed and 
positional attributes of the manager that may affect their source credibility and thus the 
perceived credibility of their management earnings forecasts. 
 
 
2.6.1 Managers’ Personal Attributes 
 
Managers’ personal attributes examined include: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) educational background, 
(4) military experience, and (5) network size.  
 
Age can affect perceptions of credibility because it is a sign of broad experience (Hovland et 
al., 1953). Research in psychology also finds that age can be positively related to perceptions 
of credibility (Weibel et al., 2008). Prior studies find that age is positively associated with 
ethical standards (Loe et al., 2000, Peterson et al., 2001), negatively associated with risk-taking 
behaviour (Serfling, 2014), and that older CEOs are less likely to commit fraud (Troy et al., 
2011) and more likely to have higher reporting quality (Huang et al., 2012). If investors and 
analysts consider older managers to be more credible, this could suggest a positive association 
between the age of the manager and the reaction to their management earnings forecasts. 
 
Some studies of gender differences in perceived credibility suggest that females are associated 
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with higher trustworthiness (Newell and Shemwell, 1995, Buchan et al., 2008), higher ethical 
standards (Loe et al., 2000), higher earnings quality (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008, Srinidhi et 
al., 2011) and use less positive tone than males in conference calls (Davis et al., 2015). 
However, other studies find that men are perceived to have higher credibility than women 
(Weibel et al., 2008, Armstrong and McAdams, 2009). Therefore, the relation between sex and 
perceptions of source credibility and therefore message credibility of management earnings 
forecasts is unclear. 
 
Prior literature also finds that education is associated with the perception of expertise 
(Weisband et al., 1995, Schrand and Zechman, 2012). I therefore examine if the perceived 
credibility of management’s earnings forecasts is influenced by managers’ educational 
background including financial/accounting qualifications, MBA qualification, legal 
qualification, and Ivy league education. Prior studies find that executives with 
accounting/financial qualifications are associated with more precise forecasts (Bamber et al., 
2010), less risk-taking (Hoitash et al., 2016a), fewer internal control weaknesses (Li et al., 
2010) and fewer financial restatements (Aier et al., 2005). and that more educated CEOs seem 
to engage in less fraud (Troy et al., 2011) but there is debate as to whether MBA degrees signify 
managerial knowledge (Frydman, 2016) or actually weaken the character of graduates by 
focusing too much on profits (Pfeffer and Fong, 2004). This is consistent with evidence by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who find that CEOs with MBAs tend to be more aggressive. Prior 
studies also provide evidence that CEOs with legal backgrounds tend to be more conservative 
(Bamber et al., 2010); for example, likely to spend less on R&D (Barker III and Mueller, 2002). 
I also examine whether graduation from an Ivy league school, which is associated with prestige 
and academic excellence and can be a proxy for managers’ innate ability (Custódio and 
Metzger, 2014), affects the perceived credibility of management’s earnings forecasts. In 
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summary, education is associated with perceptions of expertise and therefore credibility 
(Hovland et al., 1953), which suggests a positive association between proxies of education and 
investors’ and analysts’ reaction to management earnings forecasts. However, if managers with 
MBAs are perceived to be more aggressive, a lesser reaction to their management earnings 
forecasts is expected. 
 
Research finds that executives with military experience are associated with more conservative 
behaviour (Bamber et al., 2010, Benmelech and Frydman, 2015) and ethical behaviour (Law 
and Mills, 2017). For example, Bamber et al. (2010) find that executives with military 
experience tend to issue more conservative and precise forecasts. Market participants might 
perceive managers with military experience to be more trustworthy because these managers 
arguably have a sense of duty and honour. However, there is some evidence that executives 
with military experience are more likely to “passively acquiesce” to illegal activities (Williams 
et al., 2000). Therefore, the expected association between executives’ military experience and 
the reaction to their management earnings forecasts is unclear. 
  
Managers’ social connections may also affect their perceived credibility as social connections 
can be seen to be valuable (Finkelstein, 1992) because they allow managers access to more 
resources and can result in better performance (Hochberg et al., 2007, Engelberg et al., 2012) 
and improved reputation (Mehra et al., 2006). However, there is some evidence that managers 
who are more socially connected are more protected through coordination and acquiescence 
and are consequently associated with higher incidence of fraud (Khanna et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the possible relation between managers’ social connectedness and the degree to 
which their management earnings forecasts are perceived to be credible could be positive or 
negative. 
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Overall, there is some evidence that personal attributes of the manager may affect her 
disclosure quality and that personal attributes may affect perceptions of the expertise and 
trustworthiness of the manager and consequently of their management earnings forecasts.  
 
 
2.6.2 Managers’ Imputed Attributes 
 
Imputed attributes of the manager, which are manager’s attributes that cannot be completely 
distinguishable from the firm, examined are: (1) managerial ability, (2) number of awards won, 
and (3) press coverage.  
 
I examine whether managerial ability, as measured by Demerjian et al. (2012a), affects users’ 
perception of the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Demerjian et al. (2012a) use 
data envelope analysis to obtain a measure of the efficiency with which managers generate 
revenue.16 Using this measure, Baik et al. (2011) find that the market response to management 
forecasts is stronger for those issued by higher ability managers. If managers with higher ability 
are perceived to be more credible, this would suggest that the reaction to their management 
earnings forecasts would be higher. 
 
Awards can act as a signal of quality and increase the award-winning manager’s perceived 
credibility (Wade et al., 2006). Koh (2011) finds that firm performance improves after CEOs 
win awards. Therefore, the number of awards won by the manager may positively affect the 
                                               
16 The Demerjian et al. (2012a) measure is explained in more detail in Section 3.5. 
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perceived credibility of the manager and their disclosures, which would increase the reaction 
to their management earnings forecasts.  
 
Prior studies argue that more reputed managers are cited more often by the press than less 
reputable managers and use press citations as a proxy for reputation (Milbourn, 2003, Francis 
et al., 2008, Baik et al., 2011, Falato et al., 2015). If managers who are considered more 
reputable are perceived to be more credible, then a stronger reaction to their management 
earnings forecasts should be observed. 
 
Overall, managers’ imputed attributes may convey perceptions of their ability and affect the 
credibility perceptions of their earnings forecasts.  
 
 
2.6.3 Managers’ Positional Attributes 
 
Positional attributes of the executives examined include: (1) tenure, (2) whether the manager 
is also the chairperson, (3) whether the CEO had CFO experience, and (3) whether the manager 
served on a charity.  
 
Tenure has been used as a proxy for the market’s perception of the executive’s reputation 
because a longer tenure indicates that the board had more opportunities to observe the 
executive’s performance and that the executive survived the board’s evaluations (Milbourn, 
2003, Barker III and Mueller, 2002, Jian and Lee, 2011). Executives with longer tenures also 
are less likely to be career-concerned and have less incentives to bias their management 
earnings forecasts (Pae et al., 2016). Anecdotal evidence in media reports also suggests that 
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tenure is important to analysts. For example, a Citigroup analyst notes about a CEO resignation: 
“Mr. Goldberg had over 15 years tenure with LQ, and was consistently one of the most 
passionate CEOs in the field; we believe his departure will be viewed as a negative” (Rivas, 
2015).17 If managers with longer tenures are considered to be more credible, then a stronger 
investor and analyst reaction to their management earnings forecasts should be observed. 
 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest that managers preferences, risk-aversion and skill levels 
are likely to matter if they are powerful enough to affect policies. Manager/chair duality is 
commonly used as a proxy for power because it increases the manager’s influence over the 
board of directors (Krause et al., 2014). However, manager/chair duality can potentially lead 
to entrenchment because it reduces effective monitoring of the manager. Therefore, the 
relationship between manager/chair duality and market participants’ reaction to management 
earnings forecasts is unclear. 
 
CFOs are financial experts and prior research finds that CEOs with CFO experience are 
associated with higher disclosure quality (Matsunaga et al., 2013) and risk-aversion (Hoitash 
et al., 2016b). Market participants might perceive CEOs with CFO experience to be more 
credible because such CEOs have expertise as CFOs, who are financial experts. This suggests 
a stronger reaction to management earnings forecasts by such CEOs.  
 
Finally, managers’ charitable involvement can act as a signal of their altruism (Wilson, 2000) 
and positively affect their perceived credibility (Hwang, 2010) but can also act as a signal that 
managers want to raise their profile (Littler, 2008). The link between  managers’ charitable 
                                               
17 http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2015/12/22/steelcase-plunges-20-as-q3-disappoints-
guidance-misses-estimates/ 
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involvement and the perceived credibility of managers and consequently of their disclosures is 
therefore unclear. 
 
Overall, there is evidence that managers’ previous positions can affect the way they may be 
perceived and arguably the perceptions of credibility of their management earnings forecasts.. 
 
 
2.6.4 Hypotheses 3 and 4 
 
In summary, there is evidence that managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes may 
affect their disclosure choices and quality, as well as the way they are perceived. Observable 
managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes may also be correlated with managers’ 
cognitive and psychological traits and innate ability. Therefore, I argue that managers’ 
attributes may be associated with investors’ and analysts’ assessments of the perceived 
trustworthiness and expertise of managers and consequently of managements’ earnings 
forecasts. Therefore, I hypothesise the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Stock price reactions to management earnings forecasts are moderated by 
managers’ attributes.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Consensus analyst forecast revisions following management earnings forecasts 
are moderated by managers’ attributes.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
Previous studies provide evidence that the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts is associated with firm-specific and firm forecast-specific characteristics. This 
chapter extends this idea to consider the relevance of individual managers as the source of the 
forecasts, and to formulate questions regarding whether the perceived credibility of 
management earnings forecasts varies with manager-specific characteristics. This chapter 
develops hypotheses based on arguments regarding the potential influence of manager-specific 
forecast performance and managers’ attributes on the perceived credibility of management 
earnings forecasts (summarised in Table 1). The next chapter describes the research method 
used to test these hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 Summary of hypotheses 
H1 
Stock price reactions to management earnings forecast news are positively related to manager-specific 
prior forecasting performance. 
H2 
Consensus analyst forecast revisions following management earnings forecast news are associated with 
manager-specific prior forecasting performance.  
H3 Stock price reactions to management earnings forecasts are moderated by managers’ attributes.  
H4 
Consensus analyst forecast revisions following management earnings forecasts are moderated by 
managers’ attributes.  
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CHAPTER 3  Research Method 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the research design used to test the hypotheses. A manager-firm matched 
panel data set, which follows managers across firms, is required to estimate manager fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects on prior forecast performance. Section 3.2 describes the 
procedure used to construct the manager-firm matched panel. Section 3.3 describes the sample 
selection process. Section 3.4 describes the model used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Section 3.5 
describes the model used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter with 
the descriptive statistics of the managerial attributes present in the sample. 
 
 
3.2 Constructing a Manager-Firm Matched Panel and Estimating Manager and Firm Fixed 
Effects 
 
If managers work at only one firm, the manager fixed effects on prior forecast performance 
cannot be reliably distinguished from the firm fixed effects on prior forecast performance. A 
manager-firm matched panel based on the Bertrand and Schoar (2003) method is therefore 
constructed for the purpose of estimating manager and firm fixed effects.18 Under this method, 
the manager fixed effects on prior forecast performance are separated from the firm fixed 
effects on forecast performance. To distinguish manager effects from those of the employing 
firm, the method requires managers to have worked at more than one firm. Following Yang 
                                               
18 The importance of the contribution of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) is discussed in Section 2.5. 
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(2012), there are no minimum requirements imposed for the length of time a manager has to 
work at a particular firm. The sample construction process to obtain the manager-firm matched 
panel is described in Section 3.2.1 and the model used to estimate manager fixed effects is 
explained in Section 3.2.2 below. 
 
3.2.1 Panel Construction 
 
The process used to construct the manager-firm matched panel is characterised in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 indicates that Manager A worked at X Inc from 1998 to 2001 and at Y Inc from 2002 
to 2004, while Manager B worked only at Y Inc from 2005 to 2009. Following studies using 
manager-firm matched panels (e.g. Bamber et al., 2010, Ge et al., 2011, Yang, 2012), 
observations with available data to estimate firm-specific effects are also retained, in addition 
to observations for firms where there is sufficient data to estimate manager-specific effects. 
These observations are referred to as ‘filler’ years in prior studies (Ge et al., 2011). These 
‘filler’ years are retained because firms need to have had more than one manager to enable the 
estimation of firm fixed effects. ‘Filler’ year observations are not included in the Hypothesis 
(market and analyst reaction) tests because manager fixed effects are not estimable for those 
observations. 
 
Figure 1 Example of sample construction process 
 
 
Manager A’s fixed effect on forecast performance is measured after controlling for the fixed 
effect of each employing firm (X Inc and Y Inc), year fixed effects and other controls which 
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are discussed in Section 3.2.2 below. Manager A’s fixed effects capture the commonalities in 
Manager A’s prior forecast performance across two firms. It is not possible to estimate the 
fixed effects of Manager B because they are fully subsumed by the fixed effects of Y Inc and 
the cross-sectional year fixed effects. 
 
 
3.2.2 Estimating Manager and Firm Fixed Effects on Prior Forecast Performance 
 
To obtain manager and firm fixed effects on prior forecast performance, which are then used 
to test the hypotheses, I follow Bamber et al. (2010) and Yang (2012) by estimating the 
following model: 
 
Yit  =  μ + ∑ γmMGRm + ∑ λiFIRMi + ∑ βtYEARt+ ∑ αkXkit + ε     (1) 
 
Where 
 
Dependent Variable: Yit is the prior forecast performance measure for firm i in year t. I use 
three forecast performance measures to estimate manager-specific forecast performance: (1) 
forecast accuracy, (2) forecast frequency and (3) forecast width (precision). Table 2 
summarises the prior forecast performance measures used. 
 
Table 2 Prior forecast performance measures 
ACCURACY = absolute difference between the management earnings forecasts and actual earnings 
multiplied by -1 and scaled by beginning of period price. 
FREQUENCY = number of management earnings forecasts issued in year. 
WIDTH = absolute difference between the upper bound and the lower bound of the management 
earnings forecast multiplied by -1 and scaled by beginning of period price. 
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Following Yang (2012), forecast accuracy is measured as the absolute difference between the 
management forecast and actual earnings, multiplied by -1 and scaled by beginning of period 
stock price. The midpoint of the forecast is used if the management earnings forecast is a range 
forecast. Forecast frequency is the number of management earnings forecasts issued by the 
firm during the year. Forecast precision (width of the range) is measured as the absolute 
difference between the upper bound and the lower bound of the management earnings forecast, 
multiplied by -1 and scaled by beginning of period stock price (Goodman et al., 2013).19 Point 
forecasts have a precision measure of zero. The forecast precision (accuracy) measure is 
multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing-in-quality precision (accuracy) measure. 
 
Variables of Interest: MGR is an indicator variable that uniquely identifies each manager. The 
manager fixed effects used in subsequent analyses are the vectors of γ obtained for each of the 
three measures of prior forecast performance. FIRM is an indicator variable for each firm in 
the model. The firm fixed effects used in subsequent analyses are the vectors of λ obtained for 
each of the three measures of prior forecast performance. 20 
 
Control Variables: YEAR is an indicator variable for each year in the model. Similar to Yang 
(2012), X is a vector of control variables (summarised in Table 3) that are expected to be 
associated with prior management earnings forecast performance.21 
 
  
                                               
19 Width of the range is highly correlated with forecast accuracy (see Chapter 4). Therefore, results using a 
categorical measure of forecast precision are also provided in additional analyses. Following Bamber et al. 
(2010) this categorical forecast precision measure is coded as 3 for point forecasts, 2 for range forecasts and 1 
for open-ended forecasts. 
20 The manager and firm fixed effects variables used to test the hypotheses are summarised in Table 5 below. 
21 For convenience, a summary of all variables used in this thesis is also provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 3 Control variables 
ANNUAL = an indicator variable coded as 1 for annual forecasts, and 0 otherwise. 
F_HORIZON = the number of days between the management earnings forecast date and the end of the 
fiscal period, divided by 365. 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets at beginning of period. 
F_LOSS = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the management forecast predicted a loss, and 0 
otherwise. 
ROA = return on assets calculated as firm i’s net income in year t divided by lagged total assets. 
ANALYSTS = the natural logarithm of number of analysts following the firm. 
EARNVOL = the standard deviation of earnings per share for the prior four periods. 
MTB = the market-to-book value at beginning of period. 
CONC = Herfindahl index using revenues of firms sharing the same four-digit SIC code. 
R&D = R&D expense scaled by total assets. 
LITRISK = an indicator variable coded as 1 if firm is in a high-litigation industry. 
RESTRUCT = an indicator variable coded as 1 if firm is engaged in restructuring during the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
ACQ = an indicator variable coded as 1 if firm has an M&A during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
INST = percentage of firm’s common stock held by institutional investors. 
OUTDIR = percentage of directors on the board that are also not officers of the firm. 
 
Managers issue management earnings forecasts with periodicity ranging from quarterly to 
annual. Following Yang (2012), because both annual and quarterly management earnings 
forecasts are included in Model (1) to estimate fixed effects, ANNUAL is an indicator variable 
coded as one and zero otherwise to control for forecast periodicity. Before 2002, quarterly 
management earnings forecasts were issued more frequently (Anilowski et al., 2007). As 
discussed in Section 2.2.1, possibly after criticism about the potential for short-termism 
associated with the issuance of quarterly management earnings forecasts, annual management 
earnings forecasts are issued more frequently (Anilowski et al., 2007). Annual forecasts might 
also be issued more frequently if managers have to amend their forecasts (Tang et al., 2016). 
Annual management earnings forecasts also tend to have longer horizons than quarterly 
management earnings forecasts (Hutton and Stocken, 2007). Most annual management 
earnings forecasts are issued between one quarter ahead to five quarters ahead while most 
quarterly management earnings forecasts are issued between one to two quarters ahead (Rogers 
and Van Buskirk, 2013).  
 
Longer horizon management earnings forecasts tend to be less accurate (Johnson et al., 2001, 
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Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Feng and McVay, 2010, Yang, 2012, Zhang, 2012) and less precise 
(Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Choi et al., 2010, Feng and McVay, 2010, Cheng et al., 2013). This 
is because, closer to the end of the fiscal period, managers are likely to have more certainty 
and it is more difficult for them to explain away forecast errors (Baginski and Hassell, 1997, 
Hutton and Stocken, 2007). Therefore, I also control for forecast horizon (F_HORIZON) which 
is measured as the number of days between the management earnings forecast issuance date 
and the end of the fiscal period, divided by 365. 
 
SIZE is included because larger firms have access to greater resources, which may enable them 
to issue management earnings forecasts more accurately, frequently and with greater precision. 
Firm size can also proxy for the amount of public information. Prior studies find that larger 
firms tend to have higher forecast accuracy (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Baik et al., 2011, Yang, 2012, 
Zhang, 2012), frequency (Kasznik and Lev, 1995, Ajinkya et al., 2005, Brochet et al., 2011) 
and precision (Choi et al., 2010, Cheng et al., 2013). 
 
Prior studies argue that it is more difficult for managers to forecast earnings for loss firms, 
which leads to less accurate forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Hutton 
and Stocken, 2007, Feng and McVay, 2010, Yang, 2012, Cheng et al., 2013). One cited reason 
is because loss firms are potentially more likely to have unusual items (Rogers and Stocken, 
2005). Brown (2001), finds evidence consistent with this argument, where managers who 
report profits are more likely to beat analyst forecast consensus than managers who report 
losses. Therefore, an indicator variable for predicted loss (F_LOSS), equal to one if the 
management earnings forecast is negative and zero otherwise, is included to control for 
difficulty in forecasting for loss firms. Prior research also provides evidence that managers 
from financially distressed firms may have more incentives to provide inaccurate disclosures 
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because distressed firms have less to lose (Koch, 2002). Prior research also finds that, because 
of the forecast difficulty and uncertainty surrounding loss firms, managers who predict losses 
tend to issue less precise forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Cheng et 
al., 2013) and tend to issue forecasts less frequently (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Bhojraj et al., 2011, 
Tang et al., 2016).  
 
Return on assets (ROA) is included to control for the firm’s operating performance because 
prior studies find that performance is positively associated management earnings forecast 
frequency (Miller, 2002, Cotter et al., 2006, Bhojraj et al., 2011), forecast accuracy (Fang, 
2009, Bamber et al., 2010, Yang, 2012, Hui and Matsunaga, 2015) and forecast precision 
(Bamber and Cheon, 1998). 
 
I control for analyst following (ANALYSTS) as prior research finds that there is a positive 
association between number of analysts following the firm and management earnings forecast 
frequency (Lang and Lundholm, 1996, Ajinkya et al., 2005, Feng et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2012), 
accuracy (Baik et al., 2011, Hui and Matsunaga, 2015) and precision (Baginski and Hassell, 
1997, Choi et al., 2010). This is because the higher the analyst following, the higher the 
reputational costs for misleading guidance (Hansen and Noe, 1999). 
 
I also control for earnings volatility (EARNVOL), measured by the standard deviation of 
earnings per share over the prior four years, because it proxies for ex-ante uncertainty (Lennox 
and Park, 2006). Prior studies find that firms with higher earnings volatility tend to issue 
management earnings forecasts less frequently (Waymire, 1985, Kross et al., 1994, Ajinkya et 
al., 2005, Brochet et al., 2011, Kim, 2016). This is because higher earnings volatility implies 
less certainty which can lead to managers being less willing to issue forecasts because they are 
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likely not to meet or beat their own projections. Prior studies also find that, because of high 
uncertainty, earnings volatility is negatively associated with management earnings forecast 
accuracy (Feng et al., 2009, Ajinkya et al., 2005, Yang, 2012) and forecast precision (Choi et 
al., 2010, Cheng et al., 2013) but positively associated with management earnings forecast 
frequency, possibly to clarify market expectations (Waymire, 1985, Billings et al., 2015).  
 
Proprietary costs associated with disclosure of voluntary information can lead to firms 
sacrificing the release of accurate, frequent or precise disclosures to protect their competitive 
advantage (Verrecchia, 1983). On the other hand, it has been argued that proprietary costs can 
proxy for credibility because the information revealed in the forecasts is costly (Gigler, 1994). 
Market-to-book value (MTB), product-market concentration (CONC), and research & 
development intensity (R&D) are included as proxies for the proprietary costs associated with 
voluntary disclosure.22 Prior studies argue that firms with higher market-to-book values 
(growth firms), higher product-market concentration and higher R&D intensity have more 
proprietary costs because such firms have more to lose if they reveal their competitive 
information (King et al., 1990, Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Ng et al., 2013). In examining the 
association between the three different proxies and prior forecast performance, mixed results 
are obtained. Bamber and Cheon (1998) do not find a significant association between market-
to-book and forecast precision. Similarly, using market-to-book value as a proxy for 
proprietary costs, Ajinkya et al. (2005) do not find an association between proprietary costs 
and forecast accuracy, frequency or precision and, Hutton and Stocken (2007) do not find a 
significant association between market-to-book value and forecast accuracy. However, Choi 
(2010) finds a positive association between market-to-book value and forecast precision and 
                                               
22 As seen in Table 12 in Chapter 4, the three different proxies for proprietary costs are not highly correlated. 
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Yang (2012) finds a negative association between market-to-book value and forecast accuracy 
while Zhang (2012) finds a positive association between market-to-book value and forecast 
accuracy. Using product-market concentration ratios, some prior studies do not find significant 
associations with forecast performance measures (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Choi et al., 2010) while 
some find a negative association between proprietary costs and management forecast precision 
(Bamber and Cheon, 1998) and forecast accuracy (Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Yang, 2012), 
and a positive association between proprietary costs and forecast frequency (Baik et al., 2011). 
Using R&D intensity as a proxy for proprietary costs, Wang (2007) finds a negative association 
between proprietary costs and forecast frequency, and Wang (2007) and Hui and Matsunaga 
(2015) find a negative association between proprietary costs and forecast accuracy. However, 
Yang (2012) finds a positive association between R&D intensity and forecast accuracy. 
Overall, evidence using the three different proxies for proprietary costs is mixed. However, all 
three proxies are included to be consistent with prior research (Bamber et al., 2010, Yang, 
2012, Ng et al., 2013). 
 
Litigation risk (LITRISK) may affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure because the fear of litigation 
can result in better forecast performance (Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Wang, 2007, Bamber et 
al., 2010, Choi et al., 2010, Baik et al., 2011). Some prior studies find a positive association 
between litigation risk and forecast frequency (Brown et al., 2005, Wang, 2007, Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy, 2011, Lee et al., 2012) and a negative association between litigation risk 
and forecast precision (Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Brown et al., 2005) and accuracy (Baik et 
al., 2011). Other studies do not find a significant association between litigation risk and forecast 
frequency (Baik et al., 2011), and accuracy (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Zhang, 2012, Yang, 2012). 
While the results are mixed, I still control for litigation risk through a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a firm is in a high litigation industry (biotechnology, computers, electronics, 
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retailing and R&D service) and suffered a 20% or greater decrease in earnings (Wang, 2007, 
Bamber et al., 2010, Yang, 2012). 
 
Following Bamber et al. (2010) and Yang (2012), I control for the incidence of restructuring 
(RESTRUCT) or M&A (ACQ) during the year to account for difficulty in forecasting for such 
firms because they are likely to experience more uncertainty and have more special items 
(Williams, 1996, Brochet et al., 2011). As such these firms may have less frequent, accurate 
and precise forecasts. Yang (2012) does not find a significant association between 
RESTRUCT/ACQ and forecast accuracy. However, some prior studies find a negative 
association between the presence of restructuring events and forecast frequency (Feng et al., 
2009) and accuracy (Feng et al., 2009).  
 
Prior studies argue that firms with better governance mechanisms are likely to have better 
forecast performance (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Prior studies find 
that firms with higher institutional ownership and greater number of outside directors issue 
more frequent (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005, Baik et al., 2011, Lee et al., 
2012), accurate (Ajinkya et al., 2005, Yang, 2012) and precise management earnings forecasts 
(Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Ajinkya et al., 2005, Cheng et al., 2013). I therefore control for 
institutional ownership (INST) and the percentage of outsiders (OUTDIR) on the board of 
directors. Data for these variables are obtained from Thomson 13F, Institutional Shareholder 
Services and BoardEx. 
 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
 
The sample selection process is summarised in Table 4. Consistent with prior research (Hutton 
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and Stocken, 2007, Bamber et al., 2010, Yang, 2012), the initial sample is comprised of all 
U.S.-listed firms in Execucomp for the post-PSLR Act period 1996 to 2014. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the PSLR Act was enacted in 1995 to reduce class action litigations and reinforced 
the safe harbor that protects managers from litigation with respect to unattained forecasts 
(Johnson et al., 2001). 
 
Table 4 Sample selection 
Sample (1996-2014) 
Number of 
Executives 
Number of 
Observations 
Strict CEO/CFO transfers in Execucomp (Worked for at least two firms) 1,159 
 
Management Earnings Forecast Data available in Zacks 351 10,304 
Data available for control variables from Compustat, CRSP, Thomson 13F, 
RiskMetrics, BoardEx, Zacks, and IBES 
338 7,168 
Panel A: Sample used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Yang 2012 estimation period) 
  
Managers whose fixed effects are estimable during 1996-2005 (Yang 2012 
estimation period) 
240 2,517 
Managers whose fixed effects are estimable during 1996-2005 and also provide 
forecasts during period 2006-2009 (Yang 2012 estimation period) 
103 1,547 
Panel B: Sample used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Extending estimation periods) 
  
Managers whose fixed effects are estimable during 1996-2013 (Extending 
estimation periods) 
276 5,708 
Managers whose fixed-effects are estimable during 1996-2013 (Extending 
estimation periods) and included market reaction tests (2006-2014) 
237 4,202 
Managers whose fixed-effects are estimable during 1996-2013 (Extending 
estimation periods) and included in analyst forecast revision tests (2006-2014) 
236 4,052 
Panel C: Sample used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 (Extending estimation periods) 
  
Data available for all manager attributes and included in market reaction tests 
(2006-2014) 
160 2,691 
Data available for all manager attributes and included in analyst forecast revision 
tests (2006-2014) 
158 2,612 
 
To construct the manager-firm matched panel used to estimate manager fixed effects on prior 
forecast performance, managers who were a CEO or a CFO in more than one firm during the 
study period were tracked across firms. Both CEO and CFO positions are included in the 
sample, but not other executives, because CEOs and CFOs usually share the primary 
responsibility for the management earnings forecasts and investor relations (Tulimieri and 
Banai, 2010, Dichev et al., 2013, Bertrand, 2009, Frank and Goyal, 2007). Therefore, both the 
  
 51 
CEO and CFO are more likely than other insiders to influence credibility perceptions of 
management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al., 2010, Brochet et al., 2011, Yang, 2012). CEOs 
are identified by the variable ‘ceoann’ and CFOs were identified by the variable ‘cfoann’ in 
Execucomp. In addition, following Ge et al. 2011 and Dejong and Ling 2013, by searching 
variables ‘titles’ and ‘titleann’ for “CFO”, “Chief Financial Officer”, “Chief Finance Officer”, 
“Chief Accounting Officer”, and variations of “VP finance”. Data about executive turnovers 
were also merged in from AuditAnalytics and BoardEx to supplement Execucomp’s turnover 
data. This resulted in 1,159 managers who worked as CEO or CFO for at least two firms.  
 
Management earnings forecasts data were obtained from Zacks Investment Research (Zacks). 
The Zacks database uses their own unique identifier for each firm: Zacks Master Company 
Identification Code (ZID). Execucomp’s unique company identifier (GVKEY) and Zacks’ 
(ZID) were merged by using CUSIP, historical CUSIPs, the company ticker and name, and the 
WRDS lookup tool. 99.6% of sample firms in Execucomp firms were matched to Zacks. This 
resulted in a sample of 10,304 observations with 351 managers who worked for more than one 
firm and provided management earnings forecasts in more than one firm. Yang (2012) obtains 
713 managers and 11,171 observations for 1996-2009 using First Call CIG data, which has 
higher coverage than Zacks; I did not have access to First Call data.23  
 
Data for control variables from Compustat, CRSP, Thomson 13F, Institutional Shareholder 
Services (RiskMetrics) and BoardEx were then merged which led to a sample of 338 managers 
and 7,168 observations. For comparability with Yang (2012), I initially restrict my estimation 
period to 1996-2005 to estimate manager and firm fixed effects (Table 4 Panel A). This results 
                                               
23 A summary of Zacks versus First Call coverage is provided in Appendix B. 
  
 52 
in 240 managers with 2,517 observations for the estimation period 1996-2005. In comparison, 
the sample in Yang (2012) includes 402 managers and 6,491 observations for the same 
estimation period. Of the 240 managers, whose fixed effects are estimable, 103 also provided 
management earnings forecasts during the period 2006-2009 and are included in the market 
reaction tests. Yang (2012) obtains 172 managers with 2,051 observations at this stage. 
 
My sample period is 1996-2014, which is longer than in Yang (2012) 1996-2009 study period. 
It is likely that managers’ and firms’ forecasting performance more likely changes over a longer 
period. Therefore, I also use extending estimation periods to estimate managers’ fixed effects, 
in which the estimation period starts in 1996 (or the year the manager enters the sample) and 
ends a year before the year the management earnings forecasts were issued (Table 4 Panel B). 
For example, for a manager present in 1996, the fixed effects estimation period for management 
earnings forecasts issued in 2013 is 1996-2012, while the estimation period for management 
earnings forecasts issued in 2014 is 1996-2013. Thus, there are 9 notional estimation periods; 
the first estimation period is 1996-2005 and the last estimation period is1996-2013. This results 
in 276 managers who have worked and issued management earnings forecasts at more than one 
firm between 1996-2013 and 5,708 observations. Of those 276 managers, 237 managers also 
issue forecasts during the test period 2006-2014 and are included in the market reaction tests. 
Data for analyst forecast consensus from Zacks is then merged which results in 236 managers 
and 4,052 observations for analyst forecast revision tests.  
 
Executives’ personal, imputed and positional attributes were then merged in from Compustat, 
Institutional Shareholder Services (RiskMetrics), BoardEx, and Factiva (Table 4 Panel C). This 
resulted in 160 managers and 2,691 observations with data available for all manager attributes 
included in the market reaction tests and 158 managers and 2,612 observations included in 
analyst forecast revision tests. 
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Following the methods used in prior research, the resulting sample is small compared to the 
population of listed companies. The results must ultimately be considered in relation to the 
sample with available data. The sample also includes relatively larger companies compared to 
the population of listed companies because of the need for data from Execucomp, BoardEx and 
management earnings forecasts. This is discussed further in Section 3.6.1. 
 
 
3.4 Research Design for Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, management forecast credibility is defined as “investors’ beliefs 
about management’s trustworthiness and competence in financial disclosure” (Mercer, 2005). 
Following prior studies, I operationalise investors’ beliefs as the extent of investors’ reaction 
to the current management earnings forecast (Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Hilary and Hsu, 2011, 
Yang, 2012) and analysts’ reaction to the current management forecast (Jennings, 1987, 
Williams, 1996).  
 
I follow Yang (2012) and use the quartile ranks of firm fixed effects (RANK_FE_FIRM) and 
quartile ranks of manager-specific estimates (RANK_FE_MGR) for the three prior forecast 
performance measures (ACCURACY, FREQUENCY, and WIDTH) obtained from Model 
(1).24 Following Yang (2012), quartile ranks are used for ease of interpretation. Managers in 
the top quartile (quartile 4) are the highest performers and managers in the bottom quartile 
(quartile 1) are the worst performers. These variables are summarised in Table 5. 
  
                                               
24 A list of variable definitions is available in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 Manager and firm fixed effects variables 
FE_FIRM_ACCU = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing ACCURACY 
on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects (From Model 1). 
FE_FIRM_FREQ = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing FREQUENCY 
on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects (From Model 1). 
FE_FIRM_WIDTH = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing WIDTH on 
firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects (From Model 1). 
FE_MGR_ACCU = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing firm-year 
ACCURACY on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
(From Model 1). 
FE_MGR_FREQ = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing 
FREQUENCY on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
(From Model 1). 
FE_MGR_WIDTH = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing WIDTH 
on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects (From Model 1). 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_ACCU. 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_FREQ. 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_WIDTH. 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_ACCU. 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_FREQ. 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_WIDTH. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between managers’ prior forecast performance and 
the market reaction to management earnings forecasts news. To test Hypothesis 1, the 
following model is estimated on the sample of management earnings forecasts issued during 
2006-2014:  
 
CAR(-1,1) = µ + µ1NEWSit + µ2RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm + µ3RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm×NEWSit 
   + µ4RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm + µ5RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm×NEWSit 
   + µ6RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm + µ7RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm×NEWSit +  
   + µ8RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi + µ9RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi×NEWSit  
   + µ10RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQi + µ11RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQi×NEWSit 
   + µ12RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi + µ13RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi×NEWSi 
   + µ14F_LOSSit + µ15F_LOSSit×NEWSit + µ16ROAit + µ17ROAit×NEWSit  
   + µ18SIZEit + µ19SIZEit×NEWSit+ µ20HORIZONit + µ21HORIZONit×NEWSit 
   + ∑ µtYEARt + εit 
           (2) 
 
CAR(-1,+1) is the sum of market-adjusted returns around the management earnings forecast 
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issuance date using CRSP value-weighted index25  (Williams, 1996, Seybert and Yang, 2012, 
Yang, 2012). 26 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an association between managers’ prior forecast performance and the 
analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts news. To test Hypothesis 2, the association 
between managers’ prior forecasting performance and management earnings forecast 
credibility with analysts, the following model is estimated on the sample of management 
earnings forecasts issued during 2006-2014:  
 
AFREVit = β + β1NEWSit + β2RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm + β3RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm×NEWSit 
   + β4RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm + β5RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm×NEWSit  
   + β6RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm + β7RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm×NEWSit 
   + β8RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi + β9RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi×NEWSit  
   + β10RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQi + β11RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQi×NEWSit 
   + β12RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi×NEWSit + β13RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi×NEWSit 
   + β14F_LOSSit + β15F_LOSSit×NEWSit + β16ROAit + β17ROAit×NEWSit 
   + β18SIZEit + β19SIZEit×NEWSit + β20HORIZONit + β21HORIZONit×NEWSit 
   + ∑ tYEARt + εit  
     (3) 
 
AFREVit is the difference between the mean analyst forecast consensus within 10 days after 
the management earnings forecast date and the mean analyst forecast up to 90 days before the 
management earnings forecast date, scaled by beginning of period stock price (Hilary et al., 
2014).  
 
The extent to which market participants react to management forecasts depends on the amount 
                                               
25 The value-weighted index (VWRETD) is calculated by CRSP using all issues listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and ARCA, excluding American Depository Receipts (CRSP, 2014). 
26 If stock returns capture cross-sectional differences in discount rates and transaction costs, this could bias 
inferences about manager and firm effects on change in earnings expectations (Yeung, 2009). To potentially 
capture this, earnings volatility and market-to-book value are included as controls in Model 1. 
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of news provided by the forecast (Jennings, 1987, Rogers and Stocken, 2005, Chang et al., 
2008). Therefore, I include forecast news (NEWS) which is measured as the difference 
between the management forecast and prevailing analyst consensus forecast,27 divided by 
beginning of period stock price (Hutton and Stocken 2007). For management earnings forecasts 
bundled with earnings announcements, this news measure is adjusted by using the Rogers and 
Van Buskirk (2013) approach to estimate a conditional news measure where a conditional 
analysts forecast revision is calculated which is then compared against the forecast to obtain 
the adjusted forecast news.28 All other variables are defined in Table 3 and Table 5 above. 
 
I also include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm predicted a loss (F_LOSS) for the 
period forecasted (Atiase et al., 2005, Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Baik et al., 2011, Yang, 2012, 
Tang et al., 2016). This is because loss firms may be perceived to have lower disclosure 
credibility (Frost, 1997, Koch, 2002). However, loss firms provide less frequent management 
earnings forecasts and therefore the reaction to the news conveyed in the forecasts they do 
provide can be higher (Tang et al., 2016). Consistent with this argument, some studies find a 
positive association between forecast news by firms predicting losses and the reaction to 
management earnings forecasts (Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Yang, 2012, Tang et al., 2016). 
Atiase et al. (2005) and Baik et al. (2011) find no significant association between the news 
conveyed by firms that predict losses and the reaction to management earnings forecasts.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, prior research finds that superior performance is associated with 
higher disclosure quality (Miller, 2002). Following Yang (2012), beginning-of-period return 
on assets (ROA) is included to control for prior performance because Yang finds that the 
                                               
27 The prevailing analyst consensus forecast is the most recent mean consensus forecast up to 90 days before the 
issuance of the management earnings forecast. 
28 Details of this adjustment are provided in Appendix C. 
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reaction to forecast news is stronger for firms with higher prior performance. 
 
I include in the model the natural log of total assets (SIZE) to control for size effects in the 
response to management earnings forecasts. This is because market participants’ reaction to 
earnings news provided by larger firms is potentially smaller because larger firms have more 
pre-disclosure information and therefore a lower amount of unexpected information (Atiase, 
1985). Prior studies find evidence consistent with this argument and find a negative association 
between size and reaction to management earnings forecasts (Atiase et al., 2005, Hutton and 
Stocken, 2007). However, Yang (2012) suggests that the reaction to management earnings 
forecasts is stronger for bigger firms and finds evidence consistent with this suggestion.  
 
Forecast horizon (F_HORIZON) is included because forecasts issued closer to the end of the 
fiscal year (shorter horizon forecasts) may be less informative because of more competing 
information (less uncertainty). In other words, longer horizon forecasts are potentially more 
useful because they are likely to contain more information (Baginski et al., 2016). However, 
prior research also finds that longer horizon forecasts are more likely to be less accurate and 
therefore less credible (Baginski and Hassell, 1997). Another argument is that market 
participants are less likely to assess the credibility of management earnings forecasts that are 
issued closer to the end of the fiscal year because it is more difficult for managers to explain 
away forecast errors (Hutton and Stocken, 2007). Prior studies find a negative association 
between forecast horizon and reaction to the forecast (Hutton and Stocken, 2007, Baik et al., 
2011, Yang, 2012). Therefore, I control for forecast horizon which is equal to the number of 
days between the issuance of the management earnings forecast and the end of the fiscal period, 
divided by 365 (Bamber and Cheon, 1998, Yang, 2012). 
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3.5 Research Design for Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict that the market reaction and analyst reaction to management 
earnings forecasts, respectively, will be conditioned by managers’ attributes. Manager 
attributes (M_ATTRIBUTES) are summarised in Table 6. 
 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, the following model will be estimated on a vector of manager 
attributes (M_ATTRIBUTES), first one attribute at a time, and then with all attributes included: 
 
RESPONSEi,t = 휙 + ∑ 휙mM_ATTRIBUTESm + 휙1NEWSit + 휙2RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm 
  + 휙3RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm + 휙4RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm 
  + 휙5RANK_FE_MGR_ACCUm×NEWSit + 휙6RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTHm×NEWSit 
  + !7RANK_FE_MGR_FREQm×NEWSit + !8RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi 
  + !9RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi + !10RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQi 
  + !11RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCUi×NEWSit + !12RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTHi×NEWSit 
  + 휙13RANK_FE_MGR_FREQi×NEWSit + 휙14F_LOSSit+ !15F_LOSSit×NEWSit 
  + 휙16ROAit + 휙17ROAit×NEWSit + 휙18SIZEit+ 휙19SIZEit×NEWSit 
  + 휙20HORIZONit + 휙21HORIZONit×NEWSit 
  + ∑ tYEARt + εit 
 (4) 
 
RESPONSEi,t  is CAR (-1, +1) as in Model 2 to test Hypothesis 3 and AFREV as in Model 3 
to test Hypothesis 4. Variables for manager attributes are summarised in Table 6. All other 
variables are as defined in the previous sections.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is difficult to obtain psychometrics data on managers’ cognitive 
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and psychological traits. Therefore, prior research recommends using observable 
characteristics which may be correlated with executives’ cognitive and psychological traits 
(Hambrick, 2007). I examine whether the perceived credibility of management earnings 
forecasts vary with observable personal, imputed and positional attributes of the manager.29 
 
Table 6 Manager attributes 
Personal attributes     
AGE = the natural logarithm of the manager’s age. 
SEX = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager is a female, and 0 otherwise. 
FIN_EXP = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has an accounting/finance 
degree or professional accounting/finance qualification, and 0 otherwise. 
MBA = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has an MBA qualification, 
and 0 otherwise. 
LEGAL = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has a law degree, and 0 
otherwise. 
IVY = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager graduated from an Ivy League 
school, and 0 otherwise. 
MIL_EXPER = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has military experience, and 0 
otherwise. 
NETWORK = the natural logarithm of the executive’s number of connections 
Imputed attributes     
M_ABILITY = managerial ability, as obtained from Demerjian et al. (2012). 
PRESS_COV = the number of press citations for manager over a five-year period prior to the 
issuance of the management earnings forecast. 
AWARDS = the total number of awards won as at the beginning of year. 
Positional attributes      
TENURE = the total number of years of experience in the current position and firm at the 
beginning of the year. 
MGR_CHAIR = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager chairs the board during the 
year. 
CEO_CFO_EXPER = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the CEO has CFO experience, and 0 
otherwise. 
CHARITY = an indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager serves on the board of a 
charity during the year. 
 
Personal attributes of the manager examined are age, sex, network size, financial expertise, 
legal expertise, MBA education, Ivy league education, military experience. Data for personal 
attributes were obtained from Execucomp, BoardEx and AuditAnalytics.30 AGE is the natural 
                                               
29 These attributes were explained in Section 2.6. I explain the variables again, in this section, for completeness. 
30 BoardEx assigns a unique ID to each manager (Director ID). This was matched to Execucomp’s unique manager 
ID (ExecID) through merging by company identifiers and the manager’s first name and last name and cross 
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log of the executive’s age. As previously discussed, age is examined because it can affect the 
perceived credibility of forecast news because the managers’ age can be used as a signal for 
general experience (Hovland et al., 1953). SEX is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
executive is female (Bamber et al., 2010, Davis et al., 2015). Prior studies find some evidence 
that gender can be a factor which affects perceptions of credibility (Newell and Shemwell, 
1995, Buchan et al., 2008). Financial expertise and education, are examined because they can 
signal a higher level of expertise (Li et al., 2010, Custódio and Metzger, 2014). Financial 
expertise (FIN_EXP) is an indicator variable equal to one if the manager has an 
accounting/finance degree or professional accounting/finance qualification, and zero otherwise 
(Bamber et al., 2010, Davis et al., 2015). MBA is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
manager has an MBA qualification, and zero otherwise (Bamber et al., 2010, Choi et al., 2010, 
Custódio and Metzger, 2014, Davis et al., 2015). LEGAL is an indicator variable coded as one 
if the manager has a law degree, and zero otherwise (Bamber et al., 2010, Custódio and 
Metzger, 2014, Davis et al., 2015). It is examined because prior studies find that managers with 
a legal background tend to be more conservative (Bamber et al., 2010, Custódio and Metzger, 
2014, Davis et al., 2015). IVY is an indicator variable equal to one if the manager went to an 
Ivy league university, and zero otherwise (Custódio and Metzger, 2014). It is examined because 
Ivy league education can convey academic excellence and competence. NETWORK is the 
natural logarithm of the executive’s number of overlaps through employment, education and 
social activities as calculated by BoardEx. Managers’ social connections are examined because 
they can indicate managers’ resourcefulness (Hochberg et al., 2007, Engelberg et al., 2012). 
 
                                               
checking the executive’s middle name, appointment year or exit year. Next, I matched using the manager’s full 
name only if BoardEx had a record of the manager’s full name working at a different firm but no record of the 
corresponding Execucomp firm. For those cases, to ensure that a true match was obtained, I performed Google 
searches to check that the manager indeed worked at both firms. This resulted in 93% of Execucomp’s ExecID 
being matched to BoardEx’s Director ID. 
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Imputed attributes examined are managerial ability, press coverage and number of awards won. 
Managerial ability (M_ABILITY) is the 2015 Demerjian et al. (2012a) score obtained from 
their website.31 This score proxies for managers’ efficiency in generating revenue32. Press 
coverage (PRESS_COV) is measured using the total number of press articles with the 
manager’s name over the five years preceding the issuance of the management earnings 
forecast. The number of press citations for each manager was obtained from Factiva and was 
hand collected from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Fortune magazine, 
Financial Times, Bloomberg Businessweek and Forbes (Francis et al., 2008, Baik et al., 
2011).33 AWARDS is the number of awards won by the executive as at the beginning of the 
year of the release of the management earnings forecast obtained from BoardEx. The number 
of awards won by an executive can signal their ability (Koh, 2011). Overall, three proxies for 
ability can affect the perceived credibility of the managers and therefore result in a stronger 
reaction to their management earnings forecasts. 
 
Positional attributes of the manager examined are tenure in the current firm, manager/chair 
duality, CEO’s CFO experience and charity involvement. Prior research argues that tenure can 
be a proxy for manager reputation because longer tenured managers have survived many board 
evaluations (Milbourn, 2003). Therefore, I examine whether tenure is associated with the 
perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. TENURE is measured as the number 
of years the manager was employed at the firm at the beginning of the year. The appointment 
                                               
31 http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html 
32 Demerjian et al (2012) obtain this score by first using data envelope analysis to estimate firm-efficiency on 
revenue-generating resources namely cost of inventory, SG&A expenses, fixed assets, operating leases, past R&D 
expenditures and intangible assets. Demerjian et al. then regress this firm level efficiency measure against firm 
characteristics. The residual from that regression is the proxy for managerial ability measure used in this thesis. 
33 For the sake of completeness, the executive’s full name including their middle name and common names 
were searched. The lists of hits were than manually checked to ensure that the mentions pertained to the correct 
person. 
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dates of managers were obtained from Execucomp, AuditAnalytics and BoardEx. I also 
examine whether manager/chair duality can affect the perceived credibility of management 
earnings forecasts. This is because prior research argues that managers who are also 
chairperson are more powerful and therefore have more influence over the firm’s policies 
including its disclosures (Krause et al., 2014). Manager/chair (MGR_CHAIR) duality is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the manager chairs the board during the year, and zero 
otherwise. Data for manager/chair duality was obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(RiskMetrics) and BoardEx. CEO’s CFO experience (CEO_CFO_EXPER) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the CEO has CFO experience at the beginning of the year, and zero 
otherwise (Matsunaga et al., 2013). I tracked CEOs across firms in Execucomp and BoardEx 
to determine whether they had CFO experience. This variable is examined because research 
finds that CEOs with CFO experience have financial expertise and are more likely to be 
associated with an increase in disclosure quality (Aier et al., 2005, Matsunaga et al., 2013, 
Custódio and Metzger, 2014, Hoitash et al., 2016a). Finally, I examine whether the manager’s 
involvement in a charity affects the perceived credibility of their management earnings 
forecast. Charitable involvement (CHARITY) is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
manager serves on the board of a charity during the year (Davis et al., 2015).34 This is because 
prior research finds that charitable involvement can signal altruism (Littler, 2008).  
 
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section provides some descriptive statistics for the distributions of the variables. Section 
                                               
34 Data for whether a manager was involved in a charity was obtained from BoardEx. 
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3.6.1 describes the sample when the Yang (2012) 1996-2009 study period is used. Section 3.6.2 
describes the full sample when extending estimation periods are used to estimate manager fixed 
effects on prior forecast performance. Section 3.6.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the 
manager attributes. Descriptive statistics for manager and firm fixed effects are reported in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics using Yang (2012) Study Period 
 
In order to compare the sample to prior research, I initially report the descriptive statistics for 
the underlying variables for the period 1996-2009 in Table 7. This consists of the same 
estimation sample 1996-2005 and test period of 2006-2009 of Yang (2012). All continuous 
control variables are winsorized at the bottom and top one percent to mitigate the potential 
impact on the results of extreme values. The sample when the Yang (2012) period of 1996-
2009 is used consists of 240 managers and 2,517 observations. The descriptive statistics are 
mostly consistent with prior studies using the manager-firm matched panel method (Yang, 
2012, Bamber et al., 2010). The average return on assets is about 6.7%, the number of analyst 
following is about 9.4, the mean level of institutional ownership is 76.4% and the mean level 
of outside directorship on the board is 91.3%. The average firm issues about 6.8 management 
earnings forecasts during the sample period. The average forecast is issued about 140 days 
before the end of the fiscal period end (0.394 × 365 days), with error of about -1.1% of price.  
 
The distributions of the variables are generally similar to Yang (2012). However, one notable 
difference is that the Yang (2012) sample has 13.5% firms predicting losses, compared to about 
4.3% in Table 7. This might be because Yang (2012) uses First Call management earnings  
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics for the period 1996-2009 (Based on Yang (2012) study period) 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STD DEV 
CAR -0.005 -0.291 -0.040 0.000 0.039 0.201 -0.624 0.568 0.086 
SIZE 7.959 4.969 6.887 7.768 8.986 11.425 4.066 12.467 1.539 
F_LOSS 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.204 
ROA 0.067 -0.205 0.031 0.065 0.106 0.310 -0.205 0.332 0.078 
INST 0.764 0.320 0.663 0.777 0.880 1.121 0.022 1.753 0.167 
ANALYSTS 9.440 1.000 5.000 8.000 14.000 24.000 0.000 30.000 5.793 
HORIZON 0.394 0.008 0.167 0.205 0.658 1.438 0.003 3.126 0.343 
EARNVOL 0.496 0.071 0.240 0.390 0.627 2.120 0.013 4.320 0.413 
ANNUAL 0.515 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
OUTDIR 0.913 0.600 0.857 0.917 1.000 1.000 0.400 1.000 0.098 
MTB 3.393 -0.417 1.782 2.675 3.955 20.094 -0.417 20.094 2.968 
CONC 0.043 0.019 0.031 0.040 0.049 0.132 0.016 0.309 0.021 
LITRISK 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.330 
RESTRUCT 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.492 
ACQ 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.292 
R&D 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.042 0.202 0.000 0.329 0.046 
FREQUENCY 6.751 1.000 4.000 6.000 9.000 24.000 1.000 33.000 4.634 
WIDTH -0.003 -0.020 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -1.680 0.000 0.022 
ACCURACY -0.011 -0.144 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -4.003 0.000 0.072 
RAW_F_NEWS -0.002 -0.037 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.020 -0.751 0.771 0.019 
F_NEWS 0.001 -0.114 -0.004 0.000 0.007 0.092 -0.793 0.771 0.037 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for 103 managers and 1,547 observations (1996-2009). This sample is obtained by using the Yang (2012) 
sample period. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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forecast data which covers more firms as compared to Zacks, especially in the earlier estimation 
periods, which are used to estimate fixed effects.35 One potential implication for this difference 
in coverage is that this sample is more representative of larger firms than Yang (2012). This 
could work against finding significant effects because manager-specific effects are expected to 
decline with size (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Bamber et al., 2010). Consistent with findings 
by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), after adjusting for bundled forecasts, the average 
management earnings forecast is a good news forecast (0.001) as opposed to the raw unadjusted 
news measure (RAW_F_NEWS) which is on average a bad news forecast (-0.002).36 
 
 
3.6.2 Descriptive Statistics using Extending Estimation Periods 
 
Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for the period 1996-2014 using the extending 
estimation periods to estimate the fixed effects of managers on management forecasting 
performance. All continuous control variables are winsorized at the bottom and top one percent 
to mitigate the potential impact on the results of extreme values. As previously mentioned, 
there are 9 estimation periods, the first estimation period being 1996-2005 and extending by a 
year at a time, leading to the last estimation period which is 1996-2013. Using extending 
estimation periods, fixed effects for 276 managers with 5,708 observations were estimable (see 
Table 4). Of those 276 managers who provided management earnings forecasts during the 
estimation periods, 237 also provided management earnings forecasts during the test period 
(2006-2014) and are included in market reaction tests while 236 are included in analyst forecast 
revision tests. For all the variables in Table 8, the number of executives included in this sample 
is 237 with 4,202 observations except for the analyst forecast revision variable which includes 
236 managers with 4,052 observations.  
                                               
35 See Appendix B for a comparison between First Call and Zacks coverage. 
36 See Appendix C for details about the Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) adjustment for bundled forecasts. 
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics for the period 1996-2014 using extending estimation periods (Used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STD DEV 
CAR 0.000 -0.223 -0.034 0.001 0.036 0.186 -0.517 0.568 0.074 
AFREV -0.001 -0.022 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.013 -0.078 0.047 0.006 
SIZE 8.649 5.598 7.532 8.563 9.697 11.651 4.588 12.240 1.485 
LOSS 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.145 
ROA 0.069 -0.191 0.031 0.066 0.105 0.266 -0.205 0.332 0.071 
INST 0.808 0.429 0.721 0.809 0.900 1.113 0.000 1.452 0.143 
ANALYSTS 12.214 2.000 8.000 12.000 16.000 27.000 1.000 36.000 5.867 
HORIZON 0.450 0.030 0.178 0.400 0.690 1.195 0.003 2.490 0.330 
EARNVOL 0.532 0.050 0.275 0.425 0.677 2.052 0.024 4.188 0.415 
ANNUAL 0.666 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.472 
OUTDIR 0.947 0.750 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.571 1.000 0.067 
MTB 3.192 0.494 1.699 2.555 3.702 20.094 -0.417 20.094 2.878 
CONC 0.040 0.019 0.030 0.037 0.045 0.093 0.016 0.143 0.015 
LITRISK 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.297 
RESTRUCT 0.513 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
ACQ 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.248 
R&D 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.038 0.151 0.000 0.221 0.037 
FREQUENCY 6.806 1.000 4.000 6.000 8.000 18.000 1.000 19.000 3.262 
WIDTH -0.003 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.157 0.000 0.006 
ACCURACY -0.009 -0.133 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.750 0.000 0.028 
RAW_F_NEWS -0.002 -0.033 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.017 -0.479 0.107 0.019 
F_NEWS -0.002 -0.106 -0.008 0.000 0.006 0.093 -0.433 0.341 0.034 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for firm and forecast for the period 1996-2014 for 237 managers and 4,202 observations for each variable except for AFREV which 
includes 236 managers and 4,052 observations. This sample is obtained by using extending estimation periods with the first estimation period commencing on 1996-2005 and 
ending on 1996-2013. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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On average, sample firms issue 6.8 management earnings forecasts. The average forecast is a 
range forecast with an error of about 1% of price and issued about 164 days before the end of 
the fiscal period. The average ROA is about 6.9%, firms with predicted losses are about 2.2% 
of the sample and about 6.6% of firm-years had an acquisition or merger during the sample 
period. The average level of institutional ownership during the sample period is 80.8% and the 
average level of outside directors on the board is 94.7%. The average raw management earnings 
forecast news (RAW_F_NEWS) and the adjusted forecast news (F_NEWS) have similar 
means and medians. Overall, the distributions are generally similar to Table 7. Some 
differences are size and number of analyst following which is higher when extending 
estimation periods are used.  The percentage of firms predicting losses falls from 4.3% to 2.2%. 
This could imply that the sample is biased towards larger firms. As discussed previously, this 
would work against finding results for manager fixed effects because manager fixed effects is 
expected to decline with firm size (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Bamber et al., 2010). 
 
 
3.6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Managerial Attributes 
 
Table 9 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for managerial attributes over the period 1996-
2014. These managerial attributes are included to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Panel B reports the 
descriptive statistics for the other variables included in the models. All continuous variables 
except for the dependent variables and managerial attributes are winsorised at the bottom and 
top one percent to mitigate the impact on the results of extreme values. This sample is 
comprised of managers who have provided management earnings forecasts in more than one 
firm and for which data for all managerial attributes are available. The sample includes 160 
managers and 2,691 observations, except for the variable AFREV which consists of 158 
managers and 2,612 observations.  
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Table 9 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for manager attributes (Used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STD DEV 
SEX 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.232 
AGE 54.154 42.000 50.000 54.000 58.000 68.000 40.000 72.000 5.930 
FIN_EXP 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.484 
MBA 0.533 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
LEGAL 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.234 
IVY 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.424 
MIL_EXPER 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.279 
NETWORK 6.683 4.762 6.109 6.652 7.275 8.599 4.543 8.599 0.847 
M_ABILITY 0.026 -0.203 -0.062 -0.015 0.076 0.542 -0.275 0.594 0.146 
PRESS_COV 33.296 0.000 1.000 2.000 11.000 654.000 0.000 902.000 114.103 
AWARDS 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.000 0.000 10.000 1.545 
TENURE 4.532 0.159 1.885 3.751 6.504 15.260 0.079 18.263 3.279 
MGR_CHAIR 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.440 
CEO_CFO_EXPER 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.420 
CHARITY 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.105 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for managerial attributes, firm and forecast characteristics for the period 1996-2014 for 160 managers and 
2,691 observations. This sample is the sample for which data for all managerial attributes are available. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 9 Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firm and forecast characteristics (Used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
Variable Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STD DEV 
CAR 0.002 -0.214 -0.034 0.003 0.039 0.189 -0.402 0.412 0.071 
AFREV -0.001 -0.022 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.012 -0.078 0.047 0.006 
SIZE 8.701 5.739 7.596 8.678 9.642 11.706 5.317 12.240 1.414 
LOSS 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.151 
ROA 0.075 -0.191 0.043 0.076 0.112 0.253 -0.205 0.332 0.072 
INST 0.819 0.489 0.738 0.807 0.905 1.121 0.382 1.189 0.125 
ANALYSTS 12.844 2.000 8.000 13.000 17.000 28.000 1.000 36.000 5.940 
HORIZON 0.432 0.027 0.178 0.285 0.685 1.181 0.003 2.490 0.318 
EARNVOL 0.525 0.049 0.289 0.440 0.680 1.643 0.031 4.188 0.387 
ANNUAL 0.637 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.481 
OUTDIR 0.951 0.750 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.571 1.000 0.067 
MTB 3.459 -0.417 1.882 2.820 3.844 20.094 -0.417 20.094 3.034 
CONC 0.038 0.019 0.029 0.036 0.043 0.072 0.016 0.143 0.013 
LITRISK 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.317 
RESTRUCT 0.570 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 
ACQ 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.232 
R&D 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.045 0.147 0.000 0.221 0.039 
FREQUENCY 7.061 2.000 4.000 7.000 9.000 19.000 1.000 19.000 3.407 
WIDTH 0.003 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.157 0.000 0.006 
ACCURACY -0.010 -0.153 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.750 0.000 0.031 
RAW_F_NEWS -0.002 -0.040 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.017 -0.479 0.107 0.022 
F_NEWS -0.002 -0.113 -0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.091 -0.433 0.341 0.033 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for managerial attributes, firm and forecast characteristics for the period 1996-2014 for 160 managers 
and 2,691 observations. This sample is the sample for which data for all managerial attributes are available. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.
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About 5.7% of the sample is female and the average age of a manager is 54 which is consistent 
with Davis et al (2015), who use a manager-firm matched sample to study tone across 
managers, find that 6% of their sample are female and the average age of the manager is 51. 
Approximately 37.2% of managers in the sample have an accounting/finance accounting 
degree or qualification, 53.3% have an MBA degree, 23.5% graduated from an Ivy league 
university and 22.8% of CEOs have CFO experience. The average managerial ability 
(M_ABILITY) score is 0.026. About 5.8% of managers have a law degree and 8.5% of 
managers have military experience, which is similar to what Bamber et al. (2010) obtain. The 
average tenure for a sample manager is about 4.5 years and about 26.3% of the sample’s 
managers also serve as the chairperson. About 1.1% of sample managers have charity 
experience. An average manager in the sample has about 812 network connections. The mean 
number of press citations over five years is 33 while the median is 2 which indicates that press 
citations is positively skewed. The average number of awards won by a manager is 0.4 and the 
median is 0. Firm and forecast characteristics (Panel B) are, in general, comparable to those in 
Table 8. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Overall, this chapter documents the research design used in this thesis. The attributes for this 
sample is compared to the sample attributes for similar prior studies. The variable values and 
distributions are mostly consistent with prior research and the sample is assessed as reliable to 
proceed to testing the hypotheses. The results are reported in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4  Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reports and interprets the estimations of manager fixed effects and the results for 
my four hypotheses tests. Hypotheses 1 predicts a positive association between manager-
specific prior forecast performance and market reaction to management earnings forecast news 
while Hypothesis 2 predicts an association between manager-specific prior forecast 
performance and analyst reaction to management earnings forecast news. Hypotheses 3 and 4 
predict that investors’ and analysts’ reactions to management earnings forecasts, respectively, 
is moderated by managerial attributes. Section 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the 
fixed effects estimated using Model 1. Section 4.3 reports the correlations between variables. 
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 provide the results when the Yang (2012) study period is used. Section 
4.4.3 presents the results for Hypothesis 1. Section 4.5 provides the results for Hypothesis 2. 
Section 4.6 provides the results for Hypothesis 3 and Section 4.7 reports the results for 
Hypothesis 4. Section 4.8 concludes this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation of Manager and Firm Fixed Effects 
 
To obtain manager and firm fixed effects, Model 1 is estimated on forecast accuracy, forecast 
frequency and forecast precision. In addition, I estimate fixed effects using: (1) the Yang (2012) 
study period, and (2) extending estimation periods, as discussed in Chapter 3. Table 10 
describes the distributions of the manager and firm fixed effect coefficients on accuracy when 
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the model is estimated for the Yang (2012) time periods. Panel A provides the descriptive 
statistics for manager and firm fixed effects on accuracy for the Yang (2012) estimation period 
(1996-2005). The estimation period includes 240 managers and 2,517 observations. For the 
estimation sample, the manager fixed effects coefficients on accuracy (FE_MGR_ACCU) are 
lower than Yang (2012) and firm fixed effects coefficients on accuracy (FE_FIRM_ACCU) 
are comparable with Yang (2012), who estimates the coefficients for 402 managers and 679 
firms as compared to the sample’s 240 managers and 414 firms. As noted in Section 3.3, this 
is because, Yang (2012) uses First Call data for management earnings forecasts, which has 
higher coverage than Zacks. The mean of the manager fixed effects on accuracy for the 
estimation period is 0.004 compared to Yang’s 0.016 and the median on manager fixed effects 
on accuracy is 0.003 compared to Yang’s 0.017. The mean firm fixed effects on accuracy for 
the estimation period is -0.021 compared to Yang’s which is -0.027 and the median obtained 
is -0.024 compared to Yang’s -0.020. Yang (2012) does not report the standard deviation of 
the fixed effect estimations. The interquartile range for manager fixed effects this sample is 
0.024, which is comparable to Yang’s interquartile range of 0.020. However, the interquartile 
range for firm fixed effects in the sample is 0.137, which is higher than Yang’s interquartile 
range of 0.047, which suggests higher variability in the sample’s firm fixed effects. 
 
Table 10 Descriptive statistics for fixed effects using Yang (2012) study period 
Variable N Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STDEV 
Panel A: Estimation Sample (1996 - 2005)       
FE_MGR_ACCU 240 0.004 -0.108 -0.007 0.003 0.017 0.110 -0.209 0.354 0.044 
FE_FIRM_ACCU 414 -0.021 -0.238 -0.096 -0.024 0.041 0.316 -4.059 0.475 0.137 
 
          
Panel B: Testing Sample (2006 - 2009)        
FE_MGR_ACCU 103 -0.001 -0.108 -0.010 0.002 0.013 0.083 -0.123 0.354 0.033 
FE_FIRM_ACCU 107 0.007 -0.203 -0.076 -0.011 0.072 0.475 -0.561 0.475 0.122 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for manager fixed effects on accuracy using the Yang (2012) estimation period 
(1996-2005) and test period (2006-2009). The estimation period includes 240 managers, 414 firms and 2,517 observations. 
The test period includes 103 managers, 107 firms and 1,547 observations. Variable Definitions: FE_MGR_ACCU is the 
raw fixed effects of the manager on forecast accuracy. FE_FIRM_ACCU is the raw fixed effects of the firm on forecast 
accuracy.  
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Table 10 Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the managers whose fixed effects were 
obtained in the estimation period and also provided management earnings forecasts during the 
Yang (2012) test period of 2006-2009. The mean for manager fixed effects on accuracy for the 
test period is -0.001 and the mean for firm fixed effects on accuracy is 0.007. It can be seen 
that the signs for mean manager and firm fixed effects for accuracy flip in the test period 
compared to the estimation period. One possible reason is because there are less extreme values 
for manager and firm fixed effects on accuracy in the test period. The minimum value for firm 
fixed effects on forecast accuracy is -4.059 in the estimation period while the minimum value 
in the test period is -0.561. However, the standard deviation for manager and firm fixed effects 
obtained are comparable in the estimation sample and the testing sample. As previously 
mentioned, Yang (2012) does not report standard deviations of manager and firm fixed effects 
estimated. The interquartile range for manager fixed effects in the test period in this sample is 
0.023 compared to Yang’s 0.016 and the interquartile range for firm fixed effects is 0.148 
compared to Yang’s 0.054. These differences in fixed effects highlight the sample differences 
between this study and Yang (2012), which could impact on the results obtained.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3, because the sample period (1996-2014) in this thesis is longer than 
Yang (2012) and it is reasonable to expect that manager and firm forecasting performance 
changes over time, extending estimation periods are used to estimate fixed effects. The first 
estimation period is 1996-2005 and extends in increments of one year. The last estimation 
period is 1996-2013. The test period when using extending estimation periods is 2006-2014. 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the test period 2006-2014, when extending 
estimation periods are used in estimating the fixed effects on accuracy, frequency and 
precision. The sample includes 4,202 management earnings forecasts issued by 237 managers 
and 253 firms.  
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Distributions of manager fixed effects and firm fixed effects coefficients are centered around 
zero except for firm fixed effects on forecast frequency which has a mean of 1.644. There is 
variation in the manager fixed effect estimates on accuracy (FE_MGR_ACCU) with managers 
in the 75th percentile issuing forecasts that are more accurate by about 1.8% of price than those 
issued by managers in the 25th percentile. Similar to what is obtained when the Yang (2012) 
sample is used, the mean and median manager fixed effects on accuracy are lower than those 
obtained by Yang (2012). Firm fixed effects on accuracy are comparable to those obtained by 
Yang (2012). Manager fixed effects on frequency (FE_MGR_FREQ) show that managers in 
the 75th percentile provide about 3.24 more forecasts each year than managers in the 25th 
percentile. Variation in management fixed effects on width of forecasts (FE_MGR_WIDTH) 
is low with managers in the 75th percentile issuing forecasts with a width at about 0.3% of price 
more precise than managers in the 25th percentile. 
 
Table 11 Descriptive statistics for fixed effects using extending estimation periods   
Variable N Mean 1% 25% Median 75% 99% MIN MAX STDEV 
FE_MGR_ACCU 237 0.002 -0.108 -0.007 0.002 0.011 0.093 -0.185 0.473 0.033 
FE_FIRM_ACCU 253 -0.022 -0.162 -0.048 -0.027 -0.002 0.147 -0.292 0.341 0.054 
FE_MGR_FREQ 237 -0.338 -6.231 -1.977 -0.249 1.259 7.211 -13.402 11.647 2.704 
FE_FIRM_FREQ 253 1.644 -5.416 -0.574 1.726 3.890 9.053 -8.212 14.751 3.396 
FE_MGR_WIDTH 237 0.000 -0.030 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.019 -0.159 0.532 0.022 
FE_FIRM_WIDTH 253 0.005 -0.018 -0.001 0.002 0.008 0.053 -0.023 0.110 0.012 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the estimated fixed effects during the test period 2006-2014 when 
extending estimation periods are used. The sample in the test period includes 237 managers, 253 firms and 4,202 
observations. Variable Definitions: FE_MGR_ACCU is the raw fixed effects of the manager on forecast accuracy. 
FE_FIRM_ACCU is the raw fixed effects of the firm on forecast accuracy. FE_MGR_FREQ is the raw fixed effects 
of the manager on forecast frequency. FE_FIRM_FREQ is the raw fixed effects of the firm on forecast frequency. 
FE_MGR_WIDTH is the raw fixed effects of the manager on forecast precision (width of the range). 
FE_FIRM_WIDTH is the raw fixed effects of the firm on forecast precision (width of the range). 
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4.3 Correlations 
 
The correlation matrix for all variables for the 2006-2014 test period sample of 4,202 
management earnings forecasts used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 is reported in Table 12. SIZE 
is strongly associated with firm fixed effects on forecast accuracy (correlation = 0.61), forecast 
frequency (correlation = -0.21) and forecast width (correlation = 0.40). This indicates that 
bigger firms have stronger firm fixed effects on management earnings forecast performance. 
As discussed in Section 3.6.1, this could imply that manager fixed effects for larger firms may 
be lower. As expected, prior forecast accuracy is positively associated with market reaction 
(correlation = 0.10) and analyst forecast revisions (correlation = 0.21). In general, quartile 
ranks of manager fixed effects are negatively associated with the quartile ranks of firm fixed 
effects. This implies that manager fixed effects on forecast performance increase as firm fixed 
effects on forecast performance decrease.37 The quartile rank of manager fixed effects on 
accuracy is strongly positively associated with the quartile rank of manager fixed effects on 
precision (correlation = 0.42). 38 Similarly, the quartile rank of firm fixed effects on accuracy 
is strongly positively associated with the quartile rank of firm fixed effects on precision 
(correlation = 0.73). Given the small sample size, this may work against identifying significant 
effects when both quartile ranks are included in the same model because there is little variation 
unique to each quartile rank (Kennedy, 2003).39 
 
The correlation matrix for all variables for the 2016-2014 test period sample of 161 managers 
and 2,691 observations with data available to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 are reported in Table 13. 
Size is negatively correlated with financial expertise (correlation = -0.30) which suggests that 
the larger the firm the less likely the manager will have an accounting/finance background. 
                                               
37 It is possible that this could also be a design artefact (Fee et al., 2013). Hypotheses 3 and 4 tackle some of this 
issue by examining observable manager attributes in addition to manager fixed effects on prior forecast 
performance. 
38 The correlations cannot be compared with Bamber et al. (2010) and Yang (2012) because they do not report 
correlations for manager and firm fixed effect coefficients. 
39 In additional analyses, I follow Bamber et al. (2010) and use a categorical variable for precision to test the 
hypotheses. 
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Firm size is positively correlated with the manager’s network size (correlation = 0.49), press 
coverage (correlation = 0.45) and the number of awards won by the manager (correlation = 
0.40). This suggests that larger firms are likely to hire more connected, visible, high-profile 
and better performing managers. It could also mean that managers employed by larger firms 
receive more exposure and make more connections, are covered more by the press and win 
more awards. The manager’s sex is positively correlated with press coverage (correlation = 
0.31) and number of awards won (correlation = 0.30) which suggests that female managers are 
more likely to receive more press coverage and more awards. Military experience is positively 
associated with age (correlation = 0.28) which is expected as older managers are more likely 
to have served in the military. Financial expertise is negatively correlated with military 
experience (correlation = -0.23), network size (correlation = -0.28) and press coverage 
(correlation = -0.21). This suggests that managers with an accounting/finance background are 
less likely to have served in the military, have fewer connections and lower press coverage. 
MBA and Ivy league education are positively correlated which suggests that managers are 
more likely to have a received an MBA from an Ivy league university. Network size and tenure 
are positively correlated with LEGAL which suggests that managers with a legal background 
are more likely to be more connected and have longer tenures.  
 
The managerial ability score obtained from Demerjian et al. (2012) is positively correlated the 
number of awards won by the manager, which suggests that higher ability managers are more 
likely to be higher performing and win more awards. Press coverage is highly positively 
correlated with the number of awards won (correlation = 0.83). This result may be the 
consequence of the fact that managers who win more awards are likely to be more high-profile 
and covered more by the press. Tenure and forecast frequency are positively correlated 
(correlation = 0.22) which suggests that longer tenured managers are more likely to issue 
management earnings forecasts. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 13 show that many of the manager attributes are correlated. While 
most coefficients are not very large, there is still the potential for multicollinearity, which 
combined with the low sample size, may yield unreliable estimates for coefficients of the  
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Table 12 Correlation matrix (Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
 
This table provides the Pearson correlations for the sample of 237 managers and 4,202 management earnings forecasts issued over the test period 2006-2014. Variable definitions 
are available in Appendix A. The correlations marked in bold are significant at the 5% level.   
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Table 13 Correlation matrix (Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
 
This table provides the Pearson correlations for the sample of 160 managers and 2,691 observations during the test period 2006-2014 with data available for all managerial attributes 
used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Variable definitions are available in Appendix A. The correlations marked in bold are significant at least at the 5% level.   
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variables concerned. Therefore, I examine the association between investors’ and analysts’ 
reactions and each manager attribute individually, before including them together in the 
multiple regression. 
 
 
4.4 Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between manager prior forecast performance and 
the stock price reaction to each unit of forecast news. Section 4.4.1 presents the results when 
the association between manager fixed effects on accuracy and stock market reaction is tested 
using the Yang (2012) study period. Section 4.4.2 reports the results when the Yang (2012) 
study period is used but when forecast news is adjusted for bundled forecasts using the Rogers 
and Van Buskirk (2013) approach. Section 4.4.3 reports the results for Hypothesis 1 when 
extending estimation periods are used.  
 
 
4.4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 using Yang (2012) Study Period 
 
The results using the same estimation period 1996-2005 and test period 2006-2009 as Yang 
(2012) are reported in Table 14. The forecast news measure (RAW_NEWS) in this test follows 
Yang (2012) and does not adjust for the presence of bundled forecasts. It is calculated as the 
difference between the management earnings forecast (midpoint of the range) and analyst 
forecast consensus 90 days prior to the release of the management earnings forecast scaled by 
price (Yang, 2012, Hilary et al., 2014). 
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Table 14 Results using the Yang (2012) study period and raw forecast news 
    (1) (2) 
  2006-2009 2006-2009 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 
        
RAW_NEWS + 3.302* 5.450*** 
  (0.056) (0.004) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? -0.001 0.000 
  (0.711) (0.799) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×RAW_NEWS + -0.221 -0.098 
  (0.365) (0.691) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ?  0.007*** 
   (0.001) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×RAW_NEWS +  0.727*** 
   (0.004) 
SIZE ? 0.002 -0.002 
  (0.213) (0.173) 
SIZE×RAW_NEWS ? -0.217 -0.722*** 
  (0.214) (0.004) 
F_LOSS ? -0.021* -0.029** 
  (0.067) (0.013) 
F_LOSS×RAW_NEWS ? -1.653** -2.417*** 
  (0.014) (0.001) 
ROA ? -0.061** -0.058** 
  (0.033) (0.039) 
ROA×RAW_NEWS + 6.828** 5.252* 
  (0.022) (0.082) 
HORIZON ? 0.005 0.006 
  (0.352) (0.240) 
HORIZON×RAW_NEWS ? 0.144 0.415 
  (0.840) (0.559) 
Constant  0.144 0.415 
  (0.840) (0.559) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES 
Observations  1,547 1,547 
Adj R-squared   0.024 0.034 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on manager fixed effects on 
accuracy using the Yang (2012) study period and raw forecast news. The sample includes 103 
managers and 1,547 observations. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The R-squareds (not tabulated) obtained are 0.033 for the model with manager fixed effects 
only (Column 1) and 0.044 for the model that controls for firm fixed effects on accuracy 
(Column 2).40 These are comparable to Yang (2012).  
 
As opposed to Yang (2012), as seen in Column 1 of Table 14, no significant results are obtained 
for manager-specific fixed effects on accuracy. This could possibly be because of the sample 
differences with Yang (2012). However, further analyses show similar results when alternative 
test periods are used.41 Once firm fixed effects on management earnings forecast accuracy are 
included as controls (Column 2), Yang (2012) finds that the manager-specific effect on 
accuracy is no longer significant while the firm-specific effect on accuracy interacted with 
news is positive and significant. As seen in Column 2 of Table 14, once firm fixed effects on 
forecast accuracy are included as controls, RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS is positive and 
significant which is similar to Yang (2012). This implies that the market reaction is stronger 
for management earnings forecast news released by firms with higher prior forecast accuracy.  
 
SIZE×NEWS is negative and significant, which suggests that there is a smaller reaction to 
management forecast news released by larger firms. As discussed in Chapter 3, this could be 
because larger firms have more pre-disclosure and less unexpected information which would 
incite a smaller reaction from market participants (Atiase, 1985). 
 
 
                                               
40 Yang (2012) reports R-squareds but does not report Adjusted R-squareds. 
41 See Appendix D where I report the results when the Yang (2012) estimation period and alternative test 
periods are used. 
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4.4.2 Testing Hypothesis 1 using Yang (2012) Study Period (Adjusted for Bundled 
Forecasts) 
 
The results for when the forecast news measure is adjusted for bundled forecasts using the 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) approach are reported in Table 15. Appendix B provides 
details of this adjustment. Data requirements for this adjustment leads to a sample of 94 
managers and 1,267 observations. As seen in Table 14, without adjustment, forecast news 
(RAW_NEWS) is positive and significant which suggests that the market reaction is stronger 
when more news is released. However, when forecast news is adjusted bundled forecasts 
(NEWS) in Table 15, forecast news is no longer significant. This suggests that the results in 
Table 14 maybe reflect the market’s reaction to the earnings announcement rather than the 
management earnings forecast news. Similar to results obtained in Table 14, manager fixed 
effects on accuracy (RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU) interacted with NEWS is not significant 
suggesting that the market does not vary with manager-specific forecast accuracy. In addition, 
compared to results in Table 14, when forecast news is adjusted for bundling, 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS is no longer significant but RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is 
positive and significant suggesting that the market reacts more strongly to issuance of 
management earnings forecasts by firms with higher firm-specific prior forecast accuracy.  
 
Overall, the results in Table 15 when news is adjusted for bundled management earnings 
forecasts, suggest that the results obtained by Yang (2012) may be driven by the market’s 
reaction to earnings announcements rather than to the management earnings forecasts. 
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Table 15 Results using the Yang (2012) study period and adjusted forecast news 
    (1) (2) 
  2006-2009 2006-2009 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 
        
NEWS + -0.039 -0.312 
  (0.947) (0.626) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? 0.000 0.001 
  (0.988) (0.674) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS + 0.007 -0.017 
  (0.930) (0.849) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ?  0.006** 
   (0.025) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS +  -0.087 
   (0.489) 
SIZE ? 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.179) (0.517) 
SIZE×NEWS ? -0.028 0.034 
  (0.644) (0.733) 
F_LOSS ? -0.031** -0.032** 
  (0.035) (0.027) 
F_LOSS×NEWS ? -1.226* -1.100* 
  (0.058) (0.093) 
ROA ? -0.030 -0.031 
  (0.367) (0.354) 
ROA×NEWS + 2.533* 2.839* 
  (0.080) (0.051) 
HORIZON ? 0.010 0.010* 
  (0.110) (0.093) 
HORIZON×NEWS ? 0.290 0.304 
  (0.413) (0.390) 
Constant  -0.018 -0.008 
  (0.214) (0.586) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES 
Observations  1,267 1,267 
Adj R-squared   0.005 0.008 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on manager fixed effects on accuracy 
using the Yang (2012) sample period and adjusted forecast news. The sample includes 94 managers and 
1,267 observations. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Testing Hypothesis 1 using Extending Estimation Periods 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between manager-specific forecast performance 
and stock price reaction to management earnings forecast news. Table 16 presents the results 
for Hypothesis 1. Because the different fixed effects on forecast performance measures are 
highly correlated, Columns 1, 2 and 3 separately present the results for manager fixed effects 
on accuracy, frequency and precision, respectively. Column 4 presents the results when all 
manager-specific forecast performance measures are included in the model.  
 
Overall, manager-specific forecast performance does not seem to affect the market’s response 
to management earnings forecasts. On the other hand, there is some evidence that firm-specific 
forecast performance affects the market’s response to management earnings forecasts. As 
shown in Column 1, RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is positive and significant suggesting that the 
firm’s propensity to issue accurate forecasts elicits a stronger market reaction to the 
management earnings forecast. Column 2 shows a positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction between RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ and NEWS which suggests that there is a 
stronger reaction to each unit of news for firms with a propensity to issue forecasts more 
frequently. Column 3 shows a positive and significant coefficient for 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH but no significant results on the interaction between 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH and NEWS. This suggests a positive reaction to forecasts issued 
by firms with a historic propensity to issue more precise management earnings forecasts. 
Column 4 presents the results when all manager-specific and firm-specific forecast 
performance measures are included. The interaction between RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ and 
NEWS continues to be positive and significant but RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is no longer 
significant.  
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Table 16 Results for Hypothesis 1 using extending estimation periods 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2006-2014 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) 
      
NEWS + 0.892*** 0.366 0.866*** 0.365 
  (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.223) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? 0.001   0.000 
  (0.363)   (0.870) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS  + -0.013   -0.019 
  (0.671)   (0.591) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ ?  -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.830)  (0.897) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS  +  0.012  0.012 
   (0.714)  (0.745) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH ?   0.002 0.002 
    (0.105) (0.189) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS  +   -0.007 -0.000 
    (0.844) (0.994) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ? 0.005***   0.003 
  (0.000)   (0.102) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS  + -0.025   0.040 
  (0.432)   (0.298) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ ?  0.002*  0.002** 
   (0.055)  (0.050) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS  +  0.126***  0.139*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH ?   0.005*** 0.003* 
    (0.000) (0.095) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS  +   -0.060 -0.091** 
    (0.113) (0.032) 
SIZE ? -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.416) (0.003) (0.004) 
SIZE×NEWS  ? -0.079*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.052** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.044) 
F_LOSS ? -0.022*** -0.020** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) 
F_LOSS×NEWS  ? 0.094 0.037 0.088 0.071 
  (0.728) (0.890) (0.740) (0.795) 
ROA ? -0.033** -0.039** -0.043*** -0.043** 
  (0.042) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) 
ROA×NEWS  + 1.713*** 1.616*** 1.758*** 1.603*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON ? 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON×NEWS  ? -0.018 0.007 -0.019 0.007 
  (0.891) (0.960) (0.887) (0.955) 
Constant  0.006 -0.005 -0.000 -0.006 
  (0.432) (0.613) (0.983) (0.560) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4,202 4,202 4,202 4,202 
Adj R-squared   0.024 0.025 0.025 0.028 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on manager fixed effects on accuracy, frequency and 
precision. The sample includes 237 managers and 4,202 management earnings forecasts issued over the test period 2006-
2014. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
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Once all forecast performance measures are included in one model (Model 2), the interaction 
between RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH and NEWS is negative and significant. This suggests that 
there is a weaker market reaction to forecast news issued by firms with a higher propensity to 
issue more precise forecasts. One potential explanation could be the high correlation between 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU and RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH. 42 Overall, results do not support 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
4.5 Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an association between manager-specific forecast performance and 
analysts’ reactions to management earnings forecast news. Table 17 reports the results for 
Hypothesis 2. As in Section 4.4.3, because the different fixed effects on forecast performance 
measures are correlated, Columns 1, 2 and 3 separately present the results for manager fixed 
effects on accuracy, frequency and precision, respectively and Column 4 presents the results 
when all manager-specific forecast performance measures are included. 
 
As seen in Column 1, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the interaction between 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU and NEWS is positive and significant suggesting that analysts react 
more strongly to management earnings forecast news issued by managers with higher prior 
forecast accuracy. Consistent with prediction, ROA×NEWS is positive and significant 
suggesting that analysts react more strongly to management earnings forecasts issued by higher 
performing firms.  
                                               
42 In additional analyses, fixed effects on precision are estimated on a categorical precision measure by coding 
precision as 3 for point forecasts, 2 for range forecasts and 1 for open-ended forecasts. 
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Table 17 Results for Hypothesis 2 using extending estimation periods 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2006-2014 
VARIABLES   AFREV 
NEWS + 0.057*** -0.002 0.049*** -0.042* 
  (0.001) (0.939) (0.008) (0.069) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? 0.000   0.000 
  (0.175)   (0.104) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS  ? 0.007***   0.006** 
  (0.007)   (0.017) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ ?  -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.481)  (0.481) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS  ?  0.000  0.003 
   (0.845)  (0.211) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH ?   -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.772) (0.324) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS  ?   0.007*** 0.005* 
    (0.007) (0.085) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ? 0.000**   0.000** 
  (0.025)   (0.040) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS  ? -0.003   0.004 
  (0.280)   (0.202) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ ?  -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.577)  (0.590) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS  ?  0.018***  0.021*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH ?   0.000 -0.000 
    (0.480) (0.389) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS  ?   0.001 -0.001 
    (0.616) (0.678) 
SIZE ? 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
  (0.157) (0.000) (0.004) (0.115) 
SIZE×NEWS  ? -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.170) (0.942) (0.132) (0.542) 
F_LOSS ? -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS  ? 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.129*** 0.117*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA ? 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.454) (0.553) (0.606) (0.405) 
ROA×NEWS  + 0.071*** 0.049** 0.063*** 0.047* 
  (0.004) (0.040) (0.009) (0.078) 
HORIZON ? 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.903) (0.929) (0.898) (0.949) 
HORIZON×NEWS  ? -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.023** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.039) 
Constant  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4,052 4,052 4,052 4,052 
Adj R-squared   0.086 0.010 0.087 0.102 
This table reports the results from regressing analysts’ reaction on manager fixed effects on accuracy, frequency and precision. 
The sample includes 236 managers and 4,052 management earnings forecasts issued over the test period 2006-2014. Variable 
definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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HORIZON×NEWS is negative and significant suggesting that analysts react more strongly to 
forecasts issued closer to the end of the fiscal period. LOSS×NEWS is positive and significant 
suggesting that analysts’ reaction to management earnings forecasts issued loss firms is greater. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this could be because loss firms provide management earnings 
forecasts less frequently and the forecasts managers do issue potentially have higher 
information content, which elicits a stronger reaction from market participants (Tang et al., 
2016).  
 
Column 2 presents the results for manager and firm fixed effects on frequency. The coefficient 
on RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS is not significant but the interaction between NEWS and 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ is positive and significant. This suggests that analysts’ reaction is 
stronger for management earnings forecasts issued by firms with a historic propensity to issue 
more frequent forecasts. However, analysts’ reaction does not seem to vary with manager-
specific forecast frequency. Results for control variables are similar to those found under 
Column 1. 
 
Column 3 presents the results for manager and fixed effects on precision (width of the range). 
As predicted, the coefficient on RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS is positive and significant. 
This suggests a stronger analyst reaction to the forecast news given by managers with a higher 
propensity to issue more precise management earnings forecasts. Results for control variables 
are similar to those found under Columns 1 and 2. 
 
Column 4 presents the results when fixed effects on all manager fixed effects on forecast 
performance measures are included in one model (Model 3). When all variables are included 
in one model, the interaction between RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU and NEWS and between 
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RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH and NEWS are still positive and significant. The interaction 
between RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ and NEWS is still not significant. The coefficient on 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is still positive and significant but its interaction with NEWS is not 
significant. The interaction between RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ and NEWS is also still positive 
and significant. The results suggest that analysts’ reaction is stronger to management earnings 
forecasts news issued by managers with historic propensities to issue more accurate and precise 
forecasts. Analysts’ reaction is not associated with managers propensity to issue more frequent 
forecasts. However, analysts’ reaction is positively associated with the firm’s propensity to 
issue more frequent forecasts. The coefficients on the control variables behave as previously. 
Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 2. There is evidence that analysts react more 
strongly to forecast news provided by managers with a historical propensity to provide more 
accurate and precise forecasts.  
 
 
4.6 Testing Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the market reaction to management earnings forecasts is conditioned 
by managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes. As discussed in Section 4.3, because 
managers’ attributes are correlated, I first examine whether the market reaction varies with 
each manager attribute separately. I then include all manager attributes in the same model to 
test their effects on stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts. 
 
 
4.6.1 Results for Personal Attributes (Hypothesis 3) 
 
The results when personal attributes are examined separately are reported in Table 18. Personal 
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attributes examined include sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, legal background, 
Ivy league education, military experience, and network size. 
 
Columns 1 to 6 report the results for sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, legal 
background, Ivy league education, military experience and network size, respectively. Control 
variables behave as reported above (see Table 16). No significant association is found between 
the interaction of NEWS and sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, military experience 
or network size. As seen in Column 5, there is a positive association between LEGAL×NEWS 
and the market reaction to management earnings forecasts. This suggests that the market 
perceives management earnings forecasts news by managers from a legal background to be 
more credible. Prior research finds that managers with a legal background tend to be more 
conservative in their disclosures (Bamber et al., 2010, Custódio and Metzger, 2014, Davis et 
al., 2015). This result is consistent with the suggestion that the market may be aware that 
managers with legal backgrounds are more conscious of litigation risks and potentially more 
likely to provide credible forecasts. 
 
Column 6 reports the results when Ivy league education is examined. There is a significant 
positive association between IVY×NEWS and the stock market reaction to management 
earnings forecasts. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ivy league education may be associated with 
academic excellence and perceived competence (Custódio and Metzger, 2014). As seen in 
Table 13, consistent with this argument, Ivy league education is positively correlated with 
network size, press coverage, and number of awards won by the manager. Therefore, it is 
possible that Ivy league education is correlated with measures that investors use to assess the 
perceived competence of managers which results in the market perceiving management 
earnings forecasts issued by managers with an Ivy league education to be more credible. 
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Table 18 Results for Hypothesis 3 (Personal attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2006-2014 
 CAR(-1,1) 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES SEX AGE FIN_EXP MBA LEGAL IVY MIL_EXPER NETWORK 
NEWS 0.357 1.242 0.199 0.396 0.457 0.484 0.427 -0.125 
 (0.233) (0.427) (0.532) (0.189) (0.129) (0.109) (0.158) (0.789) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.002 0.011 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.641) (0.320) (0.337) (0.619) (0.873) (0.757) (0.410) (0.775) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS -0.129 -0.214 0.130 -0.084 0.519*** 0.270*** -0.105 0.037 
 (0.300) (0.568) (0.118) (0.314) (0.001) (0.003) (0.529) (0.506) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.866) (0.899) (0.858) (0.797) (0.843) (0.816) (0.761) (0.933) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.010 -0.015 -0.031 -0.015 0.029 
 (0.555) (0.645) (0.766) (0.781) (0.669) (0.399) (0.682) (0.475) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.922) (0.966) (0.885) (0.956) (0.907) (0.884) (0.925) (0.393) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.012 0.008 -0.003 0.006 0.030 
 (0.857) (0.871) (0.916) (0.737) (0.821) (0.934) (0.867) (0.420) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.179) (0.195) (0.214) (0.237) (0.199) (0.190) (0.192) (0.433) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS 0.009 0.001 0.015 -0.007 -0.017 0.010 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.814) (0.972) (0.697) (0.853) (0.653) (0.799) (0.980) (0.759) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.005** 
 (0.102) (0.115) (0.118) (0.110) (0.074) (0.115) (0.100) (0.018) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.041 0.040 0.054 0.056 0.039 0.002 0.035 -0.002 
 (0.288) (0.309) (0.170) (0.198) (0.318) (0.954) (0.371) (0.957) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.002* 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.052) (0.043) (0.065) (0.063) (0.051) (0.064) (0.059) (0.275) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.092) (0.101) (0.111) (0.101) (0.115) (0.112) (0.116) (0.771) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.090** -0.090** -0.090** -0.100** -0.079* -0.097** -0.088** 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.063) (0.028) (0.045) (0.936) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.050* -0.054** -0.047* -0.050* -0.063** -0.049* -0.053** -0.054 
 (0.055) (0.039) (0.070) (0.055) (0.016) (0.059) (0.043) (0.111) 
F_LOSS -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.055 0.072 0.037 0.057 0.112 0.090 0.044 -0.182 
 (0.840) (0.790) (0.893) (0.834) (0.680) (0.741) (0.872) (0.501) 
ROA -0.042** -0.041** -0.043*** -0.041** -0.039** -0.039** -0.041** -0.035* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.060) 
ROA×NEWS 1.557*** 1.553*** 1.574*** 1.628*** 1.777*** 1.685*** 1.571*** -0.674 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) 
HORIZON 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.002 0.009 -0.002 -0.043 0.031 -0.015 -0.034 -0.058 
 (0.989) (0.944) (0.986) (0.746) (0.817) (0.911) (0.801) (0.667) 
Constant -0.006 -0.048 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.013 
 (0.554) (0.269) (0.808) (0.518) (0.593) (0.542) (0.503) (0.315) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,202 4,202 4,202 4,159 4,202 4,159 4,165 3,358 
Adj R-squared 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.012 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on each personal attribute (sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, legal background, IVY league education, 
military experience, and network size), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
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Overall, the results show that observable demographic characteristics of managers such as age, 
sex, financial expertise, MBA education and military experience, do not seem to have an effect 
on the stock market’s reaction to management earnings forecasts. However, there is evidence 
that market seems to react more strongly to management earnings forecasts issued by managers 
with an Ivy league education and managers with a legal background. 
 
 
4.6.2 Results for Imputed Attributes (Hypothesis 3) 
 
The results when imputed attributes are examined separately are reported in Table 19. Imputed 
attributes examined include managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2012), press coverage and 
number of awards won by the manager. 
 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 19 report the results for managerial ability, press coverage and number 
of awards won, respectively. Control variables behave as previously. No significant association 
is found between the interactions of NEWS with press coverage and number of awards won. 
One potential reason for the lack of significance for press coverage and awards won could be 
the lack of variation in those variables (see Table 13), with most managers having no press 
coverage or awards. The coefficient for M_ABILITY×NEWS is not significant but the main 
effect for managerial ability (M_ABILITY) is positive and significant at the 10% level which 
suggests that the stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts issuance is higher for 
managers with higher ability. Overall, there is no evidence that stock market reaction to the 
management earnings forecast news varies with managers’ imputed attributes. 
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Table 19 Results for Hypothesis 3 (Imputed attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 2006-2014 
 CAR(-1,1) 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES M_ABILITY PRESS_COV AWARDS 
    
NEWS 0.114 0.396 0.384 
 (0.743) (0.199) (0.203) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.008* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.075) (0.703) (0.638) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS 0.228 0.000 0.012 
 (0.144) (0.486) (0.574) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.905) (0.897) (0.890) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS -0.022 -0.014 -0.019 
 (0.585) (0.704) (0.601) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.439) (0.929) (0.884) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS 0.024 0.018 0.016 
 (0.560) (0.625) (0.657) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.137) (0.182) (0.178) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS 0.013 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.777) (0.853) (0.910) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.245) (0.121) (0.118) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.075 0.042 0.043 
 (0.119) (0.285) (0.274) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.049) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.157*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH 0.004* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.079) (0.085) (0.090) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.159*** -0.097** -0.093** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.029) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.034 -0.057** -0.056** 
 (0.304) (0.032) (0.038) 
F_LOSS -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.081 0.067 0.075 
 (0.781) (0.805) (0.783) 
ROA -0.044** -0.043*** -0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) 
ROA×NEWS 1.639*** 1.647*** 1.633*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.031 0.014 0.007 
 (0.838) (0.918) (0.961) 
Constant -0.020 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.104) (0.504) (0.500) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 3,536 4,185 4,202 
Adj R-squared 0.034 0.028 0.028 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on each imputed attribute (managerial ability 
score, press coverage and number of awards won), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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4.6.3 Results for Positional Attributes (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Positional attributes examined include tenure, manager/chair duality, CEO’s CFO experience 
and charitable involvement. The results for tests involving positional attributes are reported in 
Table 20. Columns 1 to 4 present the results for tenure, manager/chair duality, CEO’s CFO 
experience and charitable involvement, respectively. 
 
Results indicate that there is no significant association between NEWS and tenure but the main 
effect for tenure is positive and significant at the 10% level. This suggests that there is a 
stronger market reaction to management earnings forecast issuance from managers who have 
been employed at the firm for longer. There is also no significant association between stock 
market reaction to management earnings forecasts news and manager/chair duality or 
charitable involvement. Contrary to intuition, the coefficient on CEO_CEO_EXPER×NEWS 
is negative and significant at the 5% level. This suggests that there is a weaker reaction to 
management earnings forecast news issued by CEOs with previous CFO experience. In other 
words, the results suggest that the market perceives management earnings forecasts issued by 
CEOs with CFO experience to be less credible. Prior research finds that firms appoint ex-
CFO’s as CEOs when the firm’s disclosure quality has deteriorated (Matsunaga et al., 2013). 
It is therefore possible that the CEO_CFO_EXPER variable proxies for lower quality 
disclosures which would explain the negative association between 
CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS and stock market reaction. Another potential reason for this result 
could be that CEOs with observed CFO experience are younger and with less extensive 
networks because the disclosure of CFO status has only been reliably measured (by 
Execucomp) in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. 
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Table 20 Results for Hypothesis 3 (Positional attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2006-2014 
 CAR(-1,1) 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES TENURE MGR_CHAIR CEO_CFO_EXPER CHARITY 
     
NEWS 0.449 0.337 0.596* 0.364 
 (0.139) (0.255) (0.058) (0.225) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.001* 0.000 0.001 -0.018 
 (0.064) (0.860) (0.648) (0.105) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS 0.013 -0.026 -0.235** 0.299 
 (0.103) (0.747) (0.015) (0.650) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.669) (0.861) (0.969) (0.774) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS -0.023 -0.019 -0.024 -0.020 
 (0.530) (0.581) (0.503) (0.579) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.801) (0.985) (0.913) (0.887) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS -0.007 0.010 -0.004 0.011 
 (0.841) (0.774) (0.905) (0.764) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.302) (0.249) (0.167) (0.188) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS -0.026 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.503) (0.982) (0.921) (0.985) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.170) (0.068) (0.118) (0.120) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.020 0.041 0.040 0.040 
 (0.615) (0.288) (0.308) (0.300) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 
 (0.087) (0.065) (0.058) (0.050) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.122*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.138*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.065) (0.102) (0.089) (0.072) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.098** -0.093** -0.084** -0.091** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.046) (0.031) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.045* -0.049* -0.067** -0.051** 
 (0.094) (0.053) (0.012) (0.049) 
F_LOSS -0.024*** -0.021** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.118 0.108 0.104 0.070 
 (0.665) (0.691) (0.703) (0.798) 
ROA -0.040** -0.042** -0.042** -0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
ROA×NEWS 1.636*** 1.597*** 1.413*** 1.601*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON×NEWS 0.036 0.032 0.038 0.009 
 (0.792) (0.808) (0.775) (0.948) 
Constant -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.462) (0.578) (0.583) (0.618) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,108 4,124 4,199 4,199 
Adj R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction on each positional attribute (tenure, manager/chair 
duality, CEO’s CFO experience, and charitable involvement), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions are 
included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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4.6.4 Results for all Managerial Attributes (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Table 21 reports the results for Hypothesis 3 when all manager attributes are included in the 
same model.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, several manager attributes are correlated. Multicollinearity is an 
issue because the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is 136.35 when all manager attributes 
are included in the same model. The maximum VIF is 4123.39 for NEWS. The other main 
culprits are AGE×NEWS which has a VIF of 3330.71 and NETWORK×NEWS which has a 
VIF of 202.51. Results when I exclude AGE and AGE×NEWS from the model are reported in 
Column 2 of Table 21 and results when I exclude NETWORK and NETWORK×NEWS from 
the model are reported in Column 3 of Table 21. Results when I exclude both AGE and 
NETWORK and their interactions with NEWS are reported in Column 4 of Table 21. The 
mean VIF after the two variables and their interactions are excluded from the model falls to 
7.59. The maximum VIF is 112.04 for NEWS and SIZE×NEWS has a VIF of 36.33. Overall, 
this indicates high multicollinearity in the model. 
 
From Column 1 in Table 21, it can be observed that when all manager attributes are included 
in the same model, most of the manager attributes interacted with forecast news are not 
statistically significant. Compared with results when manager attributes were examined 
individually, IVY×NEWS and CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS are no longer significant (see 
Table 18 and Table 20). However, similar to results in Table 18, when all manager attributes 
are examined jointly, the coefficient for LEGAL×NEWS is still positive and significant. This 
suggests that the market reaction per unit of forecast news is stronger for management earnings 
forecasts issued by managers with a legal background.  
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Table 21 Results for Hypothesis 3 (All manager attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2006-2014 
VARIABLES CAR(-1,1) 
     
NEWS 2.861 0.194 2.137 0.420 
 (0.274) (0.780) (0.363) (0.295) 
SEX 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.867) (0.866) (0.526) (0.538) 
SEX×NEWS -0.369 -0.376 -0.306 -0.311 
 (0.114) (0.108) (0.140) (0.134) 
AGE -0.000  0.008  
 (0.979)  (0.584)  
AGE×NEWS -0.627  -0.417  
 (0.290)  (0.457)  
FIN_EXP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.907) (0.924) (0.921) (0.935) 
FIN_EXP×NEWS 0.215 0.232* 0.374*** 0.389*** 
 (0.104) (0.078) (0.002) (0.001) 
MBA 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.330) (0.332) (0.710) (0.698) 
MBA×NEWS 0.108 0.118 0.022 0.023 
 (0.435) (0.394) (0.851) (0.844) 
LEGAL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.917) (0.918) (0.843) (0.865) 
LEGAL×NEWS 0.765** 0.763** 0.757** 0.755** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
IVY -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.303) (0.300) (0.873) (0.836) 
IVY×NEWS  0.011 0.024 0.099 0.121 
 (0.946) (0.881) (0.449) (0.345) 
MIL_EXPER 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 (0.431) (0.408) (0.443) (0.336) 
MIL_EXPER×NEWS  0.212 0.148 0.280 0.244 
 (0.358) (0.506) (0.179) (0.230) 
NETWORK 0.001 0.001   
 (0.793) (0.798)   
NETWORK×NEWS  -0.032 -0.019   
 (0.704) (0.815)   
M_ABILITY 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 
 (0.364) (0.359) (0.130) (0.144) 
M_ABILITY×NEWS  0.165 0.189 0.214 0.228 
 (0.359) (0.289) (0.202) (0.171) 
PRESS_COV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.160) (0.157) (0.227) (0.222) 
PRESS_COV×NEWS  0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.300) (0.271) (0.043) (0.034) 
AWARDS -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003* 
 (0.119) (0.115) (0.055) (0.058) 
AWARDS×NEWS  -0.052 -0.067 -0.126 -0.139 
 (0.593) (0.489) (0.171) (0.125) 
TENURE 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.334) (0.321) (0.091) (0.066) 
TENURE×NEWS  0.013 0.009 0.020 0.017 
 (0.522) (0.646) (0.301) (0.360) 
MGR_CHAIR 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (0.193) (0.188) (0.384) (0.405) 
MGR_CHAIR×NEWS  -0.004 0.021 -0.065 -0.050 
 (0.974) (0.873) (0.583) (0.669) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.341) (0.335) (0.737) (0.763) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS  -0.041 -0.056 -0.164 -0.169 
 (0.770) (0.689) (0.179) (0.166) 
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CHARITY -0.016 -0.016 -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.237) (0.249) (0.175) (0.203) 
CHARITY×NEWS  0.553 0.533 0.702 0.675 
 (0.461) (0.477) (0.369) (0.387) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.430) (0.431) (0.522) (0.498) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS  0.027 0.023 -0.015 -0.020 
 (0.604) (0.663) (0.742) (0.666) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.800) (0.760) (0.403) (0.418) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS  -0.049 -0.033 -0.090* -0.081* 
 (0.380) (0.537) (0.073) (0.096) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.574) (0.587) (0.312) (0.318) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS  0.011 0.005 -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.844) (0.921) (0.779) (0.726) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.005* 0.005* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.439) (0.401) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS  -0.041 -0.037 0.025 0.029 
 (0.535) (0.570) (0.673) (0.628) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.067) (0.072) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS  0.101* 0.115** 0.104** 0.115** 
 (0.062) (0.028) (0.040) (0.018) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.963) (0.938) (0.042) (0.043) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS  0.094 0.081 -0.099 -0.103 
 (0.265) (0.333) (0.169) (0.151) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.024) 
SIZE×NEWS  -0.083 -0.078 -0.068* -0.066* 
 (0.104) (0.126) (0.089) (0.095) 
F_LOSS -0.020** -0.020** -0.022** -0.022** 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.013) (0.013) 
F_LOSS×NEWS  -0.060 -0.110 0.130 0.109 
 (0.846) (0.719) (0.662) (0.711) 
ROA -0.024 -0.023 -0.035* -0.035* 
 (0.277) (0.283) (0.071) (0.068) 
ROA×NEWS  -0.634 -0.524 1.637*** 1.728*** 
 (0.293) (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
HORIZON×NEWS  -0.045 -0.050 -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.775) (0.753) (0.892) (0.895) 
Constant -0.001 -0.003 -0.055 -0.024* 
 (0.982) (0.868) (0.347) (0.086) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,691 2,691 3,340 3,340 
Adj R-squared 0.011 0.012 0.041 0.041 
This table reports the results from regressing investors’ reaction to management earnings forecasts on each 
manager attributes in the same model. For Columns 1 and 2, the sample consists of 160 managers and 2,691 
observations with available managerial attributes data for each attribute whose fixed effects are estimable 
between 1996-2013 and who provided forecasts during the test period of 2006-2014. For Columns 3 and 4, 
without the variable NETWORK, the sample size is 189 managers and 3,340 observations. Variable 
definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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Consistent with the results obtained for Hypothesis 1 (see Table 16), manager-specific fixed 
effects on forecast performance are not significant. The main effect for the firm-specific fixed 
effect on accuracy (RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU) is positive and significant suggesting that the 
market reaction to the management earnings forecast release is stronger for firms with a historic 
propensity to issue accurate forecasts. The coefficient for RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 
is positive and significant suggesting that the market reacts more strongly per unit of forecast 
news to management earnings forecasts issued by firms with a higher propensity to issue more 
frequent management earnings forecasts. Other control variables behave similarly to results 
obtained in previous analyses.  
 
When AGE and AGE×NEWS are excluded from the model (Column 2), results are similar to 
those obtained in Column 1, with one exception. The coefficient for FIN_EXP×NEWS 
becomes positive and significant at the 10% level. When NETWORK and 
NETWORK×NEWS are excluded from the model (Column 3), the sample size increases to 
3,340 management earnings forecasts provided by 189 managers. Compared to Column 1, it 
can be seen that when NETWORK and NETWORK×NEWS are excluded (Column 3), 
FIN_EXP×NEWS is positive and significant at the 1% level and PRESS_COV×NEWS is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on LEGAL×NEWS is still positive and 
significant. Similar results are obtained when both AGE and NETWORK and their interactions 
are excluded from the model (Column 4). The results suggest that the market reaction to each 
unit of forecast news is stronger for management earnings forecasts issued by managers with 
an accounting/finance background, a legal background and for managers who receive higher 
coverage by the press. The results from Columns 2 to 4 also imply that multicollinearity 
coupled with the small sample size could be possible reasons for the lack of significance on 
some managerial attributes. In addition, as seen in Columns 3 and 4, the main effect for 
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TENURE is positive and significant and the main effect for AWARDS is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the market reaction to management earnings 
forecasts issuance is stronger for longer tenured managers. However, market reaction to 
management earnings forecasts is weaker for managers who have won more awards. Prior 
research finds that, after winning awards, managers become more distracted (e.g. writing 
books) and subsequently underperform (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Therefore, one possible 
reason for the counterintuitive result for AWARDS could be that the market is reacting to 
managers’ underperformance.  
 
 
4.6.5 Summary of Results for Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the market reaction to management earnings forecast news is 
conditioned by manager attributes. Because manager attributes are highly correlated, they are 
first examined individually. When examined individually, overall, with a few exceptions, there 
does not seem to be much evidence that the stock market reaction to management earnings 
forecasts varies with managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes. I find that the stock 
market reaction to each unit of management earnings forecast news is stronger for managers 
with a legal background and Ivy league education. I also find that the stock market reaction to 
each unit of management earnings forecast news is weaker for CEOs with CFO experience.  
 
When all manager attributes are included in a single model, only legal background (LEGAL) 
is significant. Because of high collinearity when all variables are included in one model, I also 
estimated the regressions without AGE and NETWORK and their interaction with NEWS in 
Table 21. Results without these variables in the model indicate that in addition to legal 
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backgrounds, the stock market reaction to each unit of management earnings forecast news is 
stronger for managers with accounting/finance backgrounds and higher press coverage.  
 
Results also consistently show that the stock market reaction to management earnings forecast 
news is stronger for firms with a higher propensity to issue frequent management earnings 
forecasts. This is consistent with the suggestion that firms who guide more frequently 
potentially spend more resources to build their credibility (Ying Wang and Tan, 2013). 
 
 
4.7 Testing Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts is conditioned 
managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes. Similar to Section 4.6, because 
managers’ attributes are correlated, I first examine whether the analyst reaction varies with 
each manager attribute separately and then include all manager attributes in the same model to 
test their effect on analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts. Section 4.7.1 provides 
the results for personal attributes. Section 4.7.2 reports the results for imputed attributes and 
Section 4.7.3 presents the results for positional attributes. Section 4.7.4 reports the results when 
all manager attributes are included in one model. 
 
 
4.7.1 Results for Personal Attributes (Hypothesis 4) 
 
The results for analysts’ reaction against personal attributes are examined are reported in Table 
22. Column 1 to 8 report results for sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, legal 
background, Ivy league education, military experience and network size, respectively.  
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Table 22 Results for Hypothesis 4 (Personal attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2006-2014 
 AFREV 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES SEX AGE FIN_EXP MBA LEGAL IVY MIL_EXPER NETWORK 
NEWS -0.043* 0.133 -0.031 -0.043* -0.035 -0.041* -0.042* -0.062* 
 (0.060) (0.255) (0.205) (0.063) (0.132) (0.080) (0.069) (0.098) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.000 -0.001* -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001* -0.000 
 (0.417) (0.076) (0.035) (0.984) (0.669) (0.532) (0.068) (0.849) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS -0.018** -0.043 -0.008 -0.012** 0.032*** 0.002 0.009 0.004 
 (0.049) (0.127) (0.203) (0.049) (0.005) (0.760) (0.472) (0.382) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.102) (0.079) (0.100) (0.105) (0.102) (0.117) (0.089) (0.061) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS 0.006** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007** 0.005* 0.005* 0.005 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.024) (0.030) (0.011) (0.064) (0.058) (0.123) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.516) (0.372) (0.545) (0.550) (0.476) (0.564) (0.494) (0.261) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008*** 
 (0.324) (0.423) (0.115) (0.127) (0.255) (0.161) (0.140) (0.008) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.356) (0.334) (0.245) (0.248) (0.309) (0.296) (0.360) (0.030) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS 0.006** 0.005* 0.004 0.005* 0.004 0.006** 0.006** 0.007** 
 (0.032) (0.067) (0.185) (0.075) (0.193) (0.044) (0.046) (0.031) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.050) (0.039) (0.031) (0.046) (0.037) (0.075) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006* 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.198) (0.273) (0.262) (0.060) (0.185) (0.311) (0.229) (0.331) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.564) (0.483) (0.456) (0.625) (0.567) (0.645) (0.637) (0.804) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.401) (0.438) (0.294) (0.427) (0.368) (0.478) (0.371) (0.447) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.721) (0.798) (0.637) (0.712) (0.827) (0.974) (0.978) (0.638) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.134) (0.119) (0.215) (0.105) (0.176) (0.088) (0.112) (0.100) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.679) (0.445) (0.387) (0.520) (0.305) (0.455) (0.451) (0.238) 
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F_LOSS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.370) (0.489) (0.361) (0.315) (0.298) (0.365) (0.363) (0.270) 
ROA×NEWS 0.040 0.036 0.051* 0.056** 0.058** 0.050* 0.049* 0.023 
 (0.137) (0.183) (0.056) (0.038) (0.029) (0.064) (0.068) (0.558) 
HORIZON 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.916) (0.901) (0.894) (0.976) (0.921) (0.930) (0.878) (0.719) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.024** -0.022** -0.022** -0.027** -0.021* -0.026** -0.026** -0.047*** 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.047) (0.017) (0.057) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000) 
Constant -0.002*** 0.004 -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* 
 (0.008) (0.277) (0.053) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.055) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,052 4,052 4,052 4,010 4,052 4,010 4,015 3,227 
Adj R-squared 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.101 0.102 0.105 
This table reports the results from regressing analysts’ reaction on each personal attribute (sex, age, financial expertise, MBA education, legal background, IVY league education, military 
experience, and network size), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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As seen in Column 1, SEX×NEWS is negative and significant at the 5% level. This suggests 
that analysts’ reaction per unit of management earnings forecast news is weaker for female 
managers. Results in Column 2 report that AGE×NEWS is not significant. However, there is a 
negative association between the main effect for AGE and the analyst reaction to management 
earnings forecast issuance. Similarly, as seen in Column 3, FIN_EXP×NEWS is not significant 
but FIN_EXP is negative and significant. Column 4 shows that there is a negative association 
between MBA×NEWS and analyst reaction to management earnings forecast suggesting that 
there is a weaker analyst reaction to each unit of forecast news provided by managers with 
MBAs. This implies that analysts view management earnings forecasts issued by MBA holding 
managers to be less credible. Similar to results obtained for Hypothesis 3, Column 5 shows that 
LEGAL×NEWS is positive and significant. This suggests that there is a stronger reaction to 
management earnings forecast news provided by managers with a legal background. Columns 
6 to 9 show that there is no evidence that Ivy league education, military experience and network 
size matter to analysts in assessing the perceived credibility of management earnings forecasts. 
 
As seen in Columns 1 to 7, similar to results obtained for Hypothesis 2, the interaction between 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU and NEWS is positive and significant suggesting that analysts view 
forecasts issued by managers with a historic propensity to provide accurate forecasts to be more 
credible. Similarly, the interaction between RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH and NEWS is positive 
and significant consistent with the proposition that analysts perceive forecasts issued by 
managers who are more precise to be more credible. RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is still positive 
and significant and F_LOSS×NEWS is also positive and significant suggesting a stronger 
analyst reaction for forecasts predicting losses. 
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4.7.2 Results for Imputed Attributes (Hypothesis 4) 
 
The results for whether imputed attributes matter in analysts’ reaction to management earnings 
forecasts are reported in Table 23. Columns 1 to 3 report results for manager ability using the 
Demerjian et al. (2012) score, press coverage over the last five years and number of awards 
won by the manager as at the start of the financial period.  
 
As seen in Column 1, M_ABILITY×NEWS is not significant. However, the main effect for 
the managerial ability score is positive and significant. This suggests a stronger analyst reaction 
for management earnings forecasts issued by higher ability managers. Similarly, as shown in 
Column 2, the interaction for press coverage and news is not significant but the main effect is 
negative and significant at the 10% level suggesting a weaker reaction to management earnings 
forecasts issued by managers with higher press coverage. Finally, as seen in Column 3, there 
is no evidence that analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts varies with the number 
of awards won by the manager.  
 
Other variables of interest and control variables continue to behave as previously. Columns 1 
to 3 of Table 23 show that the manager’s fixed effects on accuracy (RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU) 
interacted with NEWS continues to be positive and significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
this suggests that analysts perceive management earnings forecasts news issued by managers 
with a historic propensity to issue more accurate forecasts to be more credible. 
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Table 23 Results for Hypothesis 4 (Imputed attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 2006-2014 
 AFREV 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES M_ABILITY PRESS_COV AWARDS 
NEWS -0.034 -0.049** -0.042* 
 (0.192) (0.040) (0.068) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.001** -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.010) (0.071) (0.686) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.788) (0.382) (0.862) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.308) (0.147) (0.110) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 
 (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.607) (0.607) (0.473) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS 0.006* 0.004 0.003 
 (0.067) (0.186) (0.232) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.468) (0.399) (0.345) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS 0.006* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.064) (0.075) (0.085) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.040) (0.062) (0.050) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.006* 0.004 0.004 
 (0.091) (0.193) (0.229) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.900) (0.750) (0.584) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.319) (0.567) (0.414) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.513) (0.792) (0.702) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.576) (0.039) (0.105) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.291) (0.664) (0.602) 
F_LOSS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.588) (0.450) (0.419) 
ROA×NEWS 0.043 0.046* 0.046* 
 (0.136) (0.083) (0.087) 
HORIZON -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.736) (0.966) (0.950) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.040*** -0.022** -0.023** 
 (0.001) (0.047) (0.039) 
Constant -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.008) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 3,438 4,035 4,052 
Adj R-squared 0.102 0.103 0.102 
This table reports the results from regressing analysts’ reaction on each imputed attribute (managerial ability score, 
press coverage and number of awards won), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions are included in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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4.7.3 Results for Positional Attributes (Hypothesis 4) 
 
The results for whether imputed attributes matter in analysts’ reaction to management earnings 
forecasts are reported in Table 24 below. Columns 1 to 4 present the results for tenure, 
manager/chair duality, CEO’s CFO experience and charitable involvement, respectively. 
 
As seen in Column 1, TENURE×NEWS is positive and significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that there is a stronger analyst reaction to each unit of management earnings forecast 
news issued by managers with longer tenures. Similarly, Column 2 shows that MGR_CHAIR 
is positive and significant suggesting that there is a stronger analyst reaction to each unit of 
forecast news issued by managers who are also the chairperson. Taken together, if tenure and 
manager/chair duality proxy for power, the results from Columns 1 and 2 imply that manager 
power seems to influence analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts.  
 
Similar to results obtained from Hypothesis 3 (see Table 20), there is a negative association 
between CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS and the analyst reaction to management earnings 
forecast news. As previously discussed, possible reasons could be that this variable is proxying 
for lower quality disclosures (Matsunaga et al., 2013) or is biased towards younger managers 
given it has only been reliably measured by Execucomp after 2002. No significant results are 
obtained for the association between managers’ charitable involvement and analyst reaction to 
management earnings forecasts. 
 
Overall, compared to results obtained from the market reaction to management earnings 
forecasts (Hypothesis 3), it seems that managers’ positional attributes matter to analysts in their 
assessments of the perceived credibility of managers’ earnings forecasts.  
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Table 24 Results for Hypothesis 4 (Positional attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2006-2014 
 AFREV 
 M_ATTRIBUTES 
VARIABLES TENURE MGR_CHAIR CEO_CFO_EXPER CHARITY 
NEWS -0.044* -0.045** -0.020 -0.042* 
 (0.056) (0.050) (0.405) (0.068) 
M_ATTRIBUTES 0.000* -0.000** 0.000* -0.001 
 (0.068) (0.043) (0.076) (0.542) 
M_ATTRIBUTES×NEWS 0.001* 0.027*** -0.023*** 0.046 
 (0.074) (0.000) (0.001) (0.354) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.076) (0.134) (0.170) (0.089) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS 0.008*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.033) (0.025) (0.020) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.393) (0.717) (0.553) (0.458) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS 0.004 0.005* 0.002 0.003 
 (0.159) (0.098) (0.503) (0.223) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.271) (0.273) (0.380) (0.306) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005* 
 (0.111) (0.129) (0.110) (0.089) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.098) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.318) (0.336) (0.205) (0.193) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.346) (0.628) (0.489) (0.584) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.647) (0.247) (0.459) (0.406) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.967) (0.901) (0.823) (0.632) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.108) (0.045) (0.084) (0.121) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.241) (0.583) (0.196) (0.587) 
F_LOSS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.374) (0.646) (0.348) (0.373) 
ROA×NEWS 0.050* 0.053** 0.028 0.047* 
 (0.062) (0.048) (0.307) (0.078) 
HORIZON -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.829) (0.822) (0.976) (0.943) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.018 -0.022** -0.019* -0.023** 
 (0.106) (0.044) (0.085) (0.040) 
Constant -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,961 3,979 4,049 4,049 
Adj R-squared 0.104 0.107 0.105 0.102 
This table reports the results from regressing analysts’ reaction on each positional attribute (tenure, manager/chair 
duality, CEO’s CFO experience, and charitable involvement), separately, over 2006-2014. Variable definitions 
are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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4.7.4 Results for all Managerial Attributes (Hypothesis 4) 
 
Table 25 reports the results for Hypothesis 4 when all manager attributes are included in the 
same model. Column 1 of Table 25 report the results for Hypothesis 4 when all manager 
attributes are included in the same model. Similar to Table 21, mean VIF is high (maximum 
3859.11 for NEWS) and AGE and NETWORK have high VIFs. The interaction between AGE 
and NEWS has a VIF of about 3119 and the interaction between NETWORK and NEWS has 
a VIF of about 190. Therefore, I also report results without these variables. Column 2 reports 
the results without AGE and AGE×NEWS. The mean VIF after AGE and its interaction with 
NEWS are excluded is 14.6. Column 3 reports the results without NETWORK and 
NETWORK×NEWS. The mean VIF after exclusion of NETWORK and NETWORK×NEWS 
is 126.6 (maximum VIF is 3648.12 for NEWS). Column 4 reports the results without AGE, 
NETWORK and their respective interactions with NEWS. The mean VIF after both variables 
are excluded is 7.54 (maximum VIF is 110.80 for NEWS).  
 
As seen in Column 1, when all manager attributes are included, SEX×NEWS is not significant. 
This is different from results obtained above (see Table 22) where SEX×NEWS was negative 
and significant at the 10% level. One possible reason for the lack of significant results obtained 
in Table 25 for SEX×NEWS is that the variable is correlated with other manager attributes. 
AGE×NEWS is not significant but the main effect for AGE is significant. This is similar to 
results obtained when AGE was examined individually (see Table 22).  
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Table 25 Results for Hypothesis 4 (All manager attributes) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2006-2014 
VARIABLES AFREV 
NEWS 0.280 0.004 0.330* -0.019 
 (0.176) (0.938) (0.066) (0.550) 
SEX -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.892) (0.954) (0.119) (0.090) 
SEX×NEWS  -0.011 -0.010 0.004 0.004 
 (0.570) (0.572) (0.785) (0.791) 
AGE -0.003**  -0.003***  
 (0.022)  (0.008)  
AGE×NEWS  -0.065  -0.084**  
 (0.169)  (0.049)  
FIN_EXP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.243) (0.260) (0.078) (0.085) 
FIN_EXP×NEWS  -0.000 0.002 0.007 0.010 
 (0.993) (0.850) (0.464) (0.264) 
MBA 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.746) (0.879) (0.765) (0.641) 
MBA×NEWS  -0.023** -0.023** -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.178) (0.143) 
LEGAL -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.713) (0.838) (0.433) (0.506) 
LEGAL×NEWS  -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.870) (0.829) (0.829) (0.789) 
IVY -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.178) (0.289) (0.871) (0.879) 
IVY×NEWS  0.000 0.002 -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.974) (0.891) (0.246) (0.463) 
MIL_EXPER 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.053) (0.194) (0.058) (0.223) 
MIL_EXPER×NEWS  0.016 0.010 0.033** 0.027* 
 (0.384) (0.572) (0.038) (0.082) 
NETWORK 0.000 -0.000   
 (0.994) (0.912)   
NETWORK×NEWS  -0.005 -0.003   
 (0.477) (0.594)   
M_ABILITY 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 
 (0.043) (0.017) (0.087) (0.040) 
M_ABILITY×NEWS  -0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.484) (0.597) (0.745) (0.923) 
PRESS_COV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.440) (0.377) (0.303) (0.299) 
PRESS_COV×NEWS  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.222) (0.195) (0.246) (0.172) 
AWARDS 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.843) (0.942) (0.967) (0.831) 
AWARDS×NEWS  -0.011 -0.013* -0.011 -0.014** 
 (0.143) (0.094) (0.107) (0.044) 
TENURE 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) 
TENURE×NEWS  -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.364) (0.255) (0.487) (0.730) 
MGR_CHAIR -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.143) (0.203) (0.005) (0.011) 
MGR_CHAIR×NEWS  0.047*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.663) (0.505) (0.270) (0.226) 
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CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS  -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CHARITY 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.906) (0.908) (0.995) (0.772) 
CHARITY×NEWS  0.030 0.032 0.041 0.042 
 (0.614) (0.593) (0.490) (0.475) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.163) (0.288) (0.350) (0.420) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS  0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.008** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.275) (0.432) (0.723) (0.987) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS  0.013*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.103) (0.027) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.087) (0.073) (0.495) (0.455) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS  0.008* 0.008* 0.009** 0.008** 
 (0.059) (0.081) (0.021) (0.037) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.166) (0.249) (0.249) (0.290) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS  0.011** 0.011** 0.007 0.008* 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.152) (0.079) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.467) (0.600) (0.217) (0.361) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS  0.025*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.572) (0.525) (0.698) (0.576) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS  0.007 0.005 0.010* 0.008 
 (0.322) (0.474) (0.083) (0.144) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.433) (0.216) (0.371) (0.237) 
SIZE×NEWS  -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) 
F_LOSS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS  0.075*** 0.069*** 0.119*** 0.113*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.750) (0.682) (0.966) (0.804) 
ROA×NEWS  0.007 0.022 -0.002 0.019 
 (0.877) (0.644) (0.957) (0.560) 
HORIZON -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.687) (0.615) (0.701) (0.602) 
HORIZON×NEWS  -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.009* -0.002 0.009** -0.002** 
 (0.090) (0.112) (0.039) (0.026) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,612 2,612 3,249 3,249 
Adj R-squared 0.130 0.128 0.130 0.128 
This table reports the results from regressing analysts’ reaction to management earnings forecasts on each manager 
attributes in the same model. For Columns 1 and 2, the sample consists of 158 managers and 2,612 observations with 
available managerial attributes data for each attribute whose fixed effects are estimable between 1996-2013 and who 
provided forecasts during the test period of 2006-2014. For Columns 3 and 4, without the variable NETWORK, the 
sample size is 188 managers and 3,249 observations. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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As seen in Column 2, when AGE and AGE×NEWS are excluded, the main effect for 
AWARDS×NEWS becomes negative and significant.43 As previously discussed, prior research 
finds that, after winning awards, subsequently underperform (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). 
Therefore, one possible reason for the result for AGE and AWARDS is that these variables are 
capturing this underperformance and analysts are reacting accordingly. As seen in Columns 1 
and 2, MBA×NEWS is negative and significant at the 5% level. This is similar to the results 
obtained when MBA was examined individually (see Table 22). However, when NETWORK 
and NETWORK×NEWS are excluded, MBA×NEWS is no longer significant. As seen in 
Columns 3 and 4, MIL_EXPER×NEWS, however, is positive and significant at the 5% level 
and FIN_EXP×NEWS is negative and significant at the 10% level, when NETWORK and 
NETWORK×NEWS are excluded from the model. These varying results can also be explained 
by the collinearity within the variables. 
 
 
Some results are consistent across all four specifications. It can be seen in Columns 1 to 4 that 
the main effect for M_ABILITY is positive and significant under Columns 1 to 4. This suggests 
a stronger analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts issuance by higher ability 
managers. Similarly, TENURE is positive and significant suggesting a stronger reaction to 
issuance of management earnings forecasts issued by longer tenured managers. 
MGR_CHAIR×NEWS is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that there is a 
stronger analyst reaction per unit of management earnings forecast news issued by managers 
who are also the chairperson. Contrary to intuition, there is a weaker analyst reaction to 
management earnings forecast news issued by CEOs who have CFO experience. As discussed 
                                               
43 AGE and AWARDS have a positive correlation of 0.20 (see Table 13). 
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earlier, one possible reason could be that this variable is capturing lower quality disclosures 
(Matsunaga et al., 2013) or proxying for younger managers with smaller networks. 
 
Similar to results obtained for Hypothesis 2, RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS is consistently 
positive and significant. This suggests that analysts perceive management earnings forecast 
news issued by managers with stronger forecast accuracy to be more credible. The interaction 
between RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ and NEWS is also positive and significant suggesting that 
analysts view managers who forecast more frequently to be more credible. The interaction 
between RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH and NEWS is also positive and significant suggesting that 
analysts perceive management earnings forecast news issued by managers who provide more 
precise disclosures to be more credible. Finally, there is also evidence that analysts differentiate 
between the forecast performance of the manager and the firm. The interaction between 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU and NEWS is positive and significant suggesting that firms with 
higher prior forecast accuracy are perceived to be more credible. Similarly, the interaction 
between RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ and NEWS is positive and significant which suggests that 
analysts view management earnings forecast news issued by firms who forecast more 
frequently to be more credible. Control variables behave as in previous models. 
 
 
4.7.5 Summary of Results for Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts will be 
conditioned by manager attributes. As with Hypothesis 3, because manager attributes are 
correlated, their associations with analyst reaction are first examined individually. When 
examined individually, some personal attributes are associated with analysts’ reaction to 
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management earnings forecast news. The coefficients for SEX×NEWS and MBA×NEWS are 
negative and significant while LEGAL×NEWS is positive and significant. With regards to 
imputed attributes, when examined individually, there is a positive association between 
managerial ability and the reaction to the issuance of the management earnings forecast. 
However, the interaction with NEWS is not significant. Results for positional attributes show 
a positive association between the interaction of TENURE and NEWS as well as between 
MGR_CHAIR and NEWS. On the other hand, there is a significant and negative association 
between CEO_CFO_EXPER and NEWS.  
 
When examined together in one model, results consistently show that there is a positive 
association between MGR_CHAIR×NEWS and analyst reaction and a negative association 
between CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS and analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts. 
This suggests that analysts perceive management earnings forecast news issued by managers 
who are also the chairperson to be more credible but perceive management earnings forecast 
news issued by CEOs who have CFO experience to be less credible. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a stronger stock market reaction to management earnings forecast news 
issued by managers with higher prior forecast accuracy, frequency and precision. In summary, 
the results are not supportive of Hypothesis 1. The market does not appear to react to manager-
specific prior forecast performance. There is some evidence suggesting that the market reacts 
more strongly to firm-specific factors such as firm-specific prior forecast accuracy and 
frequency.  
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Hypothesis 2 predicts a non-directional association between manager-specific prior forecast 
performance and analyst reaction to management earnings forecast news. The results provide 
support for Hypothesis 2. Analyst reaction to management earnings forecast news is stronger 
for managers with a higher propensity to issue more accurate and precise forecasts. There is 
also evidence that analysts react more strongly to management earnings forecast news issued 
by firms who forecast more frequently. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts is 
conditioned by managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes. Overall, the results do 
not provide support for Hypothesis 3. However, there is consistent evidence that the stock 
market reaction per unit of management earnings forecast news is stronger for forecasts issued 
by managers with a legal background. There is also some evidence that the market reaction to 
management earnings forecast news is stronger for managers with an accounting/finance 
background and with higher press coverage. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts is conditioned by 
managers’ personal, imputed and positional attributes. Overall, the results do not provide 
support for Hypothesis 4. However, there is evidence that the reaction to the issuance of the 
management earnings forecast is positively associated with managerial ability. However, this 
effect is not conditioned by the forecast news. There is consistent evidence that analysts react 
more strongly to management earnings forecast news issued by managers who are also the 
chairperson.  
 
To examine the robustness of the results presented in Chapter 4, additional analyses are 
conducted in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 5  Additional Analyses 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides further analyses. Section 5.2 provides the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
using a categorical measure of forecast precision instead of width of the range because the 
latter is highly correlated with forecast accuracy. Section 5.3 examines the association between 
manager attributes and manager fixed effects. This section also provides the results for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 when fixed effects are not included in the models. Section 5.4 examines 
whether results obtained for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are driven by the type of news released.  
 
 
5.2 Using an Alternative Measure of Forecast Precision 
 
In the previous chapter, forecast precision was calculated as the width of the range. Manager 
and firm fixed effects on forecast precision estimated based on this measure of forecast 
precision is highly correlated with manager and firm fixed effects on forecast accuracy. As 
seen in Table 12, manager fixed effects on accuracy and manager fixed effects on precision 
have a correlation of 0.42 while firm fixed effects on accuracy and firm fixed effects on 
precision have a correlation of 0.73.  
 
Following Bamber et al. (2010), I use an alternative measure for forecast precision comprising 
an ordinal scale on which point forecasts are assigned 3 points, range forecasts are assigned 2 
points and open-ended forecasts assigned 1 point. I follow the classification scheme provided 
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by Anilowski et al. (2007) to classify management earnings forecasts into point, range and 
open-ended estimates. I estimate Model 1 above using this forecast precision measure to 
estimate manager and firm fixed effects on forecast precision.  
 
Table 26 provides the descriptive statistics for manager and firm fixed effects for forecast 
precision using this categorical measure of forecast precision. For ease of reading, I have also 
included descriptive statistics for the other measures of forecast performance (see Table 8). As 
previously, the sample includes 4,202 management earnings forecasts issued by 237 managers 
and 253 firms over the test period 2006-2014. 
 
Table 26 Descriptive statistics for manager and firm fixed effects using the alternate forecast 
precision measure 
 
Table 26 provides the descriptive statistics for manager and firm fixed effects for 4,202 management earnings 
forecasts provided by 237 managers and 253 firms during 2006-2014. FE_MGR_PRECI is the raw manager 
fixed effect estimate on forecast precision using the alternative categorical measure of forecast precision. 
FE_FIRM_PRECI is the raw firm fixed effect estimate on forecast precision using the alternative categorical 
measure of forecast precision. Other variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
The mean manager fixed effect estimate on forecast precision using the categorical variable 
(FE_MGR_PRECI) is 0.028 and the median is 0.015. This is comparable to results obtained 
by Bamber et al. (2010). The mean and the median manager fixed effect estimate using the 
categorical measure of forecast precision are higher than when estimated using the width of the 
range. On the other hand, the mean and median firm fixed effects using this categorical forecast 
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precision measure are lower than when width of the range is used.  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between manager-specific prior forecast 
performance and investor reaction to management earnings forecast news. The results for 
Hypothesis 1 using this alternative categorical measure of forecast precision to estimate fixed 
effects on forecast precision are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 27. For ease of 
comparison, I include the results using width of the range reported previously (Table 16) in 
Column 1 and results using the categorical measure of forecast precision to estimate fixed 
effects are reported in Column 2.  
 
Similar to results using the width of the range, it can be seen that when the categorical measure 
is used, the interaction between manager fixed effect on precision (RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI) 
and NEWS is not significant.44 However, one difference is that using the previous measure of 
precision yielded a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH and NEWS but using the new measure results in the coefficient 
for RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI×NEWS being not significant.  
 
With the new measure, however, RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU is positive and significant 
suggesting a stronger market reaction to the release of the management earnings forecast issued 
by firms with a higher propensity to issue accurate forecasts. This result is also consistent with 
the possibility of a collinearity problem between fixed effects estimates for accuracy and width 
of the range.  
                                               
44 No significant results (untabulated) are obtained when only manager and firm fixed effects for precision are 
examined.  
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Table 27 Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the alternative forecast precision measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2006-2014 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) AFREV AFREV 
      
NEWS + 0.365 0.377 -0.042* -0.027 
  (0.223) (0.299) (0.069) (0.325) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.870) (0.401) (0.104) (0.205) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS + -0.019 -0.005 0.006** 0.008*** 
  (0.591) (0.885) (0.017) (0.001) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.897) (0.987) (0.481) (0.457) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS + 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.002 
  (0.745) (0.967) (0.211) (0.388) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH ? 0.002  -0.000  
  (0.189)  (0.324)  
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS + -0.000  0.005*  
  (0.994)  (0.085)  
RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI   -0.001  -0.000 
   (0.669)  (0.743) 
RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI×NEWS   0.031  0.002 
   (0.411)  (0.480) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ? 0.003 0.006*** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.102) (0.000) (0.040) (0.032) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS + 0.040 0.006 0.004 0.003 
  (0.298) (0.864) (0.202) (0.277) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ ? 0.002** 0.002* -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.050) (0.055) (0.590) (0.569) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS + 0.139*** 0.124*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH ? 0.003*  -0.000  
  (0.095)  (0.389)  
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS + -0.091**  -0.001  
  (0.032)  (0.678)  
RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI   -0.002  -0.000 
   (0.140)  (0.472) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI×NEWS   -0.019  -0.002 
   (0.597)  (0.389) 
SIZE ? -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.115) (0.148) 
SIZE×NEWS ? -0.052** -0.070*** -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.044) (0.006) (0.542) (0.366) 
F_LOSS ? -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS ? 0.071 0.066 0.117*** 0.117*** 
  (0.795) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA ? -0.043** -0.036** 0.001 0.001 
  (0.011) (0.030) (0.405) (0.501) 
ROA×NEWS + 1.603*** 1.697*** 0.047* 0.067** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.010) 
HORIZON ? 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.949) (0.905) 
HORIZON×NEWS ? 0.007 0.023 -0.023** -0.022** 
  (0.955) (0.864) (0.039) (0.044) 
Constant  -0.006 0.003 -0.002*** -0.002** 
  (0.560) (0.784) (0.008) (0.017) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4,202 4,202 4,052 4,052 
Adj R-squared   0.028 0.027 0.102 0.101 
This table provides the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 when a categorical variable is used to measure forecast precision. 
The sample to test Hypothesis 1 includes 4,202 observations and 237 managers. The sample to test Hypothesis 2 includes 
236 managers and 4,052 observations. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Results for other variables are similar when the categorical forecast precision is used to 
estimate manager and firm fixed effects on forecast precision. The coefficient for 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ interacted with NEWS is still positive and significant suggesting 
that the market reacts more strongly to management earnings forecast news issued by firms 
who issue management earnings forecast more frequently.  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive association between manager-specific forecast performance 
and analyst reaction to management earnings forecasts. Column 4 of Table 27 reports the 
results for Hypothesis 2 using the categorical forecast precision measure to estimate fixed 
effects on forecast precision. For comparison purposes, Column 3 reports the results using the 
original width of the range measure (see Table 17). As seen in Column 3, the coefficient for 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS is positive and significant but when the categorical 
forecast precision measure is used, RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI interacted with NEWS is not 
significant. The results for the other predictors are comparatively similar. 
 
Table 28 shows the results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 using the categorical measure of forecast 
precision. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 28 report the results for Hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively, 
when the categorical precision measure is used to estimate manager and firm fixed effects on 
forecast precision. For comparison purposes, Columns 1 and 3 provide the results for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively, using the original width of the range measure. As previously 
discussed, because of the high VIFs for AGE and NETWORK, I report the results without 
these two variables.  
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Table 28 Results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 using the alternative forecast precision measure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 2006-2014 
 WIDTH PRECI WIDTH PRECI 
  CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) AFREV AFREV 
     
NEWS 0.420 0.217 -0.019 -0.036 
 (0.295) (0.662) (0.550) (0.344) 
SEX 0.004 0.003 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.538) (0.592) (0.090) (0.082) 
SEX×NEWS -0.311 -0.289 0.004 0.006 
 (0.134) (0.165) (0.791) (0.703) 
FIN_EXP -0.000 -0.001 -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.935) (0.667) (0.085) (0.089) 
FIN_EXP×NEWS 0.389*** 0.433*** 0.010 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.264) (0.519) 
MBA 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.698) (0.909) (0.641) (0.629) 
MBA×NEWS 0.023 0.078 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.844) (0.505) (0.143) (0.103) 
LEGAL 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.865) (0.930) (0.506) (0.506) 
LEGAL×NEWS 0.755** 0.764*** -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.789) (0.833) 
IVY -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.836) (0.956) (0.879) (0.967) 
IVY×NEWS 0.121 0.135 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.345) (0.290) (0.463) (0.439) 
MIL_EXPER 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.336) (0.327) (0.223) (0.207) 
MIL_EXPER×NEWS 0.244 0.309 0.027* 0.031* 
 (0.230) (0.137) (0.082) (0.052) 
M_ABILITY 0.007 0.007 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.144) (0.129) (0.040) (0.043) 
M_ABILITY×NEWS 0.228 0.182 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.171) (0.277) (0.923) (0.877) 
PRESS_COV 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.222) (0.188) (0.299) (0.271) 
PRESS_COV×NEWS 0.002** 0.003** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.034) (0.026) (0.172) (0.135) 
AWARDS -0.003* -0.003* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.831) (0.848) 
AWARDS×NEWS -0.139 -0.153* -0.014** -0.013* 
 (0.125) (0.093) (0.044) (0.051) 
TENURE 0.001* 0.001* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.003) (0.002) 
TENURE×NEWS 0.017 0.022 0.000 0.000 
 (0.360) (0.228) (0.730) (0.890) 
MGR_CHAIR 0.003 0.001 -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.405) (0.739) (0.011) (0.009) 
MGR_CHAIR×NEWS -0.050 -0.012 0.049*** 0.046*** 
 (0.669) (0.914) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.763) (0.910) (0.226) (0.174) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS -0.169 -0.209* -0.048*** -0.053*** 
 (0.166) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) 
CHARITY -0.018 -0.009 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.203) (0.543) (0.772) (0.978) 
CHARITY×NEWS 0.675 0.503 0.042 0.034 
 (0.387) (0.522) (0.475) (0.572) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.498) (0.160) (0.420) (0.537) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS -0.020 -0.010 0.008** 0.012*** 
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 (0.666) (0.824) (0.019) (0.001) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.418) (0.363) (0.987) (0.980) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×NEWS -0.081* -0.091* 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.096) (0.060) (0.027) (0.023) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 0.001  -0.000  
 (0.318)  (0.455)  
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×NEWS -0.017  0.008**  
 (0.726)  (0.037)  
RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.389)  (0.344) 
RANK_FE_MGR_PRECI×NEWS  0.046  0.006 
  (0.401)  (0.119) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.002 0.006*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.401) (0.001) (0.290) (0.173) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS 0.029 -0.014 0.008* 0.012*** 
 (0.628) (0.771) (0.079) (0.003) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.003* 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.072) (0.129) (0.361) (0.390) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×NEWS 0.115** 0.114** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH 0.004**  -0.000  
 (0.043)  (0.576)  
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×NEWS -0.103  0.008  
 (0.151)  (0.144)  
RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI  -0.003*  -0.000 
  (0.072)  (0.143) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI×NEWS  0.045  0.005 
  (0.405)  (0.229) 
SIZE -0.003** -0.003** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.237) (0.311) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.066* -0.097*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
F_LOSS -0.022** -0.021** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.109 0.071 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.711) (0.812) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.035* -0.028 0.000 0.000 
 (0.068) (0.134) (0.804) (0.817) 
ROA×NEWS 1.728*** 1.654*** 0.019 0.041 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.560) (0.190) 
HORIZON 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.602) (0.628) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.020 -0.013 -0.035*** -0.033** 
 (0.895) (0.930) (0.008) (0.013) 
Constant -0.024* -0.008 -0.002** -0.002* 
 (0.086) (0.580) (0.026) (0.096) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,340 3,340 3,249 3,249 
Adj R-squared 0.041 0.040 0.128 0.127 
This table provides the results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 when a categorical variable is used to measure forecast precision. 
The sample to test Hypothesis 3 includes 3,340 observations and 189 managers. The sample to test Hypothesis 4 
includes 188 managers and 3,249 observations. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that the market reaction to management earnings forecasts is conditioned 
by manager attributes. Tests for Hypothesis 3 reveal that the manager specific effect on forecast 
precision is not significant under either specification. When comparing results for Hypothesis 
3 in Columns 1 and 2, it can also be seen that using the categorical version of the forecast 
precision measure results in a few differences in the results for Hypothesis 3. The coefficients 
for AWARDS×NEWS and CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS were previously not significant but 
become negative and significant. In addition, RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU was previously not 
significant becomes positive and significant. RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ was previously 
significant at the 10% level but is no longer significant when the categorical measure for 
forecast precision is used. The main effect for RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH is positive and 
significant but when the categorical variable is used, RANK_FE_FIRM_PRECI is negative 
and significant. This coupled with the differences in the results for the other results suggest a 
multicollinearity problem which causes the results to be unstable. However, some results are 
consistent across specifications. The coefficients for FIN_EXP×NEWS, LEGAL×NEWS and 
PRESS_COV×NEWS remain positive and significant suggesting a stronger market reaction 
for management earnings forecast news issued by managers who have accounting/finance 
backgrounds, legal backgrounds and higher press coverage, respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that analysts’ reaction to management earnings forecasts is conditioned 
by manager attributes. Results using the two different measures of forecast precision are 
reported in Columns 3 and 4. Results across the two specifications are similar. However, the 
results using the categorical measure of precision leads to the interaction between NEWS and 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU to be significant at the 1% level instead of at the 5% level. Similarly, 
results for the coefficient of RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS becomes significant at the 1% 
level using the new measure instead of the 10% level. 
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Overall, I test Hypotheses 1 to 4 using fixed effects based a categorical measure of forecast 
precision because fixed effects estimates based on the width of the range precision measure is 
highly correlated with fixed effects estimates of forecast accuracy. Using the new measure 
results in some differences in the results for market reaction to management earnings forecasts. 
This could be due to multicollinearity. Consistent with the main results, firm-specific forecast 
performance seems to matter more to the market. However, the market seems to view 
management earnings forecasts issued by managers with an accounting/finance background or 
a legal background to be more credible. The results for analyst reaction to management 
earnings forecasts and the effect of manager-specific forecast performance and manager 
attributes are more consistent across specifications. 
 
 
5.3 The Association between Manager Attributes and Manager Fixed Effects 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Bamber et al. (2010) find that some manager attributes (age, 
financial expertise, legal background, military experience and an MBA education) are 
associated with manager fixed effects on prior forecast performance. In this thesis, I examine 
the following additional manager attributes: sex, Ivy league education, network size, 
managerial ability, press citations, number of awards, tenure, manager/chair duality, CEO’s 
CFO experience, and charitable involvement. Therefore, I follow Bamber (2010) and test 
whether manager attributes are associated with manager-specific fixed effects on prior forecast 
performance. To that end, the following model will be estimated: 
 
RANK_FE_MGR_PERFm =  d + ∑ dmM_ATTRIBUTESm + εit 
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RANK_FE_MGR_PERFm are the quartile ranks of manager-specific effects on prior forecast 
accuracy (RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU), frequency (RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ) and precision 
(RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH) estimated in Model 1 (see Table 5). M_ATTRIBUTES are 
manager attributes, summarised in Table 6 in Chapter 3 and in Appendix A. 
 
Table 29 reports the results for the relationship between manager attributes and manager-fixed 
effects on forecast performance. The sample includes all managers with data available to 
estimate fixed effects and who provided management earnings forecasts during 2006-2014 and 
for which data for all manager attributes is available. It includes 2,691 observations and 160 
managers. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for manager fixed effects on accuracy, frequency 
and precision, respectively. It can be seen that most managerial attributes are associated with 
managers’ fixed effect on forecast performance.  
 
There is some evidence that personal attributes of managers are associated with managers’ 
forecast performance. SEX is negatively associated with all three measures of fixed effects 
suggesting that female managers provide less accurate, frequent and precise forecasts. AGE is 
positively associated with accuracy and precision but negatively associated with frequency. 
This suggests that older managers provide more accurate and precise forecasts but less 
frequently. Bamber et al (2010) find no significant association for accuracy and precision but 
find similar to results obtained in Table 29 for the negative association between age and 
forecast frequency. FIN_EXP and MBA are positive and significantly associated with manager 
forecast frequency only. This suggests that managers who have more financial expertise are 
more likely to provide more frequent forecasts. However, there is no evidence that they provide 
more accurate or precise forecasts. 
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Table 29 The relationship between manager attributes and manager-fixed effects on forecast 
performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH 
        
SEX -0.220** -0.906*** -0.258*** 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.009) 
AGE 1.130*** -0.882*** 0.777*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FIN_EXP 0.065 0.413*** 0.026 
 (0.161) (0.000) (0.594) 
MBA -0.074 0.079* -0.031 
 (0.110) (0.098) (0.527) 
LEGAL 0.449*** -0.283*** 0.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) 
IVY 0.145*** 0.283*** -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.900) 
MIL_EXPER -0.372*** 0.518*** -0.716*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NETWORK -0.271*** 0.011 -0.060** 
 (0.000) (0.713) (0.044) 
M_ABILITY 0.031 0.393*** -0.042 
 (0.631) (0.000) (0.541) 
PRESS_COV -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.669) (0.000) (0.483) 
AWARDS 0.026 -0.065** 0.053** 
 (0.305) (0.012) (0.044) 
TENURE -0.010 0.012 -0.006 
 (0.167) (0.102) (0.384) 
MGR_CHAIR -0.167*** 0.145*** -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.708) 
CEO_CFO_EXP 0.327*** -0.285*** 0.085* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) 
CHARITY 1.315*** 0.776*** 0.488** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) 
Constant -0.290 5.252*** -0.131 
 (0.718) (0.000) (0.876) 
Observations 2,691 2,691 2,691 
Adj R-squared 0.105 0.117 0.042 
This table reports the results when manager-fixed effects on forecast performance is regressed against all managerial 
attributes. The sample is comprised of 2.691 management earnings forecasts issued by 160 managers. Variable 
definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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LEGAL is positively associated with accuracy and precision but negatively associated with 
frequency, suggesting that managers with legal backgrounds are likely to provide less frequent 
but more accurate and precise management earnings forecasts. These results are inconsistent 
with Bamber et al. (2010), who do not find significant results for the association between 
managers with legal backgrounds and forecast performance. IVY is positively associated with 
accuracy and frequency but not with precision, implying that managers who went to a more 
prestigious college are more likely to issue more accurate and frequent forecasts. MIL_EXPER 
is positively associated with frequency but negatively associated with accuracy and precision. 
These results are inconsistent with Bamber et al. (2010) who only finds a positive association 
between military experience and forecast precision. M_ABILITY and PRESS_COV are 
positively associated with only forecast frequency. The coefficient for AWARDS is negatively 
associated with forecast frequency but positively associated with forecast precision. 
MGR_CHAIR duality is negatively associated with forecast accuracy but positively associated 
with forecast frequency. CEO_CFO_EXPER is positively associated with accuracy and 
precision but negatively associated with frequency. Finally, charitable involvement is 
positively associated with all three forecast performance measures.  
 
Overall, manager attributes help to predict managers’ forecast accuracy, frequency and 
precision. Therefore, I run the results for Hypotheses 3 to 4 without the fixed effects to estimate 
the effects of managerial attributes on market and analyst reaction to management earnings 
forecast news. Results are reported in Table 30.  
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Table 30 Results for Hypothesis 3 and 4 (Excluding fixed effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) AFREV AFREV 
          
NEWS 5.402*** 0.788*** 1.081*** 0.130*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEX 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.001** 
 (0.399) (0.571) (0.786) (0.036) 
SEX×NEWS -0.113 -0.159 -0.024 -0.007 
 (0.538) (0.284) (0.139) (0.590) 
AGE -0.006  -0.001  
 (0.630)  (0.360)  
AGE×NEWS -1.102***  -0.217***  
 (0.010)  (0.000)  
FIN_EXP -0.002 -0.004* -0.000* -0.001** 
 (0.552) (0.078) (0.093) (0.016) 
FIN_EXP×NEWS 0.032 0.101 -0.015* -0.008 
 (0.721) (0.200) (0.054) (0.253) 
MBA 0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.323) (0.908) (0.466) (0.752) 
MBA×NEWS -0.070 0.002 -0.010 0.014** 
 (0.462) (0.980) (0.216) (0.043) 
LEGAL 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 
 (0.610) (0.266) (0.515) (0.430) 
LEGAL×NEWS 0.398* 0.563** -0.027 -0.007 
 (0.072) (0.011) (0.162) (0.709) 
IVY -0.008** -0.002 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.491) (0.022) (0.596) 
IVY×NEWS 0.065 0.086 0.025** 0.009 
 (0.582) (0.408) (0.015) (0.294) 
MIL_EXPER 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.630) (0.619) (0.115) (0.341) 
MIL_EXPER×NEWS 0.115 0.031 0.043*** 0.029** 
 (0.530) (0.855) (0.009) (0.036) 
NETWORK 0.004**  0.000  
 (0.014)  (0.485)  
NETWORK×NEWS -0.091  -0.009  
 (0.152)  (0.107)  
M_ABILITY 0.009** 0.011*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.036) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
M_ABILITY×NEWS 0.160 0.089 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.268) (0.502) (0.892) (0.914) 
PRESS_COV 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.391) (0.385) (0.332) (0.331) 
PRESS_COV×NEWS -0.000 0.001 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.995) (0.197) (0.063) (0.054) 
AWARDS -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.131) (0.118) (0.748) (0.823) 
AWARDS×NEWS 0.029 -0.073 -0.007 -0.013** 
 (0.692) (0.302) (0.272) (0.030) 
TENURE 0.000 0.001 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.285) (0.193) (0.035) (0.026) 
TENURE×NEWS 0.010 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.449) (0.944) (0.000) (0.000) 
MGR_CHAIR 0.002 0.001 -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.548) (0.748) (0.069) (0.082) 
MGR_CHAIR×NEWS 0.070 0.089 0.012 0.025*** 
 (0.465) (0.309) (0.146) (0.001) 
CEO_CFO_EXPER -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.340) (0.817) (0.849) (0.933) 
 130 
CEO_CFO_EXPER×NEWS -0.085 -0.394*** 0.009 -0.031*** 
 (0.428) (0.000) (0.364) (0.000) 
CHARITY -0.007 -0.005 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.552) (0.705) (0.751) (0.885) 
CHARITY×NEWS 0.905 0.781 0.069 0.075 
 (0.218) (0.319) (0.291) (0.256) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.002* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.007) (0.078) (0.233) (0.096) 
SIZE×NEWS -0.047 -0.090*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS -0.013 -0.016** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.108) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×NEWS 0.186 0.495* 0.132*** 0.206*** 
 (0.510) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.013 -0.021 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.445) (0.166) (0.257) (0.054) 
ROA×NEWS -0.543 2.179*** 0.035 0.103*** 
 (0.232) (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) 
HORIZON 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.698) (0.904) 
HORIZON×NEWS -0.095 -0.053 -0.119*** -0.092*** 
 (0.354) (0.602) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.007 -0.005 0.000 -0.003*** 
 (0.896) (0.544) (0.987) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,843 4,932 3,746 4,809 
Adj R-squared 0.013 0.036 0.111 0.119 
This table provides the results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 excluding fixed effects on forecast performance. Columns 1 and 
2 provide the results for Hypothesis 3 with Column 1 including all manager attributes and Column 2 excluding AGE 
and NETWORK and their interactions with NEWS. Columns 3 and 4 provide the results for Hypothesis 4 when 
manager and firm fixed effects are excluded. Column 3 includes all manager attributes and Column 4 excludes AGE 
and NETWORK and their interaction with NEWS. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Results for Hypothesis 3 when manager and firm fixed effects are excluded are similar to those 
obtained in Section 4.6. One notable exception is AGE×NEWS which was not significant in 
main tests but is now negative and significant. As previously reported, this could be due to the 
high VIF obtained for AGE×NEWS (2654.62 in this model). Column 2 reports results for 
Hypothesis 3 excluding AGE and NETWORK and their interactions with NEWS. It can be 
seen that similar to results obtained in the main tests, LEGAL×NEWS is positive and 
significant when manager and firm fixed effects are excluded from the model. This suggests 
that the market views management earnings forecast news issued by managers with legal 
backgrounds to be more credible. Results for Hypothesis 4 (Columns 3 and 4) when manager 
and firm fixed effects are excluded from the model are also comparable to the main tests (see 
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Section 4.7). Two notable exceptions are MBA×NEWS and TENURE×NEWS which are now 
positive and significant. Overall, while the manager attributes are correlated with manager 
fixed effects, the results for manager attributes when fixed effects are excluded from the model 
are comparable to results obtained when manager fixed effects are included. 
 
5.4 Results for Hypothesis 1 and 2: Good News and Bad News 
 
Bad news management earnings forecasts are forecasts which fall below earnings expectations. 
Good news management earnings forecasts are forecasts which are above earnings 
expectations. Prior research finds a stronger reaction to bad news as compared to good news. 
Some studies argue that this is because bad news is more credible than good news (Jennings, 
1987, Hutton et al., 2003, Rogers and Stocken, 2005). However, Kothari et al. (2009) argue 
that managers delay recognition of bad news and good news is frequently leaked early. 
Regardless whether bad news management earnings forecasts are more credible or released 
with a delay, I re-examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 by testing whether the association between 
market and analyst reaction to manager-specific forecast performance is conditioned by the 
type of news released. The descriptive statistics about the distribution of good news and bad 
news are provided in Table 31.  
 
Table 31 Descriptive Statistics for Good News and Bad News 
This table provides the descriptive statistics about the distribution of NEWS when it is broken down into GOOD_NEWS and 
BAD_NEWS. GOOD_NEWS is equal to NEWS when NEWS is greater than zero. BAD_NEWS is equal to NEWS when 
NEWS is less than zero. Panel A and Panel B provide the distribution for GOOD_NEWS and BAD_NEWS when market 
reaction and analyst reaction are tested, respectively. 
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GOOD_NEWS is equal to NEWS if NEWS is greater than 0, and zero otherwise. BAD_NEWS 
is equal to NEWS if NEWS is less than 0, and zero otherwise. Table 31 Panel A and Panel B 
report the descriptive statistics for good news and bad news when Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2 are tested, respectively. On average, the sample includes more good news forecasts than bad 
news forecasts, consistent with Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013).  
 
Table 32 reports the results for Hypotheses 1 (Column 1) and 2 (Column 2) when good news 
and bad news are examined separately. As seen previously in Table 16, the market reaction to 
management earnings forecasts news does not seem to vary with manager-specific prior 
forecast performance. However, it can be seen that when the effect of good news and bad news 
are examined separately in Table 32 below, the interaction between RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ 
and GOOD_NEWS is positive at the 10% level suggesting that there is a stronger reaction per 
unit of good news for management earnings forecast issued by managers with a propensity to 
issue more frequent forecasts. In addition, RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×GOOD_NEWS is 
positive and significant suggesting a stronger market reaction per unit of good news for 
managers with a historic propensity to issue more precise forecasts. The coefficient for the 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH and BAD_NEWS is negative and significant suggesting a weaker 
stock market reaction per unit of bad news issued by managers with a historic propensity to 
issue more precise forecasts. 
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Table 32 Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Good news and bad news) 
  (1) (2) 
 2006-2014 2006-2014 
VARIABLES CAR(-1,1) AFREV 
GOOD_NEWS -1.338** -0.070 
 (0.037) (0.131) 
BAD_NEWS 1.049*** 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.755) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU 0.001 0.000* 
 (0.673) (0.066) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×GOOD_NEWS -0.026 0.003 
 (0.696) (0.542) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×BAD_NEWS 0.000 0.010** 
 (0.998) (0.014) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.355) (0.452) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×GOOD_NEWS 0.115* -0.001 
 (0.072) (0.863) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ×BAD_NEWS -0.021 0.003 
 (0.707) (0.444) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.757) (0.454) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×GOOD_NEWS 0.131** 0.004 
 (0.032) (0.332) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH×BAD_NEWS -0.119** 0.005 
 (0.041) (0.255) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU 0.004** 0.000 
 (0.044) (0.137) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×GOOD_NEWS -0.088 0.000 
 (0.369) (0.947) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×BAD_NEWS 0.078 0.000 
 (0.140) (0.938) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.368) (0.744) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×GOOD_NEWS 0.207*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ×BAD_NEWS 0.093* 0.022*** 
 (0.089) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.774) (0.740) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×GOOD_NEWS 0.112 -0.003 
 (0.162) (0.626) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH×BAD_NEWS -0.170*** 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.723) 
SIZE -0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.699) 
SIZE×GOOD_NEWS 0.038 0.006 
 (0.537) (0.200) 
SIZE×BAD_NEWS -0.064* -0.006** 
 (0.080) (0.036) 
F_LOSS -0.023** -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.157) 
F_LOSS×GOOD_NEWS -0.112 -0.138*** 
 (0.806) (0.000) 
F_LOSS×BAD_NEWS -0.009 0.336*** 
 (0.982) (0.000) 
ROA -0.001 0.001 
 (0.954) (0.614) 
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ROA×GOOD_NEWS -2.203*** -0.059 
 (0.006) (0.323) 
ROA×BAD_NEWS 2.739*** 0.023 
 (0.000) (0.533) 
F_HORIZON 0.014*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.864) 
F_HORIZON×GOOD_NEWS 0.258 -0.008 
 (0.300) (0.650) 
F_HORIZON×BAD_NEWS -0.081 -0.048*** 
 (0.665) (0.005) 
Constant 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.320) (0.137) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 4,191 4,042 
Adj R-squared 0.035 0.126 
This table reports the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 when NEWS is separated into GOOD_NEWS and BAD_NEWS. 
GOOD_NEWS is equal to NEWS if NEWS is greater than 0, and zero otherwise. BAD_NEWS is equal to NEWS if 
NEWS is less than 0, and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
The results for firm-fixed effects on prior forecast performance are comparable to those 
obtained previously in Table 16 with one exception. The interaction between 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH and BAD_NEWS is negative and significant. This suggests that 
the market perceives bad news provided by more historically precise managers and firms to be 
less credible. 
 
Results for Hypothesis 2 in Column 2 suggest that analysts’ reaction to management earnings 
forecasts news is only conditioned by manager-specific forecast accuracy when the forecast 
news is bad. The coefficient for RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×GOOD_NEWS is not significant 
but interaction between RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU and BAD_NEWS is positive and significant 
suggesting that analysts view each unit of bad news issued by more historically accurate 
managers to be more credible.  
 
Overall, there is some evidence that the extent of the market’s and analysts’ reaction to 
management earnings forecast news is conditioned by manager-specific forecast performance 
and news type.  
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CHAPTER 6  Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
This thesis examines whether manager-specific factors condition the market’s and analysts’ 
reactions to management earnings forecasts. Given that management earnings forecasts are 
voluntary and, unaudited, and that managers have substantial discretion as to what, how and 
when to disclose management earnings forecasts, I examine whether the manager matters to 
the market and analysts, after controlling for firm effects.  
 
I extend prior studies that find that individual managers exert their own ‘style’ on management 
earnings forecast accuracy, precision and frequency (Bamber et al. 2010) and that manager 
fixed effects on prior forecast accuracy are positively associated with stock market reactions 
to management earnings forecast news (Yang 2012). Using a manager-firm matched panel 
dataset, I estimate manager-specific prior forecast performance after controlling for from firm-
specific prior forecast performance where prior forecast performance measures include prior 
forecast accuracy, frequency and precision. I examine whether investor and analyst reaction 
vary with manager-specific prior forecast performance. In addition, I build on Baik et al. (2011) 
and examine whether investor and analyst reaction are conditioned by manager attributes. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association between manager-specific prior forecast 
performance and stock market reaction per unit of management earnings forecast news. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a non-directional association between manager-specific prior forecast 
performance and analyst reaction per unit of management earnings forecast news. Hypothesis 
1 builds on Yang (2012) by examining whether the stock market reaction to management 
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earnings forecast news is conditioned by manager fixed effects on precision and frequency. 
Hypothesis 2 builds on Yang (2012) by examining whether the analyst reaction to management 
earnings forecast news is conditioned by manager fixed effects on accuracy, precision and 
frequency.  
 
The main results are generally not supportive of Hypothesis 1. No evidence is found that the 
stock market reactions to management earnings forecast news are conditioned by manager-
specific forecast accuracy, precision and frequency. However, there is evidence that the stock 
market reaction to management earnings forecast news varies with firm-specific factors such 
as firm-specific frequency, firm-specific precision, firm size, and firm performance, as well as 
forecast characteristics such as loss forecasts and forecast horizon. Additional analyses that 
separately examine good forecast news and bad forecast news reveal that the stock market 
reaction to good forecast news is stronger for managers with a higher propensity to issue more 
frequent forecasts and more precise forecasts. These results indicate that, depending on the 
type of forecast news, the market reactions to management earnings forecasts are conditioned 
by manager-specific forecast performance. 
 
The main tests of Hypothesis 2 support the proposition that analysts’ reactions to management 
earnings forecast news are conditioned by manager-specific forecast performance in addition 
to firm-specific forecast performance. The results suggest that analysts, being more informed 
sophisticated users, distinguish between managers’ prior forecast performance and the firm’s 
prior forecast performance as factors influencing their perceived credibility of management 
earnings forecasts. Further analyses reveal that analysts’ reactions to management earnings 
forecasts are conditioned by manager-specific prior forecast performance for bad forecast news 
but not good forecast news. This may imply that analysts are sceptical of good news forecasts 
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but are willing to react more when bad news forecasts are issued by better performing 
managers. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on whether managers’ prior forecast performance matters to 
investors and analysts. However, perceptions of credibility are not necessarily determined by 
prior forecast performance (Hirst et al., 1999). For example, some managers may have 
experienced luck in forecasting and some managers may have managed earnings to meet or 
beat their own forecasts. Prior research finds that characteristics of managers such as age, 
education and military experience, affect the properties of management earnings forecasts 
(Bamber et al. 2010). Studies in social psychology argue that cognitive, innate or psychological 
characteristics of individuals can affect their perceived credibility (Hovland et al., 1953). 
However, because it is difficult to obtain such data on managers, prior research argues for the 
use of observable characteristics of the manager that may be correlated with the cognitive and 
psychological characteristics (Hambrick, 2007) and therefore, managers’ attributes may proxy 
for managers’ cognitive and psychological traits and innate ability. Accordingly, I argue that 
investors and analysts may use observable attributes of the manager in forming their 
assessments of the perceived trustworthiness and expertise of managers and consequently of 
managements’ earnings forecasts.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the stock market reactions to management earnings forecasts are 
conditioned by manager attributes and Hypothesis 4 predicts that analysts’ reactions to 
management earnings forecasts are conditioned by manager attributes. I test the effects of 
managers’ personal attributes, imputed attributes and positional attributes. The tested personal 
attributes are sex, age, accounting/finance background, MBA qualification, legal background, 
Ivy league education, military experience and network size. The imputed attributes examined 
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are manager ability, press coverage and number of awards won. Positional attributes of the 
manager studied are tenure, manager/chair duality, CEO’s CFO experience and charitable 
involvement.  
 
Consistent with results obtained for tests of Hypothesis 1, the results for tests of Hypothesis 3 
suggest that there is not strong evidence that the stock market reactions to management 
earnings forecast news are conditioned by managers’ attributes. Multicollinearity is an issue in 
testing Hypothesis 3 because there is some correlation among manager attributes. Therefore, 
the results for Hypothesis 3 are sensitive to model specifications. However, there is consistent 
evidence that the stock market reactions to management earnings forecast news are stronger 
for forecasts issued by managers with a legal background. This could be because investors 
believe that managers with a legal background are more aware of litigation risk associated with 
missing targets or providing misleading forecasts. Alternatively, the legal background variable 
may proxy for other (omitted) factors, such as other network effects or innate ability of the 
manager that may not be correctly captured for in the model. Another potential reason for the 
lack of significance of manager attributes is that these variables may have mixed effects on 
analysts and investors reactions to management earnings forecasts. 
 
Multicollinearity is also an issue when testing Hypothesis 4 and results are sensitive to model 
specifications. However, results for tests of Hypothesis 4 consistently show that analysts’ 
reactions management earnings forecasts are stronger for managers who are also the 
chairperson and weaker for CEOs with CFO experience. Overall, consistent with the results 
for Hypothesis 2, the positional attributes of managers seem to influence analysts when 
assessing the credibility of management earnings forecasts.  
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6.2 Limitations  
 
This study used a manager-firm matched dataset, which has the advantage of allowing the 
estimation of manager fixed effects on forecast accuracy, precision and frequency as distinct 
from the firm fixed effects on forecast accuracy, precision and frequency. However, while 
using this approach allows the examination of whether the manager’s specific forecast 
performance matters to users of management earnings forecasts, it results in a potential sample 
selection bias. This is because if managers who meet this criteria of having worked across 
multiple firms are systematically different from managers who have not held CEO or CFO 
positions across multiple firms, then the results may not be generalizable to all CEOs and 
CFOs. 
 
The sample selection criteria also result in a small sample size and therefore lower statistical 
power because the manager has to hold CEO or CFO positions and provide management 
earnings forecasts at more than one firm within the estimation period, and provide management 
earnings forecasts in the test period to be included in the sample.  In addition, because manager 
movements are observed in Execucomp and management earnings forecasts are obtained from 
Zacks, this biases the sample towards larger firms. However, to the extent that more 
information is known to the market and analysts for larger firms, I would expect that this would 
bias against finding results. 
 
There is a potential multicollinearity problem because many manager attributes are correlated 
causing the results to be susceptible to change using different model specifications. However, 
to deal with this issue, the association between investors’ and analysts’ reactions and each 
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manager attribute was examined individually, before examining them together in the multiple 
regression. 
 
It is also likely that the proxies for managers’ attributes used in this thesis are crude proxies for 
managers’ innate abilities and characteristics. The manager attributes used may also not be 
capturing the perceived expertise and trustworthiness of the manager. That being said, it can 
be argued that proxies for the manager attributes used in this thesis are what investors and 
analysts can observe.  
 
In addition, the degree to which investors and analysts react to managers’ and firm’s forecast 
performance may depend on the divergence between expected forecast performance and actual 
forecast performance (Rupar, 2017). This is, however, outside the scope of this study and is 
left for future research.  
 
 
6.3 Contribution 
 
This thesis extends the management earnings forecasts literature concerned with source 
credibility and market participants’ reactions. It does so by examining whether manager-
specific prior forecast performance and manager attributes condition market participants’ 
assessments of the usefulness of management earnings forecasts.  
 
The analyses show that there may be differences in what matters to investors and what matters 
to analysts in their assessments of the perceived credibility of manager-provided disclosures. 
The results suggest that analysts, being more sophisticated users, consider both manager-and 
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firm-specific characteristics in their assessments of management earnings forecasts while 
investors, on average, do not systematically consider manager attributes. The investigation also 
provides evidence that prior forecast performance is not the only factor that market participants 
use to assess the credibility of management earnings forecasts and that market participants’ 
reactions to management earnings forecast news can vary with some manager attributes. 
Overall, this thesis extends our understanding of the importance and nature of source credibility 
for management earnings forecasts by revealing how various manager-specific factors appear 
to matter or do not matter to investors and analysts. In doing so, this thesis responds to a call 
by Dichev et al. (2013) to study the “human factor” in assessing the perceived credibility of 
financial disclosures.  
 
This thesis also offers a practical contribution to firms and managers. By informing them about 
what matters to users, particularly with respect to individual manager track records, firms and 
their managers may vary their choices about their forecasting behaviour. Results may also help 
inform boards of directors about what matters to users of management earnings forecasts and 
help the board better monitor managers in this regard. Finally, the results may inform observers 
such as regulators and commentators in providing signals about what matters to users in terms 
managers’ forecasting behaviour and attributes. 
 
 
6.4 Future Research 
 
Further advances in our knowledge of what influences perceptions of the credibility of 
voluntary disclosures will be obtained if future research addresses some of the limitations of 
this thesis. Because the sample is biased towards larger firms, the sample includes few loss 
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firms. Future research could examine how management credibility affects the usefulness of 
disclosures by loss firms. This could further extend our understanding of the perceived 
credibility of financial disclosures.  
 
Social psychology research suggests that source credibility and message credibility overlap 
(Hovland et al., 1953, Abelson, 1959). Findings in this thesis suggest that message credibility 
can affect perceptions of source credibility and consequently perceptions of message 
credibility. Examination of the interactions between source and message credibility was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, future research could expand our knowledge of 
credibility by examining the interactions between message (forecast) credibility and source 
credibility.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name   Variable Definition 
ABS_EA_NEWS = Absolute value of the earnings surprise (actual earnings minus analyst 
consensus). 
ACCURACY = Absolute difference between the management earnings forecasts and 
actual earnings multiplied by -1 and scaled by beginning of period price. 
ACQ = Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm has an M&A during the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
AFREV = Consensus analyst forecast revision: difference between the mean 
analyst forecast consensus within 10 days after the management 
earnings forecast date and the mean analyst forecast consensus before 
the management earnings forecast date scaled by beginning of period 
price 
AGE = Natural log of the manager’s age at the beginning of the year. 
ANALYST_COV = Natural log of the number of analysts covering the firm. 
ANALYST_DISP = Standard deviation of analyst estimates for current period's earnings. 
ANALYSTS = Number of analysts following the firm prior to the issuance of the 
management forecast. 
ANNUAL = Indicator variable coded as 1 for annual forecasts, and 0 otherwise. 
AWARDS = Total number of awards won at beginning of year. 
BAD_EA_NEWS = Indicator variable coded as 1 for earnings surprises less than -0.0001 
BUNDLED = Indicator variable coded as 1 if a management earnings forecast was 
issued in the 3-day window surrounding the earnings announcement. 
CAR (-1, +1) = Market-adjusted returns for the 3-day window around the management 
earnings forecast date using the CRSP value-weighted index 
CEO_CFO_EXPER = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the CEO has CFO experience, and 0 
otherwise. 
CHARITY = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager serves on the board of a 
charity during the year. 
CONC = Herfindahl index using revenues of firms sharing the same four-digit 
SIC code. 
EP_RANK = Decile rank of the firm's pre-earnings announcement earnings/price 
ratio. 
F_LOSS = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the management forecast predicted a 
loss, and 0 otherwise. 
FE_FIRM_ACCU = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing average firm-
year ACCU on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
FE_FIRM_FREQ = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing FREQUENCY 
on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
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Variable Name   Variable Definition 
FE_FIRM_WIDTH = Firm fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing average firm-
year WIDTH on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
FE_MGR_ACCU = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing average firm-
year ACCU on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
FE_MGR_FREQ = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing 
FREQUENCY on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
FE_MGR_WIDTH = Manager fixed effect coefficient estimated from regressing average firm-
year WIDTH on firm-, manager-, and year-specific fixed effects 
FIN_EXP = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has an accounting/finance 
degree or professional accounting/finance qualification, and 0 otherwise. 
FREQUENCY = Number of management earnings forecasts issued in year. 
GOOD_EA_NEWS = Indicator variable coded as 1 for earnings surprises greater than 0.0001 
HORIZON = Number of days between the management earnings forecast date and the 
end of the fiscal period, divided by 365 
INST = Percentage of firm’s common stock held by institutional investors. 
IVY = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager attended an IVY League 
school, and 0 otherwise. 
LAST_BUNDLED = Indicator variable coded as 1 if a management earnings forecast had 
been previously issued for the last earnings announced. 
LEGAL = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has a law degree, and 0 
otherwise. 
LITRISK = Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm is in a high-litigation industry. 
LOSS = Indicator variable coded as 1 if earnings for the fiscal period is negative. 
M_ABILITY = Managerial ability, as obtained from Demerjian et al. (2012). 
MBA = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has an MBA qualification, 
and 0 otherwise. 
MEF_ISSUED = Indicator variable coded as 1 if a management earnings forecast had 
been previously issued for the earnings announced. 
MGR_CHAIR = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager serves on the board during 
the year. 
MIL_EXPER = Indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager has military experience, and 
0 otherwise. 
MTB = Market-to-book value at beginning of period. 
MV_RANK = Decile rank of the firm's pre-earnings announcement market value. 
MVE = Natural log of the firm's market value of equity 3 days prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
NETWORK = Natural log of the executive’s number of connections. 
NEWS = RAW_NEWS adjusted for bundled forecasts using the Rogers and Van 
Buskirk (2013) approach. 
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Variable Name   Variable Definition 
OUTDIR = Percentage directors on the board that are also not officers of the firm. 
PRESS_COV = The number of press citations for manager over a five-year period prior 
to the issuance of the management earnings forecast. 
PRIOR_RETURN = Cumulative stock return over the 90-day period ending 3 days prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
PROP_MOB = The percentage of the last four earnings announcements that the firm met 
or beat analyst expectations. 
R&D = R&D expense scaled by total assets.  
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_ACCU. 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_FREQ. 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH = Quartile rank of variable FE_FIRM_WIDTH. 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_ACCU. 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_FREQ. 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH = Quartile rank of variable FE_MGR_WIDTH. 
RAW_NEWS = Raw Forecast News; Management earnings forecast minus mean 
analysts' forecast consensus before management earnings forecast date, 
scaled by beginning of period price. 
RESTRUCT = An indicator variable coded as 1 if firm is engaged in restructuring 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA = Return on assets calculated as firm i’s net income in year t divided by 
lagged total assets. 
SEX = An indicator variable coded as 1 if the manager is a female, and 0 
otherwise. 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets at beginning of the year. 
TENURE = Total number of years experience in the current position and the current 
firm at the beginning of the year. 
WIDTH = The absolute difference between the upper bound and the lower bound of 
the management earnings forecast, multiplied by -1 and scaled by 
beginning of period price. 
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Appendix B: Comparison of Zacks Coverage and First Call Coverage of Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
 
This thesis uses Zacks as a source for management earnings forecasts compared to Yang (2012) 
which uses First Call. I did not have access to data for First Call. Numbers for First Call were 
obtained from Anilowski et al. (2007) for the period 1995-2003. Table B1 compares available 
annual and quarterly observations in First Call and Zacks for the period covered by Anilowski 
et al. (2007). 
 
Table B 1 Comparison between Zacks and First Call: Last Forecast Issued 
  FIRST CALL ZACKS FIRST CALL ZACKS 
YEAR ANNUAL ANNUAL QUARTERLY QUARTERLY 
1995 252 63 376 115 
1996 345 99 645 225 
1997 491 87 925 183 
1998 1031 23 1694 197 
1999 1269 42 1708 313 
2000 1356 82 1890 545 
2001 2748 643 3429 1521 
2002 3414 1013 2906 1693 
2003 3125 1014 2563 1795 
 
Zacks’ coverage of annual management earnings forecasts ranges from about 2% to 32% of 
First Call. Zacks’ coverage of quarterly management earnings forecasts ranges from about 12% 
to 70% of First Call. The Zacks coverage for quarterly management earnings forecasts 
improves after 2000, coinciding with the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure which 
prohibits disclosure of material information to select individuals. Overall, it can be seen that 
Zacks has much lower coverage than First Call, especially in the earlier periods, which is a 
possible reason why this thesis has a much smaller sample than the closest study, Yang (2012).  
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Appendix C: Adjusting Forecast News using the Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) Method 
 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) suggest that, for management earnings forecasts bundled with 
earnings announcements, the traditional forecast news measure calculated by taking the 
difference between the management earnings forecast and consensus analyst forecast is stale. 
This is because the earnings surprise unveiled at earnings announcements affects analyst 
expectations of the next period’s earnings. They propose using a conditional forecast news 
measure which is estimated as follows.45 First-stage regression: 
 
P(Bundled=1) = α0 + α1MEF_ISSUED + α2LAST_BUNDLED 
   + α3GOOD_EA_NEWS + α4BAD_EA_NEWS + α5ABS_EA_NEWS 
   + α6 LOSS + α7 ANALYST_DISP 
   + α8 PRIOR_RETURN + α9 MVE + α10 ANALYST_COV 
   + α11 PROP_MOB + YEAR + INDUSTRY + ε 
 
(C.1) 
 
Bundled is an indicator variable equal to one if there is a management earnings forecast issued 
in the three-day window surrounding the earnings announcement. MEF_ISSUED is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a management earnings forecast had been previously issued 
for the earnings announced. LAST_BUNDLED is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
management earnings forecast had been previously issued at the last earnings announcement. 
GOOD_EA_NEWS is an indicator variable equal to one for earnings surprises (actual earnings 
                                               
45 The Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) model includes an indicator variable that identifies earnings 
announcements that are concurrent with conference calls. Similar to Billings et al. (2015), this variable is omitted 
from the model because I did not have access to conference call data. 
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minus analyst estimates) greater than 0.0001 and BAD_EA_NEWS is an indicator variable 
equal to one for earnings surprises (actual earnings minus analyst estimates) less than -0.0001. 
ABS_EA_NEWS is the absolute value of the earnings surprise (actual earnings minus analyst 
estimate). LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one for negative reported earnings. 
ANALYST_DISP is the standard deviation of analyst estimates for current period’s earnings. 
PRIOR_RETURN is the cumulative stock return over the 90-day period ending three trading 
days prior to the earnings announcement. MVE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
value of equity three days prior to the earnings announcement. ANALYST_COV is the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts covering the firm. PROP_MOB is the percentage of the 
last four earnings announcements that the firm met or beat analyst expectations. YEAR is the 
year of the earnings announcement. INDUSTRY is the 2-digit SIC code of the firm. 
 
Second-stage regression: 
 
ARNF = β + β1GOOD_EA_NEWS + β2BAD_EA_NEWS 
   + β3GOOD_EA_NEWS×EA_NEWS+ β4BAD_EA_NEWS×EA_NEWS 
   + β5PRIOR_RETURN + β6EA_NEWS×ABS_EA_NEWS 
   + β7EA_NEWS×MV_RANK + β8EA_NEWS×EP_RANK +β9P(Bundled) + εNF 
 
(C.2) 
ARNF is the equal to the mean analyst forecast revisions for the group of firms not providing 
management earnings forecasts, measured as the mean analyst estimate five trading days after 
the current period’s earnings announcement minus the mean analyst estimate immediately prior 
to the current period’s earnings announcement, scaled by lagged stock price. MV_RANK is 
the decile rank of the firm’s pre-earnings announcement market value. EP_RANK is the decile 
rank of the firm’s pre-earnings announcement earnings/price ratio. P(Bundled) is the predicted 
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probability of the firm issuing a management earnings forecast bundled with an earnings 
announcement, as estimated by the first-stage regression. 
 
A vector of coefficients from the non-forecasting group is obtained from Model (C.2) and 
applied to obtain a fitted value of ARF for the forecasting group, that is, an estimate of how 
analysts would have revised their estimates in the absence of management earnings forecasts. 
The conditional analyst forecast consensus is calculated as the pre-earnings announcement 
analyst forecast consensus plus the predicted revision. Conditional forecast news is then 
calculated as the difference between the management forecast and the conditional analyst 
forecast consensus. 
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Appendix D: Testing Hypothesis 1 using Yang (2012) Estimation Period and Alternative Test 
Periods 
 
Yang (2012) examines the association between manager-specific forecast accuracy and the 
stock market reaction per unit of forecast news. The Yang (2012) estimation period for 
manager fixed effects on forecast accuracy is 1996-2005 and the test period is 2006-2009. As 
previously discussed, the test period includes managers whose fixed effects are estimable 
during the estimation period and who also provide management earnings forecasts in the post-
estimation period. Results for Hypothesis 1 using the Yang (2012) study period are presented 
in Section 4.4.1.  
 
Table D1 presents the results using the Yang (2012) estimation period 1996-2005 and 
alternative test periods. Columns 1 and 2 present the results when the test period 2006-2010 is 
used. The number of observations when the 2006-2010 test period is used increases to 1,799 
with 105 unique managers. Columns 3 and 4 present the results when 2006-2011 test period is 
used. This increases the number of observations to 2,002 and 106 managers. Columns 5 and 6 
show the results when 2006-2012 test period is used which increases the number of 
observations to 2,234 with 107 managers. Finally, Columns 7 and 8 show the results when test 
period 2006-2013 is used. The number of observations when test period 2006-2013 is used is 
2,645 with 110 managers. 
 
Overall, results are similar to those obtained in Table 14 when test period 2006-2009 is used. 
As seen in Columns 1 to 8, there does not seem to be a significant association between manager 
fixed effects on accuracy and the stock market reaction per unit of forecast news 
(RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×NEWS). When firm fixed effects on accuracy are included in the 
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models as controls, RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×NEWS remains positive and significant, 
similar to results obtained when the test period is 2006-2009. This suggests that the market 
reacts more strongly to forecast news issued by firms with a historic propensity to issue more 
accurate forecasts.  
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Table D 1 Testing Hypothesis 1 using Yang (2012) study period and alternative test periods 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  2006-2010 2006-2010 2006-2011 2006-2011 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2013 2006-2013 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 
            
RAW_NEWS + 4.826*** 6.638*** 5.455*** 6.767*** 4.773*** 6.236*** 3.845*** 4.981*** 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.638) (0.924) (0.820) (0.951) (0.605) (0.400) (0.452) (0.293) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU×RAW_NEWS + -0.196 -0.072 -0.174 -0.127 0.069 0.068 0.204 0.214 
  (0.389) (0.757) (0.395) (0.536) (0.682) (0.682) (0.193) (0.172) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ?  0.004**  0.004*  0.005***  0.005*** 
   (0.043)  (0.060)  (0.009)  (0.004) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU×RAW_NEWS +  0.607**  0.518**  0.509**  0.421** 
   (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.027) 
SIZE ? 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003* 0.000 -0.003* 
  (0.692) (0.235) (0.813) (0.240) (0.935) (0.074) (0.863) (0.057) 
SIZE×RAW_NEWS + -0.345** -0.770*** -0.407*** -0.739*** -0.383*** -0.717*** -0.314** -0.586*** 
  (0.035) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001) 
F_LOSS ? -0.013 -0.017 -0.018* -0.021** -0.015 -0.018* -0.015 -0.018** 
  (0.237) (0.122) (0.078) (0.037) (0.128) (0.060) (0.101) (0.042) 
F_LOSS×RAW_NEWS - -1.189* -1.752*** -1.338** -1.738*** -0.974* -1.374** -1.116** -1.436*** 
  (0.060) (0.009) (0.026) (0.005) (0.072) (0.015) (0.034) (0.008) 
ROA ? -0.051* -0.047* -0.041 -0.037 -0.022 -0.018 -0.030 -0.026 
  (0.052) (0.073) (0.102) (0.138) (0.343) (0.450) (0.161) (0.231) 
ROA×RAW_NEWS + 9.072*** 7.903*** 9.419*** 8.336*** 5.719*** 5.303** 3.724* 3.425* 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.064) (0.091) 
HORIZON ? 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.006 0.007* 
  (0.315) (0.236) (0.288) (0.215) (0.152) (0.098) (0.123) (0.078) 
HORIZON×RAW_NEWS - -0.690 -0.566 -0.815 -0.566 -0.545 -0.359 -0.269 -0.112 
  (0.308) (0.403) (0.191) (0.370) (0.338) (0.529) (0.622) (0.838) 
Constant  0.003 0.009 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.006 
  (0.818) (0.437) (0.793) (0.451) (0.955) (0.514) (0.880) (0.521) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1,799 1,799 2,002 2,002 2,234 2,234 2,465 2,465 
Adj R-squared   0.026 0.031 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.042 0.039 0.043 
This table provides the results when the Yang (2012) hypothesis is tested using Yang (2012) estimation period 1996-2005 and alternative test periods starting from 2006-
2010 and ending with 2006-2013. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix E: Testing Hypothesis 1 using All Performance Measures and Yang (2012) 
Estimation and Test Period 
 
As previously mentioned, Yang (2012) examines the relation between manager-specific 
forecast accuracy and the stock market reaction per unit of forecast news. Table E1 below 
provides the results using all manager-specific forecast performance (accuracy, frequency and 
width) measures when the Yang (2012) estimation period of 1995-2005 and test period of 
2006-2009 is used. 
 
Table E 1 Results using all performance measures and the Yang (2012) study period 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 2006-2009 
VARIABLES   CAR(-1,1) 
 
 
    
NEWS + -0.312 -1.147 -0.240 -1.883* 
 
 (0.626) (0.198) (0.692) (0.066) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU ? 0.001   -0.001 
 
 (0.674)   (0.716) 
RANK_FE_MGR_ACCU*NEWS + -0.017   -0.019 
 
 (0.849)   (0.836) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ ?  -0.000  -0.001 
 
 
 (0.903)  (0.668) 
RANK_FE_MGR_FREQ*NEWS +  0.089  0.086 
 
 
 (0.280)  (0.311) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH ?   0.002 0.003 
 
 
  (0.231) (0.249) 
RANK_FE_MGR_WIDTH*NEWS +   0.028 0.032 
 
 
  (0.719) (0.699) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU ? 0.006**   0.002 
 
 (0.025)   (0.705) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_ACCU*NEWS + -0.087   -0.072 
 
 (0.489)   (0.689) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ ?  0.001  0.000 
 
 
 (0.671)  (0.990) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_FREQ*NEWS +  0.145  0.197* 
 
 
 (0.135)  (0.058) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH ?   0.005** 0.005 
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  (0.014) (0.223) 
RANK_FE_FIRM_WIDTH*NEWS +   -0.028 -0.055 
 
 
  (0.758) (0.691) 
SIZE ? -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 
 (0.517) (0.160) (0.869) (0.646) 
SIZE*NEWS + 0.034 0.034 -0.005 0.137 
 
 (0.733) (0.641) (0.947) (0.232) 
F_LOSS ? -0.032** -0.031** -0.033** -0.033** 
 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023) 
F_LOSS*NEWS - -1.100* -1.251* -1.204* -1.182* 
 
 (0.093) (0.054) (0.065) (0.076) 
ROA ? -0.031 -0.035 -0.028 -0.032 
 
 (0.354) (0.301) (0.403) (0.350) 
ROA*NEWS + 2.839* 2.155 2.562* 2.273 
 
 (0.051) (0.133) (0.077) (0.130) 
HORIZON ? 0.010* 0.010 0.010 0.010* 
 
 (0.093) (0.109) (0.105) (0.097) 
HORIZON*NEWS - 0.304 0.289 0.339 0.328 
 
 (0.390) (0.416) (0.338) (0.357) 
Constant  -0.008 -0.023 -0.019 -0.011 
 
 (0.586) (0.277) (0.182) (0.630) 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 
Adj R-squared   0.008 0.006 0.009 0.007 
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